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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to demonstrate the
usefulness of the concept of public participation to the
areas of forecasting stock market and security trends.

The

concept was applied to forecasting trends for both the
aggregate market and individual securities in order to de
termine whether or not there was application to either area
or to both areas.

It was hypothesized that the public

majority was usually wrong in the stock market.

This

hypothesis implied that a public majority was actually in
existence in the market, as well as an informed minority.
It was also implied that activities of the various groups
could be measured.

Empirical data used to test the hypothe

sis were taken from past stock market trading.
Several indicators guided the investigation.

The

Monthly Credit Balance, the Monthly Debit Balance, the
Balance Index, and the Short Sales Index were the primary
indicators employed to test the aggregate market.

Respective

ly, these indicators represented the round-lot public, the
professional speculator, the odd-lot public, and the odd-lot
short seller.

By testing these indicators, each of the

different groups present in the market was tested.

The

indicators were determined for time periods surrounding each
market juncture from 1956 to 1967,
ix

Since one's financial

acumen is seriously tested at each reversal of trend in the
market, the astuteness of the public was tested primarily
at the junctures.

A portion of each trend was also covered.

The following conclusions were reached with regard to
the aggregate market:
1.

The public was usually wrong at the critical
junctures in the market.
However, they were
right during a portion of the trends.

2.

Although the public was essentially correct in
purchasing securities at the bottom, they were
incorrect in selling securities at the beginning
of the advance.

3.

The public illustrated an apparent skepticism
for new trends until these trends became well
established.

4.

The majority apparently was induced to partici
pate by news, tips, and advisory services.
Such inducements seemed to be too late to be of
real value.

Since odd-lot data are available on some individual
securities, the concept of public participation was applied
to individual issues.

The following conclusions were reached

with regard to individual securities:
1.

Heavy public buying usually weakened the stock
technically, thus restricting its advance or
resulting in a downward movement.

2.

Heavy public (odd-lot) selling generally
strengthened the stock technically, thus fostering
an upward move or restricting a move on the
downside.

3.

Odd-lot data seemed to be more meaningful when
used in conjunction with the relative strength
measurement.
x

On the basis of these conclusions, the hypothesis
of the study was accepted with qualification.

The public

was generally wrong, but it was primarily wrong at the
critical junctures or turning points of the market.

The

public was generally correct during a portion of the major
trend.

This study did prove that an informed minority and

an uninformed majority do exist in the stock market.

It

is recognized that more work is needed on the public par
ticipation concept, but it is believed that the present
research has suggested areas of further investigation.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I find more and more that
it is well to be on the side of
the minority, since it is always
the more intelligent.
-- Goethe
Garfield A. Drew, a keen student of stock market
psychology, says, "Every successful speculator and every
student of psychology knows that the mass of people are
less intelligent than the few."1

Drew asserts that "...

only 5 percent of the population think for themselves,
10 percent copy the 5 percent, and 85 percent believe what
they read and hear, and do what they are told."

2

From D r e w ’s observations, one could conceivably
classify people into three distinct categories:
imitators, and incompetents.

innovators,

Therefore, success apparently

is reserved for those who have the creativity and ability
to think and reason for themselves.

^■Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit in the Stock
Market (Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 196&),
p. T6$.
2Ibid., p. 170.

Humphrey B. Neill, the Vermont Ruminator and the
world's foremost contrarian, says there are but "three
types of thinkers--thoughtful, thoughtless, and emotional."

3

Neill's statement obviously lends credence to the thoughts
and theories of Drew.

If one is thoughtful, he is an inno

vator (5 percent) and thinks for himself;

if one is thought

less, he lacks the ability to think and has to resort to
being an imitator (10 percent); and if he implements
decisions which are based on emotion, he is an incompetent
(85 percent).
The aforementioned three terms may be applicable to
most segments of society, but special attention will be
focused on the stock market.

These emotional and thought

less opinions probably have been dissipated widely from
"imitation and contagion."

A

Since individuals are categorized in accordance with
their thought processes, behavior patterns, and actions in
society, it would doubtless be helpful to attempt to
classify stock market participants on a similar basis in
connection with their activities in the market.

If such

categories also have application to the stock market, one

3Humphrey B. Neill, The Art of Contrary Thinking
(Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, X t d ., 1963), p. 136.
4These terms have been borrowed from an eminent French
Sociologist who authored an interesting treatise on mob or
crowd actions and behavior patterns.
For a treatment and
development of these concepts, see Gustave LeBon, The Crowd
(New York: The viking Press, Inc., 1966).
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may develop a valuable forecasting tool to aid in the
determination of market trends.

By acting concurrently

with the informed 5 percent, one should enjoy success in
the stock maVket.
I.

CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTORS

Graham, Dodd, and Cottle state that, "It would be most
useful to classify security buyers into two groups-defensive investors and aggressive or enterprising in
v e s t o r s . T h e y further state that "Defensive investors
are those who should place their chief emphasis upon
freedom from effort, annoyance, and the necessity for making
frequent investment decisions."6

The distinguishing feature

of the aggressive or enterprising investor "is their
willingness and ability to devote time and care to the
selection of sound and attractive investments."

*7

Although these classifications are generally accepted
throughout the investment field, they will not be employed
in this study.

If one were willing to circumvent precise

interpretation of the above terms, it might be feasible to
accept these classifications.

However, if innovators,

imitators, and incompetents are actually present in the

^Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle,
Security Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
I n c ., 1^62) , jp. 56.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., p. 67.

stock market, other classifications must be devised.
According to Drew, Neill,® and Walter A. Heiby,^ there are
three much more appropriate categories to portray the
general characteristics of security buyers.

These three

types of market participants can be grouped roughly into
the following divisions:
1.

Investors.

The investors are individuals who are

primarily seeking dividend income and long-term
appreciation as opposed to dividend income plus
immediate capital appreciation.

This classification

encompasses the "defensive investors" who lack the
time, knowledge, and ability to engage competently in
security analysis or market analysis for a livelihood
or to any greater degree than a part-time basis.
Industrial corporations, corporate pension funds,
mutual funds, and other institutional investors are to
be included under this classification.
2.

Professionals.

The professionals are the real

elite of the market place.

They are the minority or

5 percent, the innovators mho think for themselves.
Professionals supposedly do not place reliance on news,

Q

See Humphrey B. Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics
(Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publxsning Company, I960).
o
See Walter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through
Dynamic Synthesis (Chicago, Illinois: The Institute of
Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., 1965).
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tips, and gossip to enjoy stock market success.

Pro

fessionals are allegedly not swayed by "propaganda"
in the execution of their decisions.

A very inter

esting analogy can be drawn between investment
professionals and golf professionals.

Both groups are

in the minority and thrive on the majority for their
living.

Golf pros sell their services and advice for

exorbitant prices to the uninformed majority of golfers
who have illusions of shooting par.

Investment pro

fessionals likewise sell their large inventories of
securities at exorbitant prices to the uninformed
majority who dream of stock market fortunes.

In effect,

investment professionals apparently buy securities at
wholesale prices and sell them at retail prices to the
unknowing majority.

The public, or the alleged imi

tators and thoughtless, theoretically buy high and
sell low, the converse of stock market Utopia.
Included in the professional category are the
intelligent speculators, stock exchange floor-traders,
investment bankers,

large investors, and a few small

investors who are conversant with predictive techniques
and have the foundation and framework to forecast
market trends and security trends with a reasonable
degree of accuracy.

Also included as professionals

are the "insiders," who are executives of large, wellestablished corporations, and who are in the strategic
position to act upon news pertaining to their corpora
tion before it is published.

6
3.

Public.

According to Neill, Drew, and Heiby, this

group is largely composed of the 85 percent, the u n 
thinking majority.

It consists of the millions of

ill-advised, uninformed investors and speculators,
including many businessmen speculators, brokerageoffice traders, and the many thousands of gullible
amateurs who are deluded into thinking they can
capitalize on "easy money" opportunities.

Many members

of the majority can probably be detected by their
habitual trading in odd-lot quantities, or quantities
which number less than one hundred shares.

Although

there are some astute odd lotters, the odd-lot traders
in the aggregate are reputed to lack the financial
acumen of the professionals.
Groups two and three will tend to dominate discussion
throughout the investigation.

It

is a premise of thisstudy

that the "investors" do not purchase

in quantities which are

commensurate with the quantities purchased by the pro
fessionals and the public.

The defensive, conservative

investors could not possibly purchase even a small fraction
of the stocks which are exchanged
II.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY

in one day alone.
OF THE STOCK MARKET

In view of the many pronounced bull and bear markets
of previous periods, there apparently exists a profound
feeling of obligation among most market analysts to detect
these trends prior to their actual inception.

When one

delves into the area of forecasting stock-market trends, it
becomes self-evident that there exists a major dichotomy
cmcng the prediction doctrines.
On the one hand, there is the doctrine of the funda
mentally-oriented analyst who bases his prognosis on such
factors as earnings, dividends, book values, economic out
looks, company outlooks, industry outlooks, and government
contracts.

In addition, he is concerned with price-earnings

ratios, rates of capitalization, sales of durable goods,
production indexes, and governmental attitudes and outlooks.
The doctrine of technical thought, on the other hand, does
not include many of the factors which are so revered by the
fundamentalist.

The technician is occupied with such

factors as charts, price, volume, short position, odd-lot
statistics, and breadth of market data.
It is doubtful that the fundamental approach could be
useful as the major approach in this study, because funda
mentalists give little or no consideration to the partici
pation of the public in their prognosis of future market
gyrations.

The technical approach, by its emphasis on odd-

lot statistics, debit balances, and credit balances,
provides the market analyst with a better conceptual frame
work of public participation which may be useful in rendering
future projections.

Garfield Drew advocates the technical

approach by stating:
There have been frequent
analysis was the only thing
given the correct answer to
market. This was true, for

occasions when technical
that could possibly have
the future trend of the
example, in the spring

8
of 1946.
If any investor had then possessed a
crystal ball which would have shown him what
corporate earnings were to be a year later, he
could only have concluded that stock prices
would be considerably higher.
Instead, they
were substantially lower in the face of record
earnings and dividends.
To rebuff the non-believers, other examples may be cited.
From 1950 to 1952, there was a complete divergence between
earnings and the Dow-Jones Industrial Average.

The earning

power of the Industrials dropped from $30.70 in 1950 to
$24.78 in 1952.

During the same time span, the Industrial

Average rose eighty-five points.

Had one adhered solely to

the fundamentals, he would have abstained from the market
at a time when it counted most to participate.
It is also meaningful to investigate the situation in
1957 and 1958.

The earning power of the Dow-Jones

Industrials dropped from $36.08 in 1957 to $27.95 in 1958.
A concurrent drop was also registered in dividends, as they
dipped from $21.61 in 1957 to $20.00 in 1958.

For the

complete 1957-58 period, the Industrial Average climbed
109 points.

Fundamentals alone apparently do not suffice.

Other examples could be cited, but it is now time to
turn attention to other matters of concern.

The discussion

will now center around the scope of the study.

10Drew, o£. c i t .,- p. 242.
^ T h e s e examples are derived from data taken from
selected issues of Barron's National Business and Financial
We e k l y .
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III.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The objective of this investigation is to determine the
actual perspicacity of the stock market majority or the socalled ''public” investors.

It has often been theorized that

the informed fern are much more apprised of developments and
happenings than are the uninformed majority.

This investi

gation will concentrate on testing the application of the
above proposition in the stock market.

Although much

interest is devoted to the area of forecasting market trends
and security trends, primary attention will be focused on
the public and its importance in determining such trends.
Now that the scope of the problem has been explored,
it is necessary to determine the limitations which will be
imposed on the study.
IV.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

As in most studies concerning the stock market, various
limitations are involved.

The investigation has benefitted

very much from the brilliance of hindsight.

It is an

eternal truism that perception is much keener in retrospect
than in prospect.

Dr. Sloan J. Wilson, eminent market

author and Professor of Medicine at Kansas University
School of Medicine, says that "the retrospectroscope is one
of the most infallible diagnostic instruments known."

12

■*-2Sloan J. Wilson, Public participation in the Stock
Market (Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 1966),
17.

10
To be sure, hindsight is very revealing.

After all, the

practice of medicine is predicated almost completely on
events which have occurred in the past.

Although some un-

know ni ng individuals possess adamant attitudes toward the
importance and value of hindsight, many successful specu
lators view the "retrospectroscope" as the surest way to
profit.

It is perhaps the unwritten creed of successful

speculators that success is based on the supposition that
people (namely tne public majority) will continue in the
future to make the same mistakes that they have in the past.
Neill, however, takes exception to any form of extra
polation concerning the stock market or the economy.
Extrapolation, as defined by Webster, is "to project by
inference into an unexplored situation from observations in
an explored field, on assumption of continuity or corre
spondence."

Neill concedes that statistical extrapolation

is of real advantage, but he states that "the distinction
when and when not to trust extrapolation would arise when
the human factor is involved." 13

Neill continues by

stating:
That it is a fallacy to rely upon extrapolation
in making economic forecasts becomes evident, I
believe, when you stop to realize that what is
occurring at any given time may be the cause of a
complete shift and reversal of the extrapolated
trends.
Obviously, this is witnessed in the
revolutions of the business cycle:
a boom brings
on a bust (or used to!) and the lesser gyrations.^-4

*3Neill, o£. c i t ., p. 169.
14Ibid., pp. 169-170.
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According to Neill, extrapolation is perhaps most
dangerous when it falls into the hands of the majority.

He

says that the majority of people are characteristically
optimistic and bullish.

As a result, they are inclined to

extrapolate the prosperity and buoyancy of the present.
Societal conditions in the future are perceived by the
majority as an extension of themselves, where perennial
optimism reigns supreme.
very short memory.

Consequently, most people have a

However, as Santayana once said:

"He

who cannot remember the past is condemned to repeat it."15
Despite some uncertainty in the assumption that history
will repeat itself, it is wise to review the enunciation of
the immortal Patrick Henry:

"I have but one lamp by which

my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience.

I

know of no way of judging the future but by the past."1^
Heiby asserts:

"No science can ever give an exact picture

of the universe... Perfection in the understanding of the
laws of nature is an impossible goal."

17

Reliance on hindsight should be construed as a limi
tation in this study.

To reiterate, however, retrospect

has been very beneficial in the past.

One should recall an

old aphorism that reads, "The best prophet of the future is
the past."

15
As quoted by Karl N. Kaiser, "Timing Technology,"
Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques (Larchmont, New
Y o r k : Investors Intelligence^ Inc., 1965), p. 465.
16From Patrick H e n r y ’s speech given in the Virginia
House of Delegates, March 23, 1775.
17Heiby, o|>. c i t . , p. 10.
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V.

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Debit balances, credit balances, and odd-lot data are
employed in the study to depict the participation of the
public at critical junctures in the market.

The data will

be used in conjunction with the Standard and Poor's Average
to determine whether or not public activity is indeed a
valuable forecasting tool.
are either leading,

It can be stated that indicators

lagging, or coincident.

By means of

charts and tables, the aforementioned data will be analyzed
to judge the type of indicator represented by the data.
The charts and tables will be employed from 1956 to
June, 1967.

Such an extended period is representative,

since it will encompass major market cycles and trends.
There will be major trends, reactions, and sharp reversals
to witness and apply the indicators.

All data will be

analyzed at the critical junctures of the market from 1956
to June, 1967.

The analysis of each market juncture during

the above time interval will help one draw a conclusion as
to the validity and reliability of the indicators.

In

addition, the financial acumen of the public or majority
will be subjected to close scrutiny.
Many individuals feel that forecasting market trends
is analogous to forecasting the weather--there is nothing
that one can do about it.

This study takes exception to

such a statement and will seek to disprove it.
Since the data for the Debit Balances and Credit

13
■alances are published monthly, they are employed on a
monthly basis.

Odd-lot data have been converted to a meekly

basis, although such data may be obtained daily.

All indi

cators are employed prior to each juncture, coincident with
the juncture, and immediately following each juncture.
In addition to the data employed for purposes of fore
casting the aggregate market, odd-lot data are also
to individual securities.

applied

Such data are available on a

weekly basis, but they are utilized quarterly to determine
the effect of public participation on individual securities
as well as the aggregate market.

Stocks which are charac

terized by heavy public participation during a quarterly
interval are grouped together for each quarter from June,
1965, to June, 1967.

The same procedure is then applied

for those stocks which are characterized by a lack of public
activity or interest.

Then, stocks are randomly selected

from each of the two groups to determine the effect of
public interest on the market performance of the stock.
The testing period for individual securities encompasses
two bull markets and one bear market, providing an ample
framework to test the theory of public participation with
individual stocks.
Thus, the methodology employed should marshall to
gether the data and facts and make the investigation very
intelligible.

In addition, the analysis may prove to be a

valuable technical approach in forecasting market trends,
which is in turn an essential ingredient in the analysis
of any individual security.

14
Attention now turns to the preview to the presentation
and to the sequence of employment of the aforementioned
indicators.
VI.

PREVIEW TO THE PRESENTATION

As was seen earlier in this section, people supposedly
lend themselves to certain definable categories.

It is

hypothesized that the stock market also possesses the imi
tators and the thoughtless, the non-thinking 95 percent.
This group will be termed the crowd or public.

Throughout

the investigation, these two terms will be used interchangably.

The remaining 5 percent, the innovators or the

thinkers, are termed professionals.

This study will try to

determine whether or not there is in fact a professional
element or informed minority in the stock market.

If pro

fessionals are in existence, they are to be segregated from
the crowd because they have the distinct ability to think,
to supplant emotion with judgment, and to dissuade them
selves from being led astray by propaganda designed to
disillusion the m ass es.

If there is actually an informed

minority in the stock market, then the public or majority is
doubtless victimized.

If public constituents are victimized,

they apparently lack creativity and the ability to think and
are thus easily swayed by advice and propaganda.
Chapter II deals with the "opinions of others" on the
basic actions of crowds.

The opinions of eminent authors

are essentially studied to provide a conceptual framework
of crowd conduct, especially during manias.

The factor of

15
human emotion is investigated to ascertain influences on
both the professional element and the crowd or public.
Chapter II also seeks to determine from other opinions
which group is truly objective, and what role the concept
of objectivity plays in successful stock market participa
tion.
Chapter II also contains a brief discussion of the
"Theory of Contrary Thinking," formulated by Humphrey Neill.
Although Neill is not a market analyst or technician, many
expert analysts believe that there is definite applicability
of this theory to the stock market.

Opinions of other

authors are then explored to determine the possible effect
of news, tips, advice, and brokers on both the professional
and public elements.
Chapter III marks the beginning of the empirical evi
dence used to test the hypothesis.

This chapter concerns

the debit and Credit Balances, an area which has undergone
little investigation thus far.

Both Balances are investi

gated at all market junctures in order to determine their
usefulness as an indicator.

From the analysis, it should be

possible to derive a relationship between the balances and
the market trends and reversals.

It will be determined

whether the Balances are leading, lagging, or coincident
indicators.
Chapter IV investigates the Odd-Lot Theory and the
thesis that the "little man" is always wrong in the market.
Odd-lot indicators are tested on a weekly basis at critical
market junctures to see if the theory has any validity.
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Correlation between the odd-lot data and market trends will
be revealed.
Chapter V seeks to determine whether or not the OddLot Theory is applicable to situations involving individual
securities.

Tests are applied to the securities on a

quarterly basis for a period of two years to determine
whether or not odd-lot data are actually a worthwhile indi
cator of security trends for the technical student of the
stock market.
Chapter VI attempts to synthesize all of the previously
mentioned indicators and determine the over-all importance
of public participation in the stock market.

Judgment will

be passed as to which indicator is the most efficient,
which indicators give the first and most reliable signal at
tops and bottoms, and which indicator best serves as a
warning to detect the entrance of the public.
In conclusion, it is hypothesized that the role of the
participation by the uninformed majority is an essential
criterion in predicting future market moves as well as
trends for individual issues.

The problem is to determine

the extent that the uninformed majority affects the stock
market, if such a group does in fact exist.

It is also of

major interest to see how the crowd acts during typical
bull and bear markets, as well as during the recurring
secondary reactions.

Conduct of the masses is closely

scrutinized at market junctures, the critical points where
the market is headed for a pronounced reversal of trend.
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Finally, a sharp eye is focused on the public's degree of
participation at bull market tops and bear market bottoms
in order to test and judge their timing, astuteness, and
over-all market acumen.
Before the participation of the public can be analyzed
from a technical standpoint, the groundwork must be laid to
gain a basic insight into the general conduct of crowds.
Such groundwork will be formed by devoting special attention
to analyses of crowd action by others who have witnessed
the speculative manias of the past.

By understanding crowd

actions and behavior, it will expedite the understanding of
public behavior in the stock market.

CHAPTER II

EXPERT OPINIONS ON PUBLIC BEHAVIOR
Where all think alike,
no one thinks very much.
-- Walter Lippmann
According to Henry H. Harper,* the stock market is one
of the better examples of crowd action, non-thinking, and
conformity.

As Harper once said:

There are four subjects on which advice, however
good, is generally wasted— politics, stock specula
tion, religion, and love; for in these matters
grown-ups rarely follow the advice of others, and
when they do, if they profit by it they take all
the credit to themselves, whereas if they lose they
always blame the adviser.2
Harper contends that the above represents the universal
and inexorable laws of human nature.

Before delving into

public participation in the stock market, it is necessary
to check them against the empirical evidence presented later
in this study.

*See Henry H. Harper, The Psychology of speculation
(Wells, Vermont;
Fraser Publishing Company, 1966).
2Ibid., p. 14.
3 Ibid.
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I.

CROWD PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

In speaking of an agglomeration of individuals, Gustave
LeBon says:

"A collective mind is formed, doubtless transi4
tory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics.*'

LeBon continues by asserting that a crowd "...forms a single
being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of
c

r

o

w

d

s

.

in another of his brilliant treatises on crowd

behavior, LeBon states that "...the convictions of the
crowd always tend to assume a religious form.

The masses

are devoid equally of skepticism and of the critical
spirit."6

In referring to blind acceptance and non-thinking

by crowds, LeBon asserts that a creed accepted by a collec
tive group "...is always adopted without discussion, and
7
fervently venerated."
According to Neill, the characteristic of collectivism
has frequently precluded people from success in the past.
In his famed column The Ruminator, Neill says "Individuals
are influenced to act as a herd on popular, intangible

4Gustave LeBon, The Crowd
I n c., 1966).

(New York:

The viking Press,

5Ibid.
6Gustave LeBon, The Psychology of Socialism (Wells,
Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company,“T965) , p". 86.
7 Ibid.
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questions.'*

Neill contends that people are gregarious by

their very nature.

Perhaps it is nan's reliance on others

to think for him that prompted Drew to point out that 85
percent of the people believe what they read and hear.
LeBon asserts that crowd opinions are frequently illfounded and ill-timed because of the concepts of "imitation
and contagion."

Neill

9

and LeBon contend that an idea b e 

comes implanted in the minds of the imitators and the
thoughtless.

Their thesis terms this point the imitation

stage, where seeds of cursory thought generally bloom into
colorful, dogmatic opinion.

From the imitation stage, the

idea or thought then becomes popularized through contagion.
Neill says that as contagion spreads, the public or majority
"has but three ways to think:

PC6ITIVE, SPECIFIC, AND

DOGMATIC."10
The point made by Neill and LeBon is that submission
to popular thought will ultimately remove individualism and
creativity.
stating:

LeBon assails conformity and crowd conduct by

"All that has gone to make the greatness of

civilizations:

sciences, arts, philosophies, religions,

military power, etc., has been the work of individuals and
not of aggregates."11
Q
H. B. Neill, The Ruminator (March, 1967).
9See Humphrey B. Neill, The Art of Contrary Thinking
(Caldwell, Idaho: The Carton Printers, L i d ,, 1963).
10Ibid., pp. 140-141.
i:LLeBon, The Psychology of Socialism, o p . c i t . , p. 25.
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Bernard Baruch, a Wall Street scholar and one of the
world's foremost authorities on crowd behavior, once
asserted:
I think that the depression of 1929 was due more
to a world madness and delusion than anything else.
It was somewhat similar to the Tulip Craze, The
Mississippi Bubble, and the South Sea Bubble. The
world seems to go mad at times, and has extraordi
nary delusions or crowd madness. 2
Crowd madness has been present in these manias and in
many more.

13

Baruch continues by saying that much of the

crowd delusion is centered around "great speculative madness."

14

It xs very appropriate here to cite Schiller's

great dictum:

"Anyone taken as an individual is tolerably

sensible and reasonable--as a member of a crowd, he at once
becomes a blockhead."*5
Most of the aforementioned individuals were scholars
who ruminated over ideas rather than blindly subscribing to
a thought or idea.

Baruch believed that many popular

thoughts were tossed up as bait for the unthinking majority.

12

Bernard M. Baruch, "Madness of the Crowd," A Treasury
of Wall Street W i s d o m , edited by Harry D. Schultz and Ramson
CosTow (Palisades Park, New Jersey:
Investors' Press, Inc.,
1966), p. 164.
^^For an interesting treatment of crowd participation
in past manias, see Charles MacKay, Memoirs of Extraordinary
Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds IfNew Y o r k :
L. C. Page & Company, 19667"]!
14Baruch,

loc. c i t .

^ C i t e d by Baruch in the Foreword of the book by
Charles MacKay, op. cit ., p. xiii.
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Such belief once prompted Baruch to remark:
I think much of the legislation to prevent
incompetency and corrupt practices in the sale
of securities and regulation is good.
The
laws ought to be strengthened that will protect
the public when they are in these periods of
madness such as in 1929 and the Florida Boom.
That is going to be a difficult thing.
The
world has been struck with those things over
and over again...Whatever men attempt they seem
driven to try to overdo.
Judging from the commentaries on crowd participation
in the debacles of yesteryear, it seems as if the crowd
moves with a unanimity of thought.
Unanimity of Opinion
Harry D. Schultz says that "You need not fear being
contrary to any unanimous thinking, even when it occurs
among experts."

17

The preceding statement serves admirably

as a possible explanation for the public's participation in
the mass manias of time.

Baruch always contended that the

majority or public was ruled by its susceptibility to mass
thinking.

Consequently, Baruch alleged that the majority

always entered speculative manias well after their incep
tion.

According to Baruch's theory, the public or majority

engaged in speculative endeavors at their zenith because
they had been carried away by mass feeling, emotion, and
sentiment.

As these manias peaked and began to subsequently

^ B a r u c h , o|>. c i t ., p. 164.
^ H a r r y D. Schultz, Bear Markets: How to Survive and
Make Money in Them (Englewood Cli f f s , N.J.:
Prentice-Hall,
Inc.,“ 1956), pi 173.
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fizzle, the public participated fully all the way down the
decline.
Unanimity of thought or opinion is apparently one of
the greatest obstacles to success in the stock market.

Neill

says, "When everybody thinks alike, everyone is likely to be
wrong."

18

Another of the astute observers of public psy

chology is Peter Wyckoff, who states, " ... if everybody
were truly intelligent, no one would sell too cheaply or
pay too much, and the result would be that wide price swings
would not occur."
Need For Leadership
LeBon contends that most people want to be led and want
to avoid thinking.

LeBon states:

ever doing without a master."

20

"A crowd is incapable of
Neill agrees with LeBon

and proposes that people have an obvious distaste for
thinking.

Neill contends that the crowd or public in the

stock market is continually deluded or led astray by news,
tips, advisory services, and the omnipresent "experts" who
occupy chairs in every brokerage office.

21

As a result of

people's distaste for thinking, they want to be told what

18

H. B. Neill, The Ruminator

(January, 1967).

^^Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Ha"Il, Inc. , 1966) ,
p. 123.
20
LeBon, The C r o w d , o p . c i t . , p. 118.
21

For a treatment of this thesis, see H. B. Neill,
Tape Reading and Market Tactics (Wells, Vermont:
Fraser
Pu d 1ishing Com pa ny"J I95oy"I
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to do.

The public, according to Neill, desires leadership,

regardless of its quality.
II.

THE PUBLIC AND MARKET CYCLES

Since its inception, the stock market has been charac
terized by recurring cycles.

George C. Selden, an eminent

market analyst through the behavioral approach, says that
these cycles will continue "...as long as prices are fixed
by the competition of buyers and sellers, and as long as
22
human beings seek a profit and fear a loss."
Don Guyon,
a former broker of prominence on wall Street, asserts that
95 percent of the people are correct during a portion of
the trends, but incorrect at the important junctures.

23

Guyon further contends that there is a 95 percent majority
or public in the stock market.

Guyon says that such an

uninformed majority does in fact exist because "only 5 per
cent of the average brokerage firm's customers are able to
survive a complete market cycle."

24

R. W. McNeel contends that the public or majority is
nearly always wrong because they have a propensity to base

22George C. Selden, Psychology of the Stock Market
(Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing ^ompany^ TPSsyj p. 10.
^^Don Guyon, One-Way Pockets (Wells, Vermont:
Publishing Company*^ 1963) , pp. 5^7.
24Ibid.

Fraser
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their action on surface indications in the market, which
are usually wrong.

25

J. E. Granville states:

"The public

is always attracted to the obvious and thus the major timing
errors in the market are constantly being committed by the
public."

26

Timing errors are apparently the reason why most

members cannot survive in a complete market cycle.

Activity in a Bull Market
McNeel says that the market rise "always has its foundation in a sea of pessimism."

27

He asserts that the majority

of people are extremely pessimistic, and majority sentiment
is that they have been ruined after an extended decline in
stock prices.

Both Selden and McNeel assert that lagging

fundamental positions are created because the business cycle
follows the stock market cycle by several months.

C onse

quently, fundamentals will become much poorer only after
the market has bottomed out and remained low for some time.
Selden and McNeel both assail the public or majority for
rigid adherence to fundamentals, which are termed "surface
factors" by both authors.

McNeel belittles the action of

the majority at market bottoms because they have allowed

25

R. W. McNeel, Beating the Stock Market (Wells,
Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 1963), p. 39.
26J. E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market
Timing for Maximum ProfiT (EngiewootT-Cliffs, N . J . :
Prentice-Ha 11, Inc."^ 1^60) , p. 162.
27
McNeel, o£. c i t ., p. 40.
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their interest to wane at a time when enthusiasm should be
increasing.

McNeel states:

"Even when the market is on

bottom, the news from the business world grows more pessi
mistic, and the courage and inherent optimism of the public
in looking towards the future are almost entirely broken
down.”28
When the wave of pessimism prevails among the public or
majority,

the bull market is usually launched.

Granville and

Wyckoff call this stage the "accumulation” stage, where stock
29
is passing from weak hands to strong hands. Granville'
says that the informed minority or professional element is
responsible for the initial increases in a bull market.

As

the public dumps stocks, the strong hands of the profession
als are there to accumulate them.

McNeel and Selden believe

that most of these initial bull market advances are almost
imperceptible, and thus not obvious to the public constitu
ents.

McNeel states that during the early stages of an

advance, "Men of normal vision can see nothing particularly
encouraging in the outlook.”

30

McNeel also states that "The public normally does not
go into the market until it is well towards the upper levels
of the cycle.”

31

Selden and McNeel both maintain that

28Ibid.
2 % e e Granville, o£. c i t . , pp. 161-163.
30McNeel, o£. c i t ., p. 43.
3*1b i d . 9

p .

44.
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fundamentals are looking much better and serve
inducement for the public to participate.

as an

Schultz believes

that the entrance of the public is the result of news, tips,
and advice, which in turn fosters unanimity of thought.
Schultz states:

nSince mass thinking on any matter is

always tinged with exaggeration, it tends to be extremist
thinking.

This means that a reaction must come to erase

the extreme and restore balance." 32
In Neill's classic treatise, Tape Reading and Market
T a ctics, he states:

"The greatest public participation is

near and at the tops, because, as we have learned, rising
prices attract a following."

33

Harper says that bull market

tops seem to "pervade the country with an epidemic of
bullishness."

34

Harper says that at this point, majority

or public action is "directed by sentiment rather than
judgment."

35

Kelly and Burgess

3 £%

contend that public or majority

entrance into the stock market behooves the professional to
alter his course of action and pursue the opposite alterna
tive.

Harper believes that the majority or public is

3^Schultz, o£. c i t ., p. 170.
33Neill, op. cit., p. 47.
34Harper, oj>. c i t ., p. 82.

36Fred C. Kelly and Sullivan Burgess, How Shrewd
Speculators Win {Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company,

28
analogous to a herd of stampeded cattle rushing blindly
into a river or butting their heads against stone walls.
He states that under similar conditions in the stock market,
"men are but little saner than cattle."

37

Activity in a Bear Market
Granville38 contends that while the remainder of the
market has begun its downturn, the blue-chip securities
remain high and support many of the popular market averages.
He believes that the public places too much emphasis on
these stocks alone in trying to anticipate the general trend
of the market.

Since blue-chip securities are generally the

last to fall in a bear market and the last to rise in a bull
market, Granville's point apparently has much merit.
McNeel and Selden both believe that the lagging business
cycle is definitely an inducement factor, since fundamentals
are becoming stronger rather than weaker.

In addition,

Schultz assails the unanimity of public thought.

Granville

joins with the aforementioned three authors in asserting
that fundamental conditions of business and other obvious
attractions induce the uninformed majority to participate
at precisely the wrong time.

Granville states;

"If it's

obvxous to the public, then it's obviously wrong." 39

37

Harper, op. c i t ., p. 83.

38See Granville, o|>. c i t . , pp. 274-276.
39Ibid., p. 162.
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Wyckoff, Granville, and Schultz agree that the mass
entrance of the majority or public investors places the
market in an overbought position.

Granville states emphati

cally that "The market just cannot and will not accommodate
that many people."

40

The market reversal mentioned by

Schultz becomes a reality with the advent of heavy public
participation.

When the market becomes overbought and is

readying itself for a reversal, Wyckoff says that this is
the distribution stage, where stocks are passed from strong
41
hands to weak hands.
The minority or professional element
has liquidates its portfolios to the uninformed public
investors.
Bernard Baruch once contended that the minority was
never ruled by avarice, and they never attempted to depict
precise tops and bottoms.

Baruch once advised:

to buy at the bottom and sell at the top.
42
done--except by liars."

"Don't try

This can't be

Humphrey Neill says that it is characteristic of the
public to buy on market declines.

It is the opinion of

Neill, as well as others, that many public investors regard
the beginning of a downtrend or bear market as a "healthy
reaction."

40

Neill says, however, that "Many a healthy

Ib id.

4lSee Wyckoff, op. c i t ., pp. 195-196.
4^Baruch, "Baruch's Ten Rules," A Treasury of W a l 1
Street Wisdom, op. cit., p. 172.
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reaction has proved fatal." 43

The public is apparently

expanding its portfolios and showing disregard for the
downtrend because they believe it to be only a "healthy
react ion."
As a consequence of these "healthy reactions," lagging
blue-chips, and lagging business conditions, the public
apparently purchases most of the way down the decline.
McNeel says that the fact that everyone is so optimistic
over business reports and so unanimously confident that
prices cannot go lower precludes the majority from leaving
the market.

44

The cycle is subsequently renewed as the market hits
bottom, and pessimism pervades the ranks of the public.
Consequently, the majority sells at the bottom at precisely
the time they should be buying.
investors,

From the standpoint of

it is at best a very pernicious cycle.

Market Cycles
To reiterate, market cycles are regularly recurring
movements which will always be present in the stock market.
For the skeptics who endeavor to refute the theory of
cycles, it is worth while to recall the wonderful passage
in Byron's "Childe Harold":
Here is the moral of all human tales,
'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past;

43

Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit.,

p. 71.
44McNe ill, op. cit., p. 49.
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First freedom and then glory; when that fails
Wealth, vice, corruption, barbarism at last,
And history, with all her volumes vast,
Hath but one page.4 ^
Former editor of the W a l 1 Street Journal, William Peter
Hamilton,

lends further confirmation by remarking, "There

seems to be a cycle of panics and of times of prosperity."
Apparently, the majority or public investors have been
inadequate in depicting market junctures or reversals in
trend before their actual inception.

Then, an apparent

refusal to believe causes the majority of investors to
suffer from erosion of paper profits obtained by joining
the previous bull trend in the later stages.
the action of the majority or public,

To epitomize

it is perhaps best to

refer to the words of Robert L. Smitley, who states:

"The

mob is always extreme.

At first it believes that the New

Era will last forever.

Then it is satisfied that everything

is going to hell, and that we will have a hundred years of
economic struggle."47

4^Lord Byron, "Childe Harold," as quoted by William P.
Hamilton, The Stock Market Barometer (New York:
Richard
Russell Associates, 1960),
2^
46Ibid.
47Robert L. Smitley, Popular Financial Delusions
(Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 1^63}, p. 152.
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III.

HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY IN THE MARKET

Graham, Dodd, and Cottle comment that "The market is a
voting machine, whereon countless individuals register
choices which are the product partly of reason and partly of
emotion."

48

By the preceding statement, Graham, Dodd, and

Cottle infer that many individuals base their purchases upon
sentiment and emotion rather than reasoning and good common
sense.
From the above it may be stated that a knowledge of
human psychology is an invaluable tool in the stock market.
Gerald M. Loeb, author of the best seller, The Battle for
Investment Survival, states that "The most important single
factor in shaping security markets is public psychology."4 ^
Loeb continues by saying:
I feel that the psychology which leads people to
pay forty times net for a stock under one set of
conditions and refuse to buy the same shares under
another set of conditions at ten times is such a
powerful and vital price-changing factor that it
can overshadow actual earnings trends as an influence
on stock prices.5®
Fred C. Kelly, a successful market trader through the
psychological or behavioral study approach, says that vanity,

4®Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle,
Security Analysis (New York;
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,

T552y-;“ p .-3 Z :------49Gerald M. Loeb, The Battle For Investment Survival
(New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1965) , p. 6Q~.
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greed, and the will to believe are the three most malign
influences to one trying to make a profit in the stock
marketKelly's

thesis is that the only way to obtain a

profit in Wall Street is through an understanding of human
psychology and behavior.
Kelly states that, "Vanity, one's own personal vanity,
is probably the greatest single enemy to stock market
success.

It is vanity that leads us to take small profits
CJ
but large l o s s e s . W h e n one employs a behavioral or
psychological approach, he is basing his study on the
conduct or actions of the majority.

Kelly contends that the

majority is characterized by conformity, unanimity of
thought, imitation, contagion, impulse action, and the
desire for leadership, regardless of quality.
LeBon, Neill, Drew, Heiby, and Wilson all believe the
informed minority to be a group of thinkers who are willing
to diverge from majority opinion and action.

As Wilson

says, "The greatness of our nation has been built upon
concepts that include the willingness to take chances.”53
According to Kelly, "Next to vanity, I suppose the
worst foe of good judgment that a person in the market must

^ F o r a treatment of these concepts, see Fred C. Kelly,
Why You Win or Lose (wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing
Company, 196*57, pp. 34-49.
52Ibid., p. 34.
53Sloan J. Wilson, The Speculator and the Stock Market
(Palisades Park, New jersey:
Investors1 Library, Inc.,
1963), p. 3.
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guard against, is old Uncle Greed.*1

According to Kelly,

greed is probably sore potent as an influence than danger.
Kelly's reasoning steins from his conclusion that people are
optimistic by their very nature and thus are not easily
scared•
Kelly contends that greed leads the majority astray
and contributes to unanimity of thought.

He states:

Let a stock market forecaster predict an advance
that doesn't come and the public will forgive him,
but as he turns bearish too soon and warns of a
slump long before it comes, his reputation is ruined.
Kelly blames greed for the animosity that the public
majority will bear toward the forecaster.

He says that

individuals never shake free from the memories of money
they might have made.
According to Kelly, the third of man's infirmities in
the stock market is the "will to believe."

This concept

refers to the susceptibility of the majority to news, tips,
advisory services, and unanimous thought.

Kelly believes

that the public or majority relies on these "other opinions"
to avoid the arduous task of thinking.

Consequently, public

or majority opinion has been molded.
Dangers of Human Emotion
Since the individuals are emotional beings, they are
usually incapable of segregating their emotions from their

^4Kelly, o£. c i t . , p. 40.
55lbid., p. 4 2 .
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powers of reason.

According to Schultz, emotion is perhaps

the one concept that serves as an explanation for lack of
success by the majority in the stock market.
states:

Schultz

"Emotions are the common denominator that makes us

all the same, and they can bring down the mightiest.
Emotions have separated a king from his throne more than
once."^

Schultz continues by saying, "Marilyn Monroe had

everything:

great beauty, personality, attraction, wit,

position, and success.

But her emotions are alleged to

have been her problem.
Schultz and McNeel both believe that emotionallyoriented decisions are invariably poor ones.

McNeel says

that as many as 98 percent of market decisions have been
emotional decisions.

58

The governing of decision making and

action by emotion undoubtedly provoked McNeel to remark that
"Ninety to ninety-eight of every one hundred men who try to
beat the stock market are beaten."^9
S. B. Lurie asserts that the average member of the
crowd or majority makes mistakes which stem from two roots.
"First, he forgets to follow the IBM slogan to Think--which
is by far the best word in the English language.

Secondly,

he falls into the popular error of acting with his emotions

^^Schultz, op. cit., p. 165.
57Ibid.
58McNeel, o p . c i t ., p. 147.
59Ibid.
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rather than his intellect.” 60

Lurie feels that ” ...day-

to-day fluctuations are often emotional.

But the really

important money-making opportunities come from using one's
thinking processes."61
Schultz, McNeel, and Lurie all infer that emotion i n 
duces people to believe what they wish to believe as opposed
to an objective appraisal of the situation at hand.
Napoleon once remarked:

As

”We must look upon things as they

are, and not as we would wish them to be.”62

Schultz

alleges that the concept of emotion is the single factor
which precludes individuals from application of successful
theories and ideas.

He also believes that it is the main

reason most individuals perpetrate mistimed judgments in
the market.

Schultz epitomizes his theory of emotion by

commenting that emotion is ”the single factor most likely
to keep you from using what know-how you accumulate, or
using it correctly, or at the right time.”
IV.

THE TIE CRY OF CONTRARY OPINION

As of March 21, 1949, the Theory of Contrary Opinion
was finally given some consideration as a way of thinking

6°S. B. Lurie, "Market Philosophy,” Encyclopedia of
Stock Market Techniques, o p . c i t ., p. 485.
61Ibid.
62
Napoleon, as cited by Kenneth ward, "The Technical
Approach to the Stock Market,” Encyclopedia of Stock
Market Techniques, o p . cit., p. 552.
63Schultz, op. cit., p. 163.
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by Life.6*

Even in the present era, however, the Theory

has not received the recognition that it merits.
Neill says that the Theory is "primarily a method of
ruminating over a broad range of public questions; political,
economic, and social."65

Neill further states:

"In sum,

the purpose is to contest the popular view, because popular
opinions are so frequently found to be untimely, mis lead
(by propaganda), or plainly wrong."66

Neill says that the

Contrary Theory does not contest facts; however, it does
contest the ill-founded acceptance and astonishing credulity
of the public masses.67

Neill also believes that the Theory

is applicable to almost any area of endeavor, including
forecasting, politics, socio-economics, business, and the
stock market.
Neill's theory has been primarily designed to challenge
any form of unanimous thinking or majority opinion.

LeBon's

thesis is that words and opinions are often insidious in
that they misrepresent, mislead, distort, and delude.^®

64See William Miller, "The Strange State of the Market,"
Life (March 21, 1949), wherein appeared comment that Humphrey
B. Neill formulated the Theory of Contrary Opinion.
^ N e i l l , The Art of Contrary Thinking, o p . cit, p. 9.
66Ibid.
67This thesis is treated at length throughout Neill's
books, The Art of Contrary Thinking and Tape Reading and
Market Tactics.
For a complete treatment of this concept, see both
of LeBon's books, The Psychology of Socialism and The Crowd.
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The thinking of both Neill and LeBon is closely correlated
with Kelly's "will-to-believe" concept.

The use of the

Contrary Theory is probably best evidenced when it is used
to challenge the majority's "will-to-believe" propensity.
The application of the Contrary Theory to the stock
market is strongly supported by Kelly and Burgess, who r e
mark:

"Wide public belief is of itself proof that something

is wrong, for seldom is a vast number of persons capable of
arriving at a wise conclusion in the stock market."^9
Granville and Kelly both blast advisory services, the news
media, and tipsters and allege that they foster unanimity
of thought and the "will-to-believe."

Granville contends

that the nature of human beings gravitates toward laziness.

70

Fraser supports the views of Kelly and Granville, and he
also agrees that news, advisory services, and tips are
nothing more than "moulders of public opinion."

Fraser, who

is a disciple of Neill, says that the presence of these
moulders of opinion can destroy judgment.

He writes:

"A

significant human problem is to withstand group forces that
seek to modify and distort individual judgments."

71

^ K e l l y and Burgess, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
^Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing
for Maximum Profit, op. cTT7, p. 162.
71James L. Fraser, "The Neill Theory of Contrary
Opinion," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, op. cit.,
p. 465.
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Since many individuals are of the opinion that the
Theory of Contrary Thinking should be used to rebuff these
moulders of public opinion, it is necessary to ascertain
other contentions concerning the harm of these opinion
moulders.
V.

THE MENACE OF NEWS

Joseph Mindell contends that "The day-to-day market
trend often reflects the ebb and flow of emotional reactions
to the news... This belief has enough surface appeal to make
it the basic principle of the market letter and the financial
colunn,"^

Mindell further states that "The proposition

that the trend of the market follows the news is not accepted
by the financially literate."73

Mindell believes that any

one who is reasonably conversant with the market knows that
the market will often respond differently to the same type
of news.

Mindell says that news has a very misguiding

effect, and many misleading inferences may be drawn from it.
He believes that the majority, however, continually searches
for news, regardless of the shape of the market.

Mindell

states that such a continual quest for news "...indicates
an implicit acceptance of the fallacy as a working
principle."74

7^joseph Mindell, "How News Affects Market Trends,"
The Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 (januaryFebruary, 196iy^ p! 5T.

74ibid.
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Granville believes that the sheer characteristics of
the majority lead them to accept news as opposed to thinking
for themselves.

He feels that the public characteristics

of laziness and distaste for thinking,
...dictate that the task of determining what is
really going on in the stock market and the
economy in general at any particular time be
reserved for government officials, magazine
editors, financial writers, brokers, and
customers' men. Their pronouncements on the
state of the economy or the condition of the
stock market are generally believed and acted
upon by the maiority of the investing and specu
lating public.?5
Granville contends that news is a chief factor in the
accumulation and distribution of stocks.

Drew supports

Granville's theory and states that "The public will buy on
good news and sell on bad news."

76

From the aforementioned

statements, it must be inferred that the market elite go
contrary to news and majority thinking.

Perhaps it is

appropriate to recall the wise counsel of Sir Francis Bacon,
who stated:

"Doubt all before you believe anything,

watch

your idols I"??
Bacon's commentary apparently has considerable merit
because the public's purchases of stocks at high prices has
led Granville to remark that the stock market is merely a

75Granville, op. c i t ., p. 162.
?^Drew, op. c i t ., p. 192.
??As cited by Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tac tic s,
o p . c i t ., p. 58.

41
"wholesale-retail operation," where the professionals buy
low and sell high.

The public or majority, in turn buys

high and sell l o u . ^
Reliability of News
Granville relates an interesting news story which
illustrates the alleged authenticity of news.

Although the

news story relates to war, it would likewise relate to the
stock narket.

He writes:

During World War I there was a strategically
important town in Austria called Lembert.
As
the going got real rough late in the campaign,
a daily communique from the Austrian general was
circulated among the ranks which simply said,
"Lembert is still in our possession." interpre
tation: The city is as good as gone.
A few
days later the city was officially c a p t u r e d . 7 ^
Granville believes that news interpretation is the same,
whether it be in war or in the stock market.

He contends

that news in the market is always best at the zenith of a
movement, and the professional element uses it to implement
their distribution process.

AO

Kelly and Burgess both doubt the accuracy of news, and
they remark:

"The public is usually told what it prefers

to believe, regardless of whether this tallies with the
Ai
truth."
Mindell confirms the preceding statement and

78Granville, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
79 Ibid., p. 168.
80Ibid.
®^Kelly and Burgess, op. c i t ., p. 26.
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asserts that a lot of news merely ’'...reflects the intensity
of public interest in the stock market, and important tops
have usually been made during this time."

05

Neill blasts publication accuracy and policy by stating:
To my mind, news agencies owe a greater
responsibility to their readers than is consistent
with publishing sensational items which they must
know are acted upon without deliberation by the
thoughtless public.
I criticize severely public
men who, with their news agencies and propagandists,
play upon public opinion without regard to the
serious consequences which must ensue.83
Discounting the News
Don Guyon once remarked:

"News can seldom be utilized

for market purposes, even when its authenticity is beyond
qX
question."
Richard W. Schabacker, one of Wall Street's
greatest technicians, subscribes to the thoughts of Guyon.
He comments:

"By the time news regarding a stock is made

public such news has generally been discounted in the
market and the cream is off."

85

Both Guyon and Schabacker

believe that the intelligent opinion of the minority has
been registered long before the publication of facts ever
takes place.
Most market analysts believe that news has a tendency
to govern the emotions of the majority.

82Mindell,
83

Wilson comments:

. Cit., p . 32.

Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit., p.

55.
84_
Guyon, 0£. c i t ., p. 44.
85

Richard W. Schabacker, "Price Discounting News,"
A Treasury of W a 11 Street W i s d o m , o p . c i t ., p. 222.
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"Financial news can get one into a lot of emotional
Qi

trouble,"

Neill contends that a judicious dose of news

can incite a frenzy of public action which will lead to
accumulation or distribution.

If intelligent opinion is

truly registered early, then the majority should recall the
immortal words of Homer:

"After the event, even a fool is

wise."8 ^
VI.

THE MERIT OF TIPS

The "moulders of public opinion" concept cited by
Kelly, Granville, and others has another component which is
very much present in the stock market environment.

This is

the "tips" or advice which floats around every brokerage
office.88
Wyckoff says that "Nearly everybody is exposed to tips
on the market, but the overwhelming majority of such preQQ
dictions never come true."
Kelly reveals:
"I have seen
men earnestly listening to the advice of a broker's colored
porter--because he was telling what they earnestly desired
to think was true."

90

Guyon berates tipsters, stating:

8 ^Wilson, op. c i t ., pp.

122-123.

Q "7

As cited by James L. Fraser, Crises a nd Pa nics
(Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company' T96S), p. 21.
QQ
Neill, Tape Reading and Market Tactics, o p . c i t .
oq
Wyckoff, op, c i t ., p. 22.
90

Kelly, op. cit., p. 48.

"I do not knot* of a single case where anyone has been able
to >ak« money consistently by following information of this
character, even when the information comes to him first
hand."91
Robert P. Crawford says that many people "...have b e 
come parasites on the thinking of other people.

Nine times

out of ten you will discover that they are repeating,
parrot-like, someone else's ideas."
commented:

92

S. A. Nelson

"Great minds have purposes; others have wishes

.... He who prates of his wisdom doth but conceal an ass."

Q3

Garrulous individuals who continually fill brokerage offices
encounter the wrath of s. B. Lurie, who states:

"It's

strange how substantial amounts of money often are invested
on the basis of locker room gossip, or somebody else's
hearsay, rather than on the basis of using a professional
intellect to help arrive at a sound conclusion.... The moral
is clear:

There is little or no charm to the obvious in
Q4
Wall Street."
Nelson refers to the talkative tipster as
"Great vaunters, little doers." 95

Nelson further asserts

91Guyon, op. cit., p. 8.
^ R o b e r t P. Crawford, Think for Yourself (Wells, Vermont
Fraser Publishing Company, 1937), p. 87.
93S. A. Nelson, The ABC of Stock Speculation (Wells,
Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 1964), pp. £08-209.
94Lurie, op. cit ., p. 769.
95Nel son, op. c i t ., p. 208.
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that the tipster 11is as far resoved fro* the avenues that
lead to desirable information as he is from those which
lead to Paradise.**"
Neill says that if one becomes bored and has time on
his hands, "...go out and play parches!--do anything but
join in the idle, unintelligent gossip in a broker's boardrooi."97

Perhaps the general opinion of the learned in

market analysis is best stated by Joseph Marshall Wade:
If I wanted to become a tramp I would seek
information and advice from the most successful
tramp I could find.
If I wanted to become a
failure I would seek advice from men who had
never succeeded.
if I wanted to succeed in all
things, I would look around me for those who
are succeeding and do as they have done. 8

VII.

DANGER OF ADVISORY SERVICES

Wyckoff proposes that "The more statistics, opinions,
resumes, reports, and other printed material a trader reads,
go
the farther is he removed from the market's present state."
In commenting on news, tips, and advisory services, Wyckoff
feels that they "...are to the market what thunder is to

96 Ibid., p. 145.
" N e i l l , Tape Reading and Market Tactics, o p . c it.,
p. 44.
98

As cited by editors Schultz and Coslow in the
beginning of A Treasury of Wall Street W isd om.
" w y c k o f f , o£. c i t ., p. 186.
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lightning.**

10O

He feels that such "expertise" is too late

to be of value to the investor.
Fraser concludes lh«t despite the continual increase
in advisory services, especially during bull Markets,
"...bear Markets wipe out Much so-called shrewd judgments.
Better judgment is not exclusive to any individual or
committee.

That is why you see experts selling the same

shares other experts are b u y i n g . i n

October,

1959,

advisory services were subjected to close scrutiny and the
following conclusion was reached:

"There's a literary bull

market on Wall Street too, and no sign yet that it's topping
out.

Luckily for the men who produce stock-market literature,

their success does not depend on their records as fore
casters." 102
Drew says that the public is "almost always bullish."
Such feeling by the public makes Walter Heiby comment that
if an advisory service recommends general selling, "...he
will lose many subscribers whether or not time proves him
to have given a correct prognosis." 104

Therefore the in

vestment advisor apparently has a great business incentive

100 Ibid.
lOlpraser, "The Neill Theory of Contrary Opinion,"
Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, o p . c i t ., p. 678.
102

"Stock-Market Letters: A Growth Situation,"
Fortune, Vol. 50, No. 4 (October, 1959), p. 141.
103Drew, op. cit., p. 191.
104Heiby, op. c i t . , p. 24.

103
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to avoid pessimism and the mention of short sales.

Schultz

contends that "A special reason why you must regard all
advice with caution is that, sad as their record is in bull
markets, their record in bear markets is much, much worse."

105

Schultz also contends that advisory services are e m 
ployed extensively by the public to circumvent the arduous
task of thinking.

However, as Kelly and Burgess comment:

"No market prophet is ever good enough in the long run to
be followed blindly."*06
Fortune blasts advisory services in general by stating:
"...the circulation achieved by the pundits who produce this
literature seems to have little to do with their own records
as forecasters;
the market."*0 ^

it depends much more on public interest in
Fortune further states that professionals,

for the most part, are very dubious about advisory services
and their past accuracy and records.
Schultz says that advisory services and financial
writers "tell their readers that the stock aiarket cannot be
forecast with any precision, by anyone, and then promptly
proceed to forecast it."

108

He further comments:

"wrong

guesses exceed correct ones to such a degree it*s a marvel
the services continue."*0 ^

Nelson blasts the public's

l05Schultz, ££. c i t ., p. 108.
106Kelly and Burgess, o|>. cit., p. 28.
*0 7Fortune, op. c it. , p. 141.
108Schultz, o£. c it., p. 109.
109Ibid.
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reliance on advice by stating:
others have wishes."**^

"Great minds have purposes;

Apparently Nelson refers to the

distinction between the innovators

(informed minority or

professionals) and the imitators or thoughtless

(the remain

ing 95 percent public or majority).
Brokers
Heiby, McNeel, and Kaiser are among many who feel that
advice from a broker is analogous to that rendered from an
advisory service.

Heiby asserts that brokers "...rarely

recommend the sale of a specific stock, and when they do,
they are very apt to talk in favor of using the proceeds
for an immediate purchase of another i s s u e . i n

effect,

then, brokers are primarily interested in sales and
commissions.
McNeel says that when taking a broker's advice, "...It
should probably all be shunned, or at least their advice
should be considered very carefully before one acts on
it."

112

McNeel believes that the interests of the public

and the broker are very divergent, which should make any
market participant very skeptical about the advice being
rendered by the broker.

Kaiser believes that advisory

services and brokers are both very remiss in their thinking
and analysis.

He belittles brokers by commenting that

110Nelson, op. c i t . , p. 208.
i^ Heiby, op. c it. , p. 24.
112McNeel, o£. cit ., p. 106.
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brokers' "...pronouncements are always couched in hedge
language, a canny knack aimed at survival.

Their predic

tions during the spring break of 1962 left something to be
,
, 113
desired."
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in the midst
of a drastic price decline starting on September 3, 1946,
undertook a painstaking study of the market literature which
was disseminated by 36 investment advisers and 130 brokers.
The investigation pertained to the literature for the week
of August 25 to September 3.

Following is a part of the

f indings:
TABLE II-l
SEC FINDINGS OF DISSEMINATED MARKET
LITERATURE FOR THE WEEK OF AUGUST 26 TO SEPTEMBER 3,
_____________________________ 1946_______________________________
General Market - Attitude on Long-Term Outlook
Number of Letters and Wires
Bullish without qualification

...................

260

Bullish, but uncertain on day-to-day
market action .....................................

97

C a u t i o u s ............................................ 74
Definitely bearish and/or advised selling
at least part of h o l d i n g s ........................... 20
Inconclusive.......................................... 38
489
Source:

Cited by Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit
in the Stock Market, o p . c i t .,
1TSTT

**3Karl N. Kaiser, "Timing Technology," Encyclopedia
of Stock Market Techniques, op. c i t ., p. 466.
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The findings of the Commission showed that only 4.1
percent of the professional commentary and advice at this
critical juncture was correctly bearish.

Perhaps Schultz

was correct when he remarked that brokers and advisory
servxces are usually "wrong at key turning points."

114

He,

like Kelly and Burgess, believes that "There is a normal ten
dency to give the public what they want."115
Summary
Judging from the opinions of many eminent market
analysts, the majority of people do not think for themselves
and ultimately fail in the stock market.

Most contentions

are that such failure stems from the propaganda or "moulders
of public opinion" which induce public participation at
precisely the wrong time.

Vance Packard, an authority in

the area of hidden persuasion, has said that manipulators
who are probing "... beneath the surface of American life,
are starting to acquire a power of persuasion that is b e 
coming a matter of justifiable public scrutiny and concern.
Crawford says that, "Propaganda, or concerted and
definite effort to remake our thought or to save us from
thinking for ourselves, has suddenly burst into view like

114Schultz, o£. c it., p. 114.
ll5Ibid., pp. 114-115.
Il6yance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders
Pocket Books, Inc., 1957), p~. 1
7.

(New York:
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a meteor.”

7 77

From the authoritative sources cited thus

far, one receives the distinct impression that the majority
has a propensity to base their judgment on surface indica
tions and propaganda such as news, tips, brokers, and
advisory services.

If the public does in fact place such

reliance on these media, their participation should be noted
at the zenith of a movement.

In effect, their participation

should take place at precisely the opposite time that it
should occur.

If the public does base its action on surface

indicators in the market, then the majority probably is
right during most of the trends but wrong at the critical
junctures in the market.
Beginning in Chapter III, the aforementioned technical
indicators are employed.

Empirical evidence will be

utilized to check past conduct of the public at these
critical junctures to determine the validity of preceding
contentions and to ascertain the financial acumen of the
stock-market majority or public,
exist.

if such a group does really

The first indicators used will be the Monthly Debit

and credit Balances.

117Cxawford, o£. c i t . , p. 52.

CHAPTER III
THE DEBIT AND CREDIT BALANCES
People
buy on
point,
ceases

have been educated to
declines.
There is a
however, where such buying
and selling begins.
-- Charles H . Dow

In the preceding chapter, others suggested that one
should apply Neill's Theory of Contrary Thinking and act
opposite to public opinion and unanimous thought in order
to enjoy success in the stock market.

Eminent authors

suggested that one must depict the entrance and extent of
public participation and then become active buyers at a
time when the public majority is not in the market.

There

fore, to be successful, one must move in contrary fashion
to that of the public.
The outstanding technician Joseph E. Granville says:
There is no easy road to stock market success.
Here in the United states there are millions of
pianos and each one is basically the same in that
they all have 88 notes.
Yet, how many piano
virtuosos are there in the united States?
It is
the same with the stock market.
The printed music
can be distributed to everyone but many cannot
play it at all, a large number can just manage to
play it, another group plays well and a much
smaller group is downright brilliant. So, there
are no qualms about distributing the music.
It is
up to the reader and his patience, desire to work,
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and ability to interpret as to whether he plays at
all, plays well, or plays like a virtuoso.^
In order to act in an opposite fashion from the public,
one must determine when the public enters the market and
when it makes its exodus.

The action of the round-lot public

is probably best portrayed by the conduct of the Credit
Balance.

The astute professional element can likewise be

observed by the action of the Monthly Debit Balance.

Through

an explanation of these balances, one may obtain a valuable
insight into the stock market and its future gyrations.
The Theory of the Credit Balance.

The Credit Balance

or the customers' free Credit Balance Figure represents the
uncommitted money on deposit with brokers who are members
of the New York Stock Exchange.

According to Wilson, the

Credit Balance is indicative of that portion of the public
which habitually trades in round lots.

The "round lot"

public pays cash for all stocks purchased.

Wilson says,

"... This monthly figure is predominantly that amount be
longing to the public, and it is what we have been looking
o
for for a long time."
Wilson asserts:
"Banks, trust
accounts, and mutual funds usually do not have cash in a
credit account.

Thus this monthly figure is predominantly

*1
Joseph E. Granville, Granville's New Key to Stock
Market Profits (Englewood Cliffs, hi. J. : Prentice-Ha 11,
Inc., 1965), p. 11.
2Sloan J. Wilson, Public Participation in the Stock
Market (Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 1966),
pr & .
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that amount belonging to the public and it fluctuates
with the advances and declines of the market."

3

Through the use of the Credit Balance and the odd-lot
data

(to be discussed in the next chapter), one can gain

an insight into the actions of the large and small members
of the stock market public.

These indicators will be used

to test the hypothesis that "The public is always wrong."
It should be remembered that a dichotomy is present among
the members of the public--the small "odd-lot" public and
the large "round-lot" public.

To adequately test the fi

nancial acumen of these public participants, it is
essential that one have a working knowledge of both segments
of the public investors.
Monthly figures of the New York Stock Exchange Credit
Balance represent the amount of uncommitted money on
deposit with brokers who are members of the New York Stock
Exchange.

Since a large portion of these funds are eventu

ally used to purchase stocks, an increase in this balance
may be interpreted to indicate that more money has been
left on deposit with the brokers by the "round-lot" public.
The larger participants in the market have refrained from
purchasing stocks and are not presently active in the
market.

Since the majority have avoided the market, it is

said to be oversold.

These Credit Balances represent

% l o a n J. Wilson, "The Monthly Credit and Debit
Balances," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques (Larchm o n t , New Y o r k : Investors intelligence, Inc., 1965),
p. 291.
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buying power, a part of which will be invested when an up
ward trend in prices becomes evident.

Therefore, the

technical position of the market should be strong because
only the informed few have been accumulating stocks and
providing demand.
The Credit Balance should decline when stocks are pur
chased.

The purchasing of stocks may be construed as a

reduction in buying potential, which tends to have bearish
overtones because the round-lot public has entered the
market.

The astute technician who is vigilant of the

Credit Balance leaves the market at approximately the same
time that the round-lot public makes its entrance.
Walter Heiby states:

"It is possible, however, that a

decline in the Credit Balance may, on occasion, indicate a
withdrawal of funds for purposes other than for stock
4
investment."
Heiby suggested that funds may be diverted
into Savings and Loan shares, time deposits of commercial
banks, bonds, and other similar investments which bear a
fixed return.

If funds are withdrawn for these purposes,

a decline in the Credit Balance is interpreted as bullish
because the public perceives the market outlook as bearish
and has withdrawn from the market.

However, determining

when funds begin to leave the market and flow to other

^Wa Iter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic
Synthesis (Chicago, I llinois** The Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., 1965), p. 87.
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investment media is a difficult task.^
Round-lot public investors, however, characteristically
remain in the market most of the time.

These individuals

obviously have the money to participate, as evidenced by
their cash purchases of round lots.

Many members of the

round-lot public suffer from "the perils of over-acquisi
tiveness."^

Henry Harper,

in commenting on whether or not

the majority is willing to refrain from the market, says
that nearly all people,

. . whether experienced or

inexperienced, are subject to those inscrutable laws of
psychology which Nature herself seems to have designed for
the discomfiture of those who play at the wheel of Fortune."
Continuing, Harper says:

"They all resolve to stay out of
8

the market, but they all go back."

5

It should be noted that the Federa1 Reserve Bulletin
does contain a quarterly flow-of-funds statement which
reveals shifts in deposit flows and in amounts of deposits
outstanding.
The publication of such data, however, occurs
several months subsequent to the investigated period.
The
resulting time lag prohibits the data from being as useful
as it would otherwise be.
For example, see "Changes in
Time and Savings Deposits, April - July 1967," Federa1
Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 53, No. 9 (September, 1967), pp.

1488-15177;
^For an excellent treatment of this concept as it
relates to stock market participation, see Henry Howard
Harper, The Psychology of Speculation (Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 1666J, pp. 56-64.
7Ibid., p. 63.
8 Ibid.

7
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Basic Concepts of the Credit Balance.

To understand

how the Credit Balance serves as an indicator, one should
understand the concepts of convergence and divergence.
These concepts refer to the relationship between the action
of the Credit Balance and the performance of the market as
shown by the averages.

The two most commonly used market

averages are the Dow-Jones Industrial Average and Standard
and Poor's Composite ''500" Stock Average.

Standard and

Poor's Average is employed in this study because it is more
representative of the general market.

Standard and Poor's

Composite Average consists of 500 stocks, while the DowJones Industrial Average is comprised of only 30 issues,
most of which are blue chip securities.

Standard and Poor's

Average should give a better indication of the possible
correlation between the Credit Balance and over-all stock
market trends.

A comparison between the two averages

reveals a close approximation between the Dow-Jones
Industrial Average and Standard and Poor's Composite aver
age.

Granville says that an important rule of thumb

concerning the two averages is that, "The ratio of the DowJones Industrial Average reading to Standard and Poor's
9
Index is approximately 10 - 1."
Granville further states
that if the 1 0 - 1

ratio is not approximated, this " . . .

9
J. E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market
Timing for Maximum Profit (Englewoocf Ci i f f s , N.J.:
Prentice-HaTl, Inc., 1966), p. 162.
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would indicate that the Dow-Jones was not typical of the
general market.’1*^
Convergence occurs when Standard and Poor’s Average is
declining, and the Credit Balance is rising.

Technicians

interpret such convergence as the nearing of a market bottom
and the beginning of an advance in the market.
The normal behavior of the Credit Balance moves in the
same direction as the stock indicators.

The professional

element accumulates stocks and initiates the upward trend
in the market.

The public is reputed to avoid the market

during the early stages of an advance as a result of losses
incurred during the last decline, so the Credit Balance
theoretically rises with the market as stocks are liquidated
at approximate break-even levels.
Since the public supposedly enters the market near the
top, the Credit Balance begins to shrink at or near the
crest of the bull market.

As the market declines, the

Credit Balance also may decrease because the public allegedly
participates during the course of the market decline.
Divergence occurs when Standard and Poor's Average is
rising and the Credit Balance begins to decline.
occurs, a market top has been signalled.

When this

Diminishment of

the Credit Balance indicates that the majority has entered
the market and is participating on a large scale.

Pro

fessionals distribute stocks to the public, allowing them

10T, . ,
Ibid.
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to hold the stocks until the market crests and then retain
the stocks while the market moves downward at a precipitous
rate.

Divergence and convergence occur only when the Credit

Balance is a leading indicator of market trends and not
when the indexes move in the direction of the market aver
ages.
The Theory of the Debit Balance.

Sloan Wilson s a y s :

uThe Debit Balance represents the margin accounts, the most
potent tool of the very active speculator."^

In another

of his analytical works, Wilson asserts:
These figures represent one of the largest groups
of active traders, and are truly the telltale mark
left behind by the speculator.
The New York Stock
Exchange Monthly Debit Balance figures are much
greater than those of the Monthly credit Balance.
It is fantastic when one realizes the Debit Balance
is similar to the visible part of a huge iceberg;
the largest part, representing the- transactions and
actual value of shares, is completely hidden
beneath the surface. 2
Louis Engel maintains that "Margin is the speculator's
Number 1 t o o l . " ^
Each monthly Debit Balance figure represents the total
amount of money borrowed on margin in order to hold stock.
According to Wilson, shrewd speculators utilize margin and

Sloan J. Wilson, The Speculator and the Stock Market
(Palisades Park, New jersey:
Investors1Library, Inc.,
1963), p. 4.
l2Sloan J. Wilson, "The Monthly Credit and Debit
Balance," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, op. cit.,
p. 291.
1^Louis Engel, How to Buy Stocks
Books, Inc., 1962), p. 1T57.

(New York:

Bantam
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are generally able to detect market trends at their incep
tion, thus allowing them to buy low and sell high.

Specu

lators theoretically increase their commitments as the
market rises and subsequently decrease their commitments as
a bear trend is initiated.
Wilson takes exception to those who attempt to negate
the importance of the Debit Balance because of the presence
of changing margin requirements.

Wilson made a study of

margin requirement effects, concluding that for the most
part they were negligible.

He stated:

"The margins are

lowered or raised in an attempt to influence a broad move
ment.

In almost every historical period, the Federal

Reserve Board has appeared to be fighting an already established market trend."

14

Continuing, Wilson asserts:

Thus, on numerous occasions from 1949 to 1963
the margin requirements were changed up and down,
but the upward trend continued on its way.
It
would be difficult to conclude that the margin
requirements affected a bull market when it was
able to survive the Korean War, the Suez Crisis,
Lebanon, Eisenhower's heart attack, and the
development of Sputniks.
During this time, the
New York Stock Exchange Monthly Debit Balance
advanced from $466 million to $4,215 million.
By March, 1963, it had reached $4,360 million-an advance of over 800 per cent.-*-*
During the extended bull and bear markets of previous
years, nothing has had much effect in reversing trends
which were well under way.

Bernard Baruch continually

^4Sloan Wilson, The S p e c u l a t o r and the Stock Market,
o p . c i t ., p. 7.
I5ibid.
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a c c e n t u a t e d the idea that
c o uld ev e r be passe d

there mbs no l e g i s l a t i o n w h i c h

to p r o te ct man fro m his own f o l l y .16

During an extended period of market decline, the Debit
Balance figures generally decline because speculators
continue to leave the market.

Speculators theoretically

conduct themselves in a diametrically opposite fashion
from the public, because they buy close to the bottom and
sell near the top of the market.
If empirical evidence does substantiate the preceding
theory, one may conclude that speculators comprise a group
of astute market operators.

Consequently, the discovery of

the Debit Balance as a market indicator may reflect the
intelligent opinion of the market's astute segment.

Many

people, perhaps from envy, feel that speculation is a de
plorable act.

Speculators are subjected to ridicule and

abuse which is usually not directed toward the more
conservative investors who purchase for the "long pull."
It is worthwhile, however, to recall the words of Humphrey
B. Neill:
The stock market is a great cauldron of the hopes,
desires, and despairs of speculators, or traders.
If it were not for the speculators, there would be
no active stock market.
If it were not for the
speculators, America would not stand where she does,
as the leading industrial country in the world. We
may deplore speculation, but if it were not for this
outpouring of money for stocks, you and I should not

For a complete treatment of this theory, see Bernard
M. Baruch, My Own Story (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1 9 5 7 )1

enjoy a fraction of the comforts and luxuries which
we accept as necessities.1?
Now that the theory of the Balances has been explored,
it shall now be determined how the Balances have performed
at the bull market tops and bear market bottoms of the
past.

By empirically testing these Balances at actual

market junctures, one can determine the conduct of the
round-lot public as well as the professional element.

In

addition, the hypothesis that "The public is always wrong"
will encounter the first of a series of formidable tests
designed to check the financial acumen of the public or
stock market majority.
Definition of Market Tops and Bottoms.

An analysis of

the meaning and levels of Debit and Credit Balances provide
some insight into the actions of the different participants
in the market.

Such insight may be important in order to

ascertain the future trends of the market.
Neill once asserted:

As Humphrey

"So long as we guess who is doing the

buying and selling, we shall remain in a sea of confusion."
By understanding the Credit and Debit Balances, one can
depict the activity of the round-lot public and the market
speculator.

Subsequently, these indicators will be synthe

sized with the odd lots, indicative of the action of the

^ H u m p h r e y B. "
(Wells, Vermont;
18Ibid., p. 9

“

~

Jing and Market Tactics
Company“ i960)~t p. 2.
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odd-lot public.

As a result, one can determine the action

of all segments of the stock market.
The Debit and Credit Balances are tested empirically
at the previous bull market tops and bear market bottoms
from 1956 to May,

1967.

The turning points are determined

by a procedure developed by Robert Rhea.

Rhea defines a

primary bull market as follows:
A primary bull market is a broad upward movement,
interrupted by secondary reactions, and averaging
longer than two years.
During this time, stock
prices advance because of a demand created by both
investment and speculative buying caused by improv
ing business conditions and increased speculative
activity.
There are three phases of a bull period:
the first is represented by reviving confidence in
the future of business; the second is the response
of stock prices to the known improvement in corpora
tion earnings, and the third is the period when
speculation is rampant and inflation apparent--a
period when stocks are advanced on hopes and
expectations
In another of his treatises, The Story of the Averages,
Rhea provides the general characteristics of a primary bear
market.

He states:

A primary bear market is the long downwazd move
ment interrupted by important rallies.
It is
caused by various economic ills and does not termi
nate until stock prices have thoroughly discounted
the worst that is apt to occur.
There are three
principal phases of a bear market:
the first
represents the abandonment of the hopes upon which
stocks were purchased at inflated prices; the
second reflects selling due to decreased business
and earnings, and the third is caused by distress

19

Robert Rhea, The Dow Theory (Colorado Springs,
Colorado:
Rhea, Greiner & C o . , T559), p. 13.

selling of sound securities, regardless of their
value, by those who must find a cash market for
at least a portion of their assets.
In the study, secondary reactions are not analyzed.
According to Rhea, secondary reactions are:
...considered to be an important decline in a bull
market or advance in a bear market, usually lasting
from three weeks to as many months, during which
intervals the price movement generally retraces
from 33 percent to 66 percent of the primary price
change since the termination of the last preceding
secondary reaction.
These reactions are frequently
erroneously assumed to represent a change of
primary trend, because obviously the first stage
of a bull market must always coincide with a move
ment which might have proved to have been merely
a secondary reaction in a bear market, the contra
being true after the peak has been attained in a
bull market.2 *
In an editorial published December 19, 1900, Charle
Dow remarked:
The market is always to be considered as having
three movements, all going on at the same time.
The first is the narrow movement from day to day.
The second is the short swing, running from two
weeks to a month or more; the third is the main
movement, covering at least four years in its
duration.22
Dow formulated a theory of market movements which has
attracted much interest over the years.

Since Dow's per

ceptive formulation of market movements, there has been

20

Robert Rhea, The Story of the Averages (Colorado
Springs, Colorado:
Robert R h e a , 1934y^ pp. 3-5.
21Rhea, The Dow Theory, o p . c i t ., pp.

13-14.

22As quoted by william Peter Hamilton, The Stock
Market Barometer (New York:
Richard Russell Associates,
T 9 6 0 ) , p. 30'J------
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much speculation as to the cause of these movements.
William Peter Hamilton believed:

"The pragmatic basis for

the theory lies in human nature itself.

Prosperity will

drive men to excess, and repentance for the consequence of
oQ
these excesses will produce a corresponding depression."
Baruch said:

"Whatever men attempt they seem driven to try

to overdo."^4
Peter Wyckoff asserts:
Nature teaches us that there is a time for every
thing:
a time for sowing, a time for reaping; a
time for living, a time for dying.
Farmers now know
that the laws of nature cannot be defied, and would
no more try to raise pineapples in Maine than start
a maple sugar farm in a Miami suburb.
The same holds true in the stock market. When
stocks are overbought after a long advance and the
market cycle changes, neither the bullish opinions
of all the brokers and financial services in Wall
Street nor the glowing forecasts made by government
officials and corporate chiefs can stem the flow of
selling, any more than bearish news headlines and
reports, shrunken profit margins, or even the kneel
of doom itself can halt the tide of buying when the
time is ripe for another cyclical change.
The stock market moves in definite cycles of
distribution, decline, accumulation, and advance.
They dovetail roughly with cycles of prosperity,
recession, depression, and recovery in business.
It is important to be able to identify and time

^^/illiam Peter Hamilton, as cited by Richard Russell,
The Dow Theory T oda y, o p . c i t . , p. 24.
^4Bernard M. Baruch, "Madness of the Crowd," A Treasury
of Wall Street wisdom, edited by Harry D. Shultz and Samson
Cos low (Palisades Park, New Jersey:
Investors' Press, Inc.,
1966), p. 164.
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these cycles correctly, and to anticipate corre
sponding changes in public psychology as far as
possible.25
From the preceding one can conclude that human nature
may contribute to the various trends which occur in the
market.

Since the Debit and Credit Balances, respectively,

represent the speculators and the round-lot public, one is
able to determine the behavior patterns of each group.
These balances should not only be understood as technical
indicators of market trends, but as indicators of the human
nature and conduct of different segments participating in
the stock market.

The Balances and behavior patterns are

first examined at the primary bull market tops from 1956 to
May, 1967.
Bu 11 Market T o p s , 1956-57.

The year 1956 was marked

by a double top formation, with the tops occurring on
April 6 and August 2.
L. Jiler comments:

In referring to double tops, William

"Experienced analysts have long recog

nized them as common patterns of market behavior at a
turning p>oint, or reversal, and therefore as highly valu
able ,"2 *>

pc
,
Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing,
(Englewood Cliffs, N. 777 Prentice-Hall"i Inc.7 1963) ,
pp. 54-55.
26Wil liaro L. Jiler, How Charts Can Help You in the
Stock Market (New York:
Trendline, 1966*57 p. 73.
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The turn was also signalled by the change in the
Monthly Credit Balance.

At both the tops in 1956, the

Monthly Credit Balance proved to be a valuable indicator.
However, the Debit Balance plateaued rather than decreased
as did the Monthly Credit Balance.

Table A-l in Appendix A

provides the Monthly Credit and Debit Balance figures for
the tops of 1956.

Chart III-l graphically portrays the

relationship between the Balances and Standard and Poor's
Average for all major tops from 1956 to May,

1967.

The Monthly Credit Balance peaked on January 31, 1955,
and then began to decline.

A decrease in the Credit Balance

indicated that the round-lot public had begun to enter the
market.

The majority entered the market long after the

primary upward trend started as early as September 14, 1953.
The Credit Balance signalled the first top by reaching a
low on November 30, 1955, thus leading the first top and
subsequent downturn by approximately four months.

Starting

in December, 1955, however, the public began to participate
again as evidenced by a diverging Credit Balance, which
plummetted downward and leveled out on June 29, 1956.

The

second market top occurred on August 2, 1956, making the
Credit Balance a leading indicator of the downtrend by
approximately one month.
vergence in April,

From its original point of d i 

1956, the Credit Balance was a leading

indicator by three months.

The situation present in 1956

was somewhat unique in that a double top formation existed,
with the Monthly Credit Balance serving as a leading indi
cator in both instances.
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The Monthly Debit Balance was also an indicator in
both cases, as it plateaued in September,

1955.

The Debit

Balance usually increases almost all the way to the market
crest at which time the speculators either decrease their
commitments or maintain their present position.

Wilson says

that "The Debit Balance frequently plateaus just before
27
market tops.1*

When the Debit Balance plateaus, this

suggests that the speculators have maintained their present
position and have refused to increase their commitments.
In effect, they are dubious about the continuation of the
market rise and will not enlarge their portfolios as they
did at the beginning of the advance.

Therefore, the Debit

Balance may give an indication of a downturn by declining
or plateauing.

The Debit Balance plateaued for more than a

year, providing ample evidence that the speculators were
wary and had doubts about the resumption of the uptrend.
As of June,

1956, the Credit Balance also began to stabilize

at a low level, indicating that the public had maintained
its heavy commitments in the market.

The large expansion

of personal portfolios by the round-lot public had
apparently created an overbought market, leading to a weak
technical position and an opportunity for the informed
minority to distribute stocks.
As the market rose steadily during 1959-60, both the
Debit and Credit Balances illustrated a concurrent rise.

Sloan J. Wilson, "The Monthly Credit and Debit
Balances," Encyclopedia of Stock Market Techniques, op.
cit . , p . 2 9%~.
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It can be seen from Table A-2 in the Appendix that the
Monthly Credit Balance peaked on March 31, 1959, and then
diverged from the rising market.

A temporary bottom was

reached on November 30, 1959, which led the January 5,
1960 top by about one month.

The Credit Balance continued

to decline and reached its lowest level on April 29, I960.
Thus, the public continued to purchase securities as prices
declined.
The Debit Balance peaked on April 30, 1959, one month
after the Credit Balance peak, and then began to diverge
from the rising market to reach a temporary bottom on
November 30, 1959.

The diminishing balances on the ensuing

decline may be interpreted as indicatory that the specula
tors were leaving the market while the round-lot public was
entering.
Both the Debit and Credit Balances reached temporary
bottoms on November 30, 1959, leading the market by approxi
mately one month.

The Monthly Credit Balance actually

reached its final bottom on April 29, 1960, indicating that
this was the point of greatest public participation.

Four

months after the market peak, in the midst of a steep price
decline, the public was engaged in its heaviest buying of
the movement.

Speculators showed skepticism before the

market peak and continued to reduct their commitments.
Another primary bull market began on July 18, 1961,
and culminated on December 12, 1961.

Although this bull

market does not adhere strictly to Rhea's definition of a
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primary bull market, it is nevertheless a top formation
worthy of mention because of a mass entrance by the roundlot public.
Table A-3 in Appendix A indicates that the Credit
Balance peaked on April 28, 1961, and that the market con
tinued on its upward path.
III-l.

This is illustrated in Chart

As of July 31, 1961, however, the Credit Balance had

leveled out,

indicating that over a two-month span the

round-lot public made a simultaneous entrance into the
stock market.

Unanimous thinking by the majority was a p 

parently present at the top of 1961, as evidenced by the
large, simultaneous purchases of the round-lot public.
After the Credit Balance reached bottom in July, it
plateaued at a relatively low range, indicating that the
public was still participating heavily.

Although the public

was no longer increasing its holdings, neither was it d e 
creasing commitments.

This stability indicated that the

public was apparently optimistic and satisfied that the
market would continue its upward movement.

As Gerald Loeb

says :
The buying or selling power of the public once
on a stampede is almost beyond calculation, and
the fact that they are probably doing an eventually
costly thing does not in any way decrease the loss
in fighting the trend or make up for possible
profits in not taking advantage of it.^8

OB

Gerald M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Survival,
(New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1963), p. 67.
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The Monthly Credit Balance reached a bottom on July
31, 1961, leading the market by four months.

A clear point

of divergence with the market averages was obtained on June
30, 1961.

This development led the market by some five

months.
The Monthly Debit Balance plateaued as of May 31, 1961,
a time when the round-lot public was participating heavily.
Speculators became wary at this point and were reluctant to
increase commitments.

Wilson points out:

"Apparently, no

rising market of any consequence has expended itself until
29
the public enters it wholeheartedly."
Richard Russell
asserts:

"Perhaps 80 percent of all stockholders tend to

think of major price movements in terms of special news,
manipulation, government decrees, and Presidential wishes.
The majority is either ignorant of or incapable of grasping
the concept of the all-powerful trend."

30

A bull market top first occurred on Standard and Poor's
Average of 500 stocks on January 18, 1966, and a second top
was formed on April 21, 1966.

Juding from other indicators,

the market was technically strong.

However, Humphrey Neill

pointed out in his letter of January 5, 1966, that the
market could be destined for darker days.

Neill said that

2 ^Wilson, The Speculator and the Stock M a rk e t, o p . c i t . ,
p. 27.
30
For a treatment of this thesis, see Richard Russell,
The Dow Theory Today (New York:
Richard Russell Associates,
m i y : ------------------
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despite technical strength present in the market, "preservation comes ahead of profits." 31

Continuing, Neill stated
32
that ". . . 1966 is destined to be rough."
The letter

urged that a "protective program" be adopted along with a
"contrary thinking approach."
In his letter of January 19, 1966, Neill again reite
rated the necessity for adopting the Contrary Thinking
Theory.

Although not a market analyst, Neill devoted almost

the entire letter to the stock market and the anticipated
downturn, which he felt was imminent.

He asserted:

"So--

from the standpoint of past history, it is time for a set
back;

large or small.

Crowd psychology will determine

whether the cbming drop will be minor or of some magnitude." 3 3
observed:

To substantiate his contrary opinion, Neill
"There is this to be said for the possibility of

a fa 11 that will make the headlines:

According to a survey

of advisory services actual bearishness is at a minimum."

34

Advisory services and other moulders of public opinion had
apparently entered the picture after the market had reached

31
Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion
(Vermont: January 5, 1966).
32Ibid.
33 Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion
(Saxtons River, Vermont:
January 19, 1U<56X*
34Ibid.
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its peak.

Therefore,

the ultimate result should be that

the round-lot public would enter the market on the downside
of the 1966 tops, as opposed to right before the top which
is the usual custom.

Neill once wrote:

"The history of

speculation demonstrates that an understanding of mob psyOc
chology is a prime essential of price forecasting."
Neill continued in his letter of January 19 by re
marking :
From the contrary-opinion viewpoint, we
contrarians have to consider that a bear market
may eventuate because it is definitely not
anticipated.
Everybody is becoming bullish.
As readers know, it is seldom that this
contrary observer writes at length on the stock
market.
However, Wall Street today is making
history--is making a big splash, throwing off
countless irridescent bubbles that seduce the
unwary and ensnare the greety. 6
On February 2, 1966, Neill commented:
something must give.

"It seems clear

A breakaway of some kind appears

likely soon (may have already commenced in the stock market)
--so we have to be contrary and look at the bear si de."

37

On February 14, 1966, Neill observed, "while no one now
conceives

that there can be a collapse as in those days

(1929), yet experienced speculators do recognize the

Humphrey B. Neill, Harvest Time Ahead for Contrary
Thinkers," Financial world, Vol. 77, No. 12 (March 25,
1942), p. 5.
op

cit"®111* Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion, pan.

19, 1966),

~ ^ H u m p h r e y B. Neill, Neill Letter of Contrary Opinion
(Saxtons River, Vermont;
February 2”,”~ 1'956')~!
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probability of setback that will look like a '29, while it
is sliding."38

If this contrary theory had been applied at

the critical juncture of 1966, many investors would have
avoided large losses.
The Monthly Credit Balance failed to indicate a market
reversal.

The Credit Balance reached a low on August 31,

1965, although the bottom was not a strong deviation from
the plateau which had begun in January, 1965.

The Credit

Balance then began a precipitous rise, which indicated that
the public was not participating in the rise.

The market

formed a double top, the second peak occurring on April 21,
1966.

The Balances ordinarily have to be leading indicators

to be valuable to the market technician.

There was no d e 

crease in the Monthly Credit Balance until June 30, 1966,
at which time the public began to participate in the market.
In relation to the

second market top in April, the Monthly

Credit Balance was

a lagging indicator by some two months.

The top of 1966 was the only case examined where the Credit
Balance did not perform as a leading indicator.
The Monthly Debit Balance likewise gave no leading
indication that a market juncture was imminent.

It reached

a low on July 30, 1965, and continued upward with the
market.
1966.

The Debit Balance plateaued, beginning in February,
However, a Monthly

Debit Balance figure was recorded

38Humphrey B. Neill,N e i 11 Letter of Contrary
(Saxtons River, Vermont:
February 14, T § 6 6 ) .
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for April 29, 1966, meaning that the speculators shrewdly
increased their commitments immediately prior to the
second crest in April.

Although the Debit Balance did

plateau, such action could not be perceived until after the
second market crest.

The service of the Debit Balance was

that of a lagging indicator.
Bear Market Bottons, 1957-1967.

During the summer of

1957, Neill gave emphatic exception to the universal agree
ment among the public.

Neill asserted:

", . . the public's

opinion appears to be swinging strongly to the market's
going-up-again viewpoint.

Thus it appears that businessmen

and average-men look for a higher stock market over coming
months." 3 9

With the unanimous opinion extremely optimistic

and bullish for the year 1957, the stock market witnessed a
bear market which bottomed out on October 22, 1957.

Neill's

comment on July 17, 1957, was as follows:
It is not often that opinions become as one-sided
as they appear to be today.
The striking reaction
a contrarian gets from the recent surveys and group
viewpoints is that the deceptive New Era idea has
taken root in so many mature minds.
Ag'a in, it is a
reminder of 1928-29 and 1936-37, notwithstanding
those who retort that this era is "different."
The
resemblance may later prove a shock to current
complacency. 4<->

39Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letters of Contrary Opinion
(July 17, 1957).
40Ibid.
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Neill’s remarks proved to be prophetic as the market
suffered a precipitous decline.

The Contrary Thinking

Theory, used in conjunction with the Balances, signalled the
upturn which followed the market bottom.

Table A-5 in

Appendix A illustrates the movement of both Balances during
the bottom of 1957.

In addition, Chart III-2 graphically

illustrates the movement of these Balances at all market
bottoms which were examined.
The Monthly Credit Balance decreased throughout the
period of the market decline.

This development indicates

that the round-lot public increased their purchases as the
market started its downward slide.

The Credit Balance

reached bottom on April 30, 1957, as funds left on deposit
with brokers were committed to purchases of securities.

The

plateau which formed slightly before the market bottom
indicated that heavy public participation was still very
much in evidence in the market, although the level of the
plateau was slightly higher than the Credit Balance bottom.
The plateau indicated some degree of convergence, although
it was not as distinguishable at the juncture as it was
immediately thereafter.
After the market bottom of October 22,

1957, the market

then entered a period of congestion with little fluctuation.
It was during this congestion range that both Balances gave
lucid, easily establishable signals of a market upturn.
Both Balances rose rapidly, and the market followed.
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The Monthly Debit Balance plateaued throughout the
decline, which indicated that speculators were skeptical and
reluctant to increase their commitments.

However, on

October 31, 1957, the Debit Balance dropped rapidly which
indicated that the speculators had left the market.

The

Debit Balance continued to drop, while the market remained
relatively stable.

The Debit Balance then increased and

moved upward simultaneously with the market.
The Monthly Credit Balance began its upward climb on
May 31, 1957, which made it a leading indicator of a market
reversal by almost five months.

The Monthly Debit Balance

gave evidence that the speculators decreased their margin
accounts rather apathetically during the market decline.
In the rise that followed, speculators engaged in almost
panic buying.

The indication of the Debit Balance followed

closely the movement of stock prices and gave no leading
indication of a reversal of the bear trend.

While the

market was in its congestion range, however, speculators
increased their commitments rapidly.

Thus the Debit Balance

led price increases in the early stages of the gradual u p 
trend.

The Debit Balance rose rapidly as a result of almost

panic buying on the part of the speculators.
The market decline in 1960 will probably be discussed
at length for quite a few years to come because there was
much argument as to whether it was a secondary reaction or
a primary bear market.
moot question.

For purposes of this study, it is a

However, the Financia1 WorId took emphatic
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exception to those who termed the decline a secondary r e 
action.

Financia1 WorId stated:

. . the stock market

embarked on its biggest binge since the late

'twenties, a

wild speculative orgy that ended--as all previous ones have-in a slide of c a t a c l y s m s proportions." 41
Since the dip was regarded as a rather serious one, it
is analyzed thoroughly despite the fact that the bottom
does not strictly adhere to R h ea ’s definition of a primary
bear market.

Selden points out, however, that " . . .

the

decline is usually much more rapid than the previous adva nee .1,42
Monthly Balance figures in Table A-6 of the Appendix
reveal that the Credit Balance began to decline prior to the
market top of early I960 and proceeded to decrease through
out the entire market decline.

The Credit Balance actually

reached bottom on April 29, 1960, and then began its upward
climb.

The fact that the rising Credit Balance was con

verging on the falling stock market became obvious at the
end of July,

1960.

The Monthly Credit Balance began to

lead the increase in stock prices by about three months.
The concept of convergence and its implication of a nearterm market reversal are very well illustrated at the market
bottom of October 25, 1960.

^"Extraordinary Delusions," Financia1 W o r I d , Vol. 124,
No. 26 (December 29, 1965), p. 3.
^ G e o r g e C. Selden, Psychology of the Stock Market
(Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company^ T9S5y^ pi 17.
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The Monthly Debit Balance touched bottom on July 29,
1960, and then moved upward.

A large increase in the Debit

Balance had been recorded by the end of August,

I960, which

meant that this Balance was also converging with the market.
An especially strong signal was provided since both balances
confirmed the bottom by converging with the market.
Both Balances continued to increase, thus paralleling
the upward trend in the market.

The rising Debit Balance

may be interpreted to mean that the speculators were
accounting for the first stages of a new bull market trend,
while the rising Credit Balance illustrated that the roundlot public was abstaining from the stock market during the
early stages of the advance--a time when they should have
been buying.
The market bottom of 1962 was a "double bottom" forma
tion, with the first bottom occurring on June 26, and the
second taking place on October 23.
The Monthly Credit Balance reached a temporary bottom
at the end of April,
two months.

1962, and then increased for the next

The temporary bottom and the ephemeral increase

in the Credit Balance gave evidence that a rally would occur
in the near future.

The upswing in the Credit Balance led

the brief increase in stock prices on the secondary reaction
by approximately one month.

On June 26, the market hit

bottom and then exhibited a pronounced reversal of trend,
which gave surface indications that an uptrend was in the
making.

However,

the Credit Balance once more decreased
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sharply and indicated a renewed interest on the part of the
round-lot public.

The Credit Balance reached its final

bottom at the end of September and then showed a distinct
rise by the end of October, as illustrated by Chart III-2
and Table A-7 in the Appendix.

The increase in the Monthly

Credit Balance was coincident with the upsurge in stock
prices, rising in gear with the market toward the end of
October.
The Monthly Debit Balance proved to be a good indicator
in both instances.

The Debit Balance decreased during the

market decline and barely missed bottom at the end of June,
1962.

The final bottom for the Debit Balance was reached

at the end of July, and the concept of convergence became
pronounced.

The increase in speculator commitments during

August signalled that the market bottom was near, and the
Debit Balance then led the market in its upward course by
almost two months.

By failing to increase in June, the

Debit Balance gave warning that the secondary reaction did
not represent the formation of a true primary uptrend and
that another bottom would follow.

Speculators decreased

their commitments into stocks as prices fell, and holdings
reached a low level coincident with the first market bottom.
Technicians who followed the Debit and Credit Balances were
given ample indication of the subsequent upturn and were
able to capitalize on the reversal of trend in the market.
At the bottoms of 1962, examination of the Monthly
Credit Balance revealed that the round-lot public increased
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stock commitments during the entire decline and did not
complete purchasing until the second market bottom.

Ap

parently the public believed that 1962 marked another new
era market, where prices would never cease to go higher.
Wyckoff says, however, that:

"The market actually is very

old; only we who participate in it are new."

43

Fred c. Kelly

and Sullivan Burgess once remarked:
Our New Era market (1920's) could hardly have
ended in any other way than it did, in a panic.
People had to be dynamited out of the idea that
they were dealing only in prices and not in values.
Seemingly intelligent folk actually began to
believe that only minor reactions were ever needed,
and that broad upward trend could last forever.44
From the standpoint of the Balances, the juncture of
1966 is perhaps the most peculiar on record.
reached for a double top on April 21,
its downward course.

The market

1966, and then began

The terminal point of the bear market

was reached on October 7, 1966.
has previously been analyzed,

Although the top of 1966

it is necessary to synthesize

the top and bottom of 1966 in order to determine over-all
public participation in one of the most perplexing of all
ma r ke t pe r iod s .
Since Neill mentioned that advisory services became
bullish in January,

1966, the many "public readers" were

43Wyckoff, op. c i t ., p. 76.
44

Fred C. Kelly and Sullivan Burgess, How Shrewd
Speculators win (Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company,
1^64) , pp. l T ^ 120.
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apparently encouraged to become bullish and to purchase
stocks.

After the second market top, the market began to

drop quickly.

The Theory of Contrary Thinking is perhaps

one of the better market tools when one detects the influ
ence of the "public opinion moulders" which encourage
unanimous thought by the majority.
The Monthly Credit Balance first gave evidence of
round-lot public participation in June, 1966, two months
after the second top formed in the market.

Although the

round-lot public entered the market, it entered much later
than usual.

The round-lot public entered the market on the

decline as opposed to immediately prior to the market top.
Bernard Baruch once asserted:

"All economic movements, by
45
their very nature, are motivated by crowd psychology."

Baruch also stated:
Although there be no scientific cure, yet, as in
all primitive, unknown (and therefore diabolic)
spells, there may be potent incantantions. I have
always thought that if, in the lamentable era of the
"New Economics," culminating in 1929, even in the
very presence of dizzily spiralling prices, we had
all continuously repeated, "two and two still make
four," much of the evil might have been averted.4 ^
The round-lot public participated continuously during
the market decline and during a few months of the recovery.
However, the round-lot public began to liquidate its

Bernard M. Baruch in the foreword of the book by
Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the
Madness of Crowd's (New York:
L . C. Page & Co., I n c. ,' 1966)
46Ibid.
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securities in December,

1966, before the market underwent

any appreciable rise.
The Monthly Debit Balance peaked at the end of April,
1966, approximately the same time that the second market
top was formed.

Speculators then began a steady reduction

of their commitments, with real evidence being provided by
the low figures at the end of September and the final
bottom at the end of October.

Speculators increased their

stock holdings until the market reached its second crest,
then reduced their stock holdings during the entire d e
cline, and reached a low point almost coincident with the
final market bottom.

Speculators were selling their

securities to the public as the market entered its downward
movement.

It should also be mentioned that the Monthly

Debit Balance plateaued from December,

1965, to August,

1966, which indicated that speculators were dubious and
opposed to an increase in their holdings.
The F i na nc ia 1 w o r l d , like Neill, showed very much
skepticism.

On December 29, 1965, Financia1 World stated:

When too many people begin to believe they can
make a lot of money in the market quickly and
easily, prudent investors would do well to prepare
for the inevitable.
Once again brokers* board
rooms are filled to standing capacity with hordes
of tape-watchers. Many of the more gullible are
succumbing to the frequent and persistent rumors
that are making the rounds.4 ”

47"Extraordinary Delusions," Financial W o r I d , o p . c i t .,
p. 3.
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Confucius, the sage for another era, once remarked:

"The

superior man makes demands upon himself; the inferior man
makes demands upon o t h e r s . C o n f o r m i s t s

have apparently

fared poorly in the annals of the stock market, but the
correlation between man's ability to think and success has
never been in greater evidence than during the bear market
of 1966.

Such success brings to mind the great wisdom of

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow:
The heights by great men won and kept
Were not attained by sudden flight
For they, while their companions slept,
Were toiling upwards in the night.
It should be indicated that the followers of the
Balances, despite their lagging relationships, probably
left the market at a time when losses were not great.

At

the market bottom, both Balances followed the initial rise
in stock prices.
December,

Neither Balance signalled an upturn until

1966, some two months after the market bottom.

Both Balances then paralleled the market in its upward
spiral.

The lagging Balances enabled the followers of the

Balances to join the market at a time when one could have
participated and enjoyed an appreciable market rise.

The

junctures of 1966, more than any other critical points
investigated, indicated the necessity of using the Balances

48As quoted by Walter A. Heiby, Live Your Life (New
York;
Harper & Row Publishers, 1966)"i
65.
49Ibid., p. 47.
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in conjunction with the Contrary Thinking Theory.

The 1966

junctures, as evidenced by the commentaries of Neill and
the Financia1 W o r l d , were associated with unanimous opinion
and thought that were more one-sided than at any other
juncture.

Granville contends:

"Human nature being what it

is, the public majority is unfortunately wedded to majority
opinion despite the fact that the stock market has proven
such opinion wrong at the most critical times, just prior to
major market turns.
Summary.

From the preceding analysis,

it is readily

seen that there are worthwhile indicators to aid the market
technician in ascertaining the type of buying and selling
which is transpiring in the market place.

The Monthly

Credit Balance indicates the round-lot public, the generally
uninformed segment of the market place.

The round-lot pub

lic has a propensity to begin purchasing near or at the
zenith of a market movement and then expanding these pur
chases during the market decline.

Generally the round-lot

public will purchase securities on the downward move to the
proximity of the bottom.

Although the round-lot public is

essentially right in purchasing near a market bottom, they
are decidedly wrong in liquidating their portfolios as the
market begins to rise.

The beginning of the market rise

50J. E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market
Timing for Maximum ProfiT,~op^ c i t ., p. 162.
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marks the precise time when securities should be purchased
rather than sold.
The Monthly Debit Balance represents the apparently
more astute group in the market known as speculators.
Speculators are generally characterized by increasing their
stock commitments as the market begins to rise and then
reducing these holdings as the market declines.

The timing

of the speculators is generally good and is in contrast to
that of the public.

While the speculators buy low and sell

high, the public appears to buy at higher prices and sell
at lower prices.

The action of the two Balances lends

credence to the market maxim that for every seller, there is
a buyer and conversely, for every buyer, there is a seller.
The Monthly Credit Balance served as a valuable,
leading indicator of all market tops, with the exception of
the 1966 crest.

The Credit Balance gave leading indications

of the tops from one to four months, and it thus allowed the
astute market technician to determine the entrance and
degree of public participation.

By knowing from one to four

months ahead of time that the public had entered the market,
it allowed the intelligent trader ample time to liquidate
his securities prior to the anticipated downturn.

Neill

advises:
The ideal situation is a result of your having
timed your actions so that you precede the public
in buying--that is, buy when stocks are being
accumulated--then you can go along with the
majority during the major portion of the advance,
and can part company at definite signs of in
creased public participation without corresponding
progress in the movement of the stock.
The
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greatest public participation is near and at the
tops, because as tie have learned, rising prices
attract a f olloti ing .51
The Credit Balance does not confirm the idea that the
round-lot public is always wrong.

Essentially, the public

is right during a portion of the major trends, but it is
wrong at the critical junctures where the market is readying
for a pronounced reversal of trend.
Of the four p>eriods reviewed, only in the 1966 period
did the Credit Balance fail to give a leading indication of
a market top.

The Credit Balance was a lagging indicator

by some two months, but it did illustrate that the roundlot public accumulated stocks during the decline in the
mark et.
For the market bottoms tested, the Monthly Credit
Balance was

once a coincident indicator and twice a leading

indicator of the terminal points of bear markets.

Only in

1966 did the Credit Balance actually not provide a strong
signal, as it was a lagging indicator by some two months.
The Credit Balance, however, did turn upward shortly there
after and parallel the market rise.
The Monthly Debit Balance was also a leading indicator
of market tops in every instance tested with the exception
of the 1966 top.

It should be recalled that the Debit

Balance may give an indication of a market top by either
diverging from the market or by plateauing.

The divergence

■^Neill, Tap>e Reading and Market Tactics, op. cit.,
p. 47.
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process usually occurred approximately one or two months
prior to the downturn of the market, while the plateau
process started several months before the market top.

Es

pecially strong signals are given when the two Balances
confirm each other; that is, acting together and diverging
from the rising market prior to the market reversal.
The Monthly Debit Balance was also an excellent indica
tor of stock market bottoms.

As in the analysis of market

tops, the Debit Balance proved to be a strong leading indi
cator in every instance except the 1966 bottom, where it
lagged by approximately two months.

In most cases the Debit

Balance was a leading indicator by some two to three months
and illustrated the concept of convergence, where it began
to rise and converge on the falling stock market.

At the

juncture of 1957, the Debit Balance was a coincident indica
tor, paralleling the market rise and still providing a
useful signal.
Now that the speculator and the round-lot public have
been investigated,

it is necessary to delve into the actions

of the odd-lot public.

By investigating the actions of the

odd-lot public, a picture will be obtained of the professi
onals

(speculators), the round-lot public, and the odd-lot

public.

Constituents of the odd-lot public will be con

trasted with the round-lot m m b e r s and an over-all view of
public participation will be gained.

CHAPTER IV
QDD-LOTTERS AND MARKET JUNCTURES
There is a tide in the affairs
of men, which taken at the flood,
leads on to fortune; omitted, all
the voyage of their life is bound
in shallows and in miseries.
-- William Shakespeare
Stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange are
generally traded in round lots or in lots of one hundred
shares.

(There are approximately 200 issues which trade

in lots of 10 shares, most of these being preferred and
high-priced,

low-volume issues.)

In most cases, however,

one who desires to buy or sell in quantities of less than
one hundred shares is considered to be an "odd-lot" in
vestor.

About 99 percent of the odd-lot volume is handled

by two brokerage firms:
& Doremus.

Carlisle & Jacquelin and De Coppet

Odd-lot transactions are reported as prelimi

nary figures on the ticker tape before noon of each trading
day.

These reported figures relate to the trading of the

immediately preceding market day.

Some two weeks later

the Securities and Exchange Commission publishes the final
figures.

Preliminary figures are far the more valuable as

forecasting devices since they are more timely.

Walter

Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis,

91

92

made the completion of this section possibly by furnishing
such preliminary, odd-lot trading data.
Predictive yalue of Odd-Lot D a t a .

One of the most

exhaustive studies ever conducted on odd-lot data was made
by the Brookings Institution (1920 - 1938) and published
in book form by Charles Hardy.

Hardy concluded that the

behavior of the odd-lot trading public was contrary to
those (professionals) who dominated the price movements.^
Hardy asserted:

"In general, unless either the net balance

or the price change was very small, the public net sales
were followed by price advances, and public net purchases
were followed by price declines."

2

Hardy continues by stating:

"This phenomenon has been

observed frequently enough to give rise to a tradition that
the public is always wrong or is wrong so often that the
movements of the odd-lot balance furnish a serviceable
forecaster of stock prices."

3

Hardy then apparently re

verses his position by contending:

"In the writer's judg

ment, however, the correlations have little or no real
forecasting value, because a forecast based on the behavior
of the odd-lot public would be substantially the same as

^For a complete treatment of this thesis, see Charles
0. Hardy, 03d Lot Trading on the New York Stock Exchange
(Washington, D. C."i The Brookings I ns t it ut ion , 1939) .
2Ibid., pp. 61-62.
^Ibid.
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one based on the movements of the market itself."

4

Atten

tion will be focused on Hardy's contention that the
correlations have little or no forecasting value.
Underlying Theory of the Odd Lots.

Garfield Drew, the

originator of the Odd-Lot Theory, states that odd-lot data
"are a fairly recent innovation and, for the first time in
Stock Exchange history, have afforded definite information
on the question of who is doing what."5

Drew also advocates

the use of preliminary figures as opposed to the final
figures of the SEC, as he mentions that the latter "comes
too late to be of much significance."^
Granville apparently supports Hardy's initial conten
tion that odd-lotters do represent the trading public.
states:

He

"The public usually buys and sells stock in lots

of less than lOO shares and thus the odd-lot figures best
7
reflect what the public is doing."
Loeb says:
"People
who depend more on the buying or selling quality information
given by the odd-lot figures are in a far better position
to know of a coming trend before it actually starts."

4 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit in the Stock
Market {Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company” 1966),
p.' 193.
^Ibid., p . 194.
7

Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market
Timing For Maximum Profit (Englewood cTTff s , New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.~ 1966), p. 76.
Q
Gerald M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Surviva1
(New York;
Simon and Schuster, 1963)“ pT 76.
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Drew says that technicians should be vitally concerned with
the odd-lotter because he is a "creature of emotion with
o
his psychology and reactions."
Drew also states:
"The
trading public is ordinarily most interested in this day,
this week, and this month." 10

In another of his classic

articles on odd-lot behavior, Drew maintains:

There are

classic, consistent patterns of mass behavior which appear
in the varying quantities of odd-lot buying and selling;
from these, much can be learned about future probabili
ties."^

The findings of the Brookings Institution that

80 to 95 percent of all odd-lot trades were turned over
within one month during the eighteen-year-study illustrated
that odd-lotters apparently succumb to emotions and the desire to make a quick profit. 12

In view of the character

istically rapid turnover of shares held by odd-lot traders,
it is understandable that one could contend that the public
is victimized by emotion and sentiment.

Drew says that "It

is fair to say that changes in odd-lot trading are evidence

o
Garfield A. Drew, "The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter,"
Barron's, Vol. XLII, No. 26 (June 25, 1962), p. 5.
"^Garfield A. Drew, "The Odd Lotters," A Treasury of
Wall Street Wisdom, edited by Harry D. SchuTtz and Samson
Coslow (Palisades Park, New Jersey:
Investors' Press, Inc.,
1966), p. 164.
^Drew,
12

"The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter," o£. c i t ., p. 5.

See Hardy, op* cit., p. 65.
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of shifts in public sentiment."

13

The theory^-4 alleges that trading patterns of the oddlotters usually fall into the same sequence in relation to
cyclical swings of stock prices, as well as on the shorter
term moves.

According to Drew, odd-lotters are purported

to regard a decisive price decline as a bargain day, and
they begin to buy heavily on balance.

As the slide is sus

tained, however, the confidence of the odd-lot segment is
shaken and a reduction of odd-lot purchases is witnessed.
When prices increase, the theory maintains that the oddlotters are dubious concerning the extent of the advance
and reduce their holdings.

Ultimately, however, the per

sistence of the advance overcomes the skepticism and the
odd-lot public buys on balance.

According to the Odd-Lot

Theory, the odd-lot public manages its portfolios in a
manner similar to the round-lot public in that it does not
join an advance until near the top or just subsequent to
the market crest.

After a market bottom has been reached,

the public supposedly liquidates its portfolios, thus
illustrating a lack of timing in the market.
Walter Heiby is another proponent of the Odd-Lot Theory
and a staunch supporter of Garfield Drew.

Heiby says that

. these odd-lotters are quite representative of the

13D rew, "The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter," o£. cit., p. 5.
14For a complete treatment of the Odd-Lot Theory and
its many implications, see Garfield Drew, New Methods for
Prof it in the Stock M ar k et , op. cit.
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general public.” '*'5

Heiby confirms Drew's idea that odd-

lotters are creatures of emotion, as he states:

"Odd-

lotters, as a group, act in ways that suggest a considerable
sensitivity to the immediate trend of stock prices.""*-^
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that such theories do
have some merit.

On May 28, 1962, the Dow-Jones Industrial

Average dipped 34.95 points and became known as "Black
Monday."

As a concurrent reaction to such a dip, odd-

lotters sold more than thirteen shares for each ten that
were purchased.

However, on May 30, 1962, odd-lotters re

versed their position and purchased approximately three
shares for each one sold.
On November 3, 1948, the entire nation was stunned when
President Truman won the presidential election.

On that

day, the odd-lotters sold some five shares for every four
that were purchased.

On the next day, however, odd-lotters

purchased approximately 10 shares for every six which were
sold.
Misunderstandings of the T heory.

As a result of the

complexity of the Odd-Lot Theory, there have been many re
sulting misconceptions.

There are at least two important

factors which have been largely overlooked by the vast
majority.

First, the Brookings study explicitly states that

15Wa Iter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic
Synthesis (Chicago, Illinois: The Institute of Dynamic
Synthes is, Inc., 1965), p. 157.
l6Ibid,, p. 159.
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some 6 percent of odd-lot purchases are made by "investors"
who are concerned with the long pull.

These investors

purchase blue-chip stocks for storage in bank boxes and
completely dismiss the idea of selling them.

Any moderate

excess of odd-lot purchases over sales, therefore, may
represent an excess of selling so far as the active public
trading element is concerned.
to be sure,

The public trading element,

is almost the entire part of the whole as re

lating to the odd-lot transactions.
Secondly, Drew states:
...because odd-lot trading is essentially a
speculative quick turn affair--its volume is
always directly proportional to the total volume
of trading. Therefore, it is not the number of
shares bought or sold on balance that is
important, but the proportions of buying or
selling to each other.17
Since the total amount of odd-lot trading is a relative
constant as it relates to total trading volume, the number
of shares bought or sold on balance by the odd-lotters is
not a primary consideration.

The proportions of buying or

selling to each other, however, represent the essential
criterion to gauge the activities of the general odd-lot
segment of the market place.
Indicators in the St u d y .

In order to determine the

financial acumen of the odd-lot public, certain indicators

17Drew, New Methods For Profit in the Stock Mar ket ,
op. cit., p. 198.
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are used.

1ft

These consist of the Weekly Balance Ratio, a

Balance Index, the Weekly Short Sales Ratio, and a Short
Sales index.

Before proceeding with the investigation,

it

is necessary to define each of the above.
The Weekly Balance Ratio is defined as total weekly
odd-lot sales divided by total weekly odd-lot purchases.
The Balance Index is a five-week moving average of the weekly
ratios of odd-lot selling to odd-lot buying.

Mathematically,

the moving average of the weekly figures is not completely
accurate, but it is easier than the more tedious methods of
deriving the five-week totals and then obtaining the Index
figures.

In addition, the calculations used illustrate the

trends as well as any other method and allows the technician
an opportunity to formulate a trend of odd-lot activity.
The Balance Ratio and the Balance Index both serve well as
an indicator of trends in odd-lot activities and public
sentiment.^

Drew regards the determination of the trend of

public sentiment as the key factor involved, stating:
important, however,

"Most

is the fact that the trend of sentiment

as indicated by the odd-lot balance of trading is more

1ft
For other variations of this same type of analysis,
see Walter A. Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic
Synthesis, op. cit. Also, see Garfield A, Drew, New
Methods For Profit in the Stock Market, o p . c i t .
l^ F o r a treatment of odd-lotter behavior, see "The OddLotter," Financial World, Vol. 120, No. 16 (October 16, 1963),
pp. 3, 23“
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important than the side on which the balance lies."

20

If the Odd-Lot Theory has merit and proves the public
to be wrong at critical market junctures, both the Weekly
Balance Ratio and the Balance Index should become lower on
market declines and at market bottoms.

This would be c on

strued as increased public participation as the market turns
downward.

Both indicators should increase when the stock

market turns upward, as the public begins selling during
the early stages of a market advance.

Heiby asserts that

the Balance Index and Balance Ratio are of primary value
when one can observe "the trend relative to the trend of
stock prices."

21

The other indicators employed in the study are the
Weekly short Sales Ratio and a Short Sales Index, these
being expressed in terms of percentages.

The odd-lotter

who sells short is of special interest because of the
comment made by Drew:
The odd-lot short seller is apparently a
different breed of cat than the average member
of the odd-lot public, which is not surprising,
since comparatively few members of the public
understand short selling and even fewer are
willing to put it into practice.
However, he is
even less right than the average odd-lot trader,
and the reactions of those willing to employ the
short side more nearly conform to the supposed
habits of the public than is indicated by the

20D rew , New Methods For Profit in the Stock Market,
o p . cit., p. 198.
2^Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic Synthesis,
op. cit., p. 205.
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buying and selling share balances themselves. 22
From Drew's comment, one could infer that if the odd-lotter
is truly wrong, then the odd-lot short seller is even more
wrong.

This proposition shall be tested.

The Short Sales Ratio is determined by dividing weekly
odd-lot short sales by total weekly odd-lot sales.

The

Short Sales Index is a five-week moving average of the Short
Sales Ratios, and it also allows the technician to formulate
a trend of odd-lot activity.

Both of these indicators have

a propensity to move in the opposite direction from the
stock market.

The Short Sales Ratio and Index both generally

rise as stock prices fall and decline as the market rises.
When the market reaches a bottom, the odd-lot short seller
is typically very busy.

Anthony Ludovici says that "... in

creases in odd-lot short sales usually precede a market
rally,"

23

Ludovici believes that "the more shares sold
24
short the more bullish the implication."
Therefore, both

the odd-lotters and the odd-lot short sellers should provide
an indication of over-all public sentiment.
These four indicators are employed to determine the
astuteness of the odd-lot public at the critical market
junctures.

Drew contends that the Balance Ratio and Index

22Drew, New Methods for Profit in the Stock Ma rke t, o p .
c i t ., p. 205.
23Anthony Ludovici, "Odd-Lot Short Sales Presage Market
Rally," The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 204,
No. 6622 (October 20, 1966)7 P» 1388 •
2 4 Ibid.
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are key determinants.

He also asserts:

the Short Sales Index, however,

"Corroboration by

is an important factor."

Pitfalls of the Balance Indicators.

25

At the end of

each calendar year, empirical evidence reveals that many
odd-lotters begin to liquidate their stocks for income tax
purposes.

Consequently,

selling at this time.

there is an abundance of odd-lot

If there is a buyer for every seller

and a seller for every buyer, each purchase is a sale and
each sale represents a purchase.

In odd-lot transactions,

however, "there is an intermediary, the odd-lot dealer, and
the number of shares purchased differs, in general, from
the number of shares sold.

Shares purchased and shares sold
9
are reported as distinct figures."
The abundance of odd-lot selling at the end of the year
results in a distortion of the Balance Index and the Balance
Ratio and both become larger.

Consequently, one could

easily misinterpret the Index to conclude that odd-lotters
are leaving the market as a result of public sentiment being
on the bearish side.

The distortion as a result of tax-

selling usually occurs between mid-November and the first
week in December, but there is no rigid date for the be 
ginning of tax-selling effects.

25Dr ew, "The Misunderstood Odd-Lotter," Barron's , o p .
cit., p. 22.
2 ^*Heiby, Stock Market Profits Through Dynamic Synthesis,
op. cit., p. 167.
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Now that the basic tenets of the Odd-Lot Theory have
been examined, an investigation of the odd-lot public at
critical market junctures will be conducted.

Odd-Lotters at Critical Market Junctures.

The odd-lot

public began purchasing stocks on balance in the middle of
October,

1955.

These purchases preceded the double top of

April 6, 1956, and August 2, 1956.

Chart IV-1 illustrates

the indicators and standard and Poor’s Average for all
critical junctures from 1956-1960.

The derived computations

of the indicators for the 1956 double top are presented in
Table B-l of Appendix B.
Odd-lotters purchased on balance from the middle of
October,

1955, until the second market top in August, 1956.

The odd-lot segment then continued to purchase on the de
cline which followed.

The action of the odd-lotters con

firms the thoughts of William L. Jiler, who states:

’’Toward

the end of an advance, odd-lotters begin to buy more than
normally.
its top.
very top.”

They continue to do so while the market is making
Often their buying becomes frenzied close to the
27

Granville says :

’’The sharp increase in the

on-balance odd-lot buying usually commences somewhere near
the end of the upswing and thus the informed elements are
pleased to accommodate the public with all the stock it

27
William L. Jiler, How Charts Can Help You in the
Stock Market (New York:
Trendline Corp., 1^66), p. 173.

103

M

'M l

O t» IO '

*U*L>(

*1

M M RI'

rU N C V U I

'*M *r

£
'

;i
1\

o { i

l-v
t

i i
i

I
1957

I

I
\

.

i f

:*

i

V

104
wants at the then advanced prices."

28

Continuing, Gr an

ville contends that when there is ". . . heavy public
participation on the bullish side, the time has come to
think about some serious selling."

29

The only noticeable

selling occurred in the calendar distortion period of
December,

1955.

Both of the market tops of 1956 were adequately de
picted by the odd-lot indicators.

The Balance Ratio and

the Balance Index were firmly corroborated by the Weekly
Short Sales Ratio and the Short Sales Index, the confirma
tion beginning at the first of the year 1956 and terminating
in August,

1956.

As the Balance Index and Ratio remained

low, the Short Sales indicators likewise were unusually d e 
pressed.

Such action is construed that the odd-lot public

was unusually bullish and purchased on-balance prior to the
tops and down the subsequent decline.

The odd-lot short-

sellers were concurrently bullish, as the Short Sales indi
cators reflected very little activity.
The Balance Ratio and Balance Index diverged from the
climbing market by mid-October,
prior to the market downturn.

1955, almost six months
However, the tax-selling

effect was present in December, thus nullifying an earlier
signal that the public had entered the market.

28

However, the

Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing
For Maximum Profit7 op. cit~7, pp~T~T7^7W.

^Ibid.
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Balance Index, corroborated by the Short Sales Index,
clearly signalled the market decline by some four months.
If one had studied the odd-lot data closely, he would have
easily understood that the double top formation indicated
only a struggling attempt by the market at the second top
to attain previous heights.

Heavy odd-lot purchases warned

the technician that the odd-lot public had entered the
market on a large scale, thus relegating the market to a
weaker technical position.

Consequently, the astute tech

nician understood that a market decline was imminent.
The bull market began on September 14, 1953, but the
odd-lot public was apparently not cognizant of such a move
until mid-October,

1955.

Odd-lotters joined the market late

in the trend and continued purchasing on the decline, proba
bly eroding most of the profits that had been realized late
on the upswing.
A market bottom was registered on October 22, 1957.
The general odd-lot public began to purchase on balance as
of late June,

1957, and continued to do so until May, 1958.

Computations to indicate the activity of the odd-lot public
are provided in Table B-2 of the Appendix.

The Short Sales

indicators decreased concurrently with the Balance Ratio and
the Balance Index, which meant that the general odd-lot
public and the odd-lot shorts were all confident that the
market would continue to rise.

The general odd-lot public,

as evidenced by the Balance Index and the Balance Ratio,
showed that they remained bullish all the way to the market
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bottom and for a slight portion of the advance.

Odd-lot

short sellers remained inactive until October,

immediately

prior to the market bottom.

Drew asserts that the odd-lot

short-seller "is only prodded into exceptional activity by
the spectacle of sharply declining prices, at which time he
proceeds to swim with the tide.'*30
The Weekly Odd-Lot Short Sales Ratio and the Short
Sales Index proved to be excellent indicators of the market
bottom in 1957 as both measures increased substantially at
approximately the market bottom.

The market then remained

in a congestion range until April,
able market rise was launched.

1958, before an appreci

By becoming active only at

the market bottom, the odd-lot short sellers apparently
confirmed Drew's contention that they are "even less right
than the average odd-lot trader."

31

Odd-lot short selling

reached a maximum coincident to the market bottom of 1957.
The Balance Ratio and the Balance Index, indicative of the
general odd-lot public as opposed to the odd-lot short
seller, revealed that the general public mistimed the market
movement.

The public purchased on the decline and apparent

ly watched paper profits diminish.

The general odd-lot

public was essentially correct in purchasing securities at
the bottom, but they were obviously wrong in selling as the

3(^Drew, "The Misunderstood O d d - L o t t e r B a r r o n ' s ,
c i t ., p. 22.

op.

31Drew, New Methods For Profit in the Stock Market., o p .
cit., p. 205.
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market began an appreciable rise in May,
graphically shown by Chart IV-1.

1958.

This is

It was in May,

1958, that

the odd-lotters started selling heavily on balance, as de
tected by the Balance Ratio and the Balance Index.

The

change in public sentiment proved to be most inopportune
and supports Drew's statement that "Changes of public sentiment are almost always wrong."

32

Granville contends that

the on balance selling by odd-lotters at the start of a
market advance ",

. • is only providing the professional

element with a grand opportunity to take the stock off their
hands at wholesale prices,"

The conduct of the majority

or odd-lot public at the market bottom of 1957 apparently
lends credence to Robert L. Smitley's thesis that "The
greatest majority are ruled entirely by their emotions and
are, therefore, the natural prey of those who think."

34

The double top of 1959 and early 1960 resembled very
much the double top of 1956.

The first top occurred on

July 29, 1959, and the second on January 5, 1960.

The

general odd-lot public began to purchase on balance at the
beginning of August, 1959,

immediately after the first

32Ibid., p. 199.
33Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing
For Maximum ProfitJ op. ci f T, p. 76.
^ F o r a treatment of this thesis, see Robert L.
Smitley, Popular Financial Delusions (Wells, Vermont:
Fraser Publishing Company, 1963).
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market top.

Table B-3 in the Appendix provides computations

necessary to understand odd-lot activity during this period.
Jiler says that odd-lotters " . . .

buy more than normally

during the beginning stage of a decline in the market.1*35
The initial stages of the on-balance buying were concurrent
with depressed Short Sales indicators,

indicating a very

bullish public sentiment.
The second market top in Figure IV-1 for 1960 was also
greeted with depressed figures for all indicators, meaning
that public opinion was still optimistic.

The odd-lot

public did not purchase on-balance until immediately after
the first market top, and then continued to purchase heavily
on-balance throughout the second market top and on the de
cline.

Both tops illustrated unanimity of public thought

and sentiment, as reflected by the indicators.

The concept

of unanimous thinking makes one recall the immortal words
of Charles F. "Pop" Kettering, who stated:
Whenever you look at a piece of work and you
think the fellow was crazy, then you want to pay
some attention to that.
One of you is likely to
be, and you had better find out which one it is.
It makes an awful lot of difference,
A technician who was conversant with odd-lot statistics
perceived the second market top as a struggling effort to
regain former heights.

The odd-lot public was heavily

35Jiler, op. c i t ., p. 173.
3^Charles F. Kettering, as cited by Walter A. Heiby,
Live Your Life (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1966),

PT15T:
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engaged in the market, and such buying apparently made the
market overbought and technically weak.

Schultz says that

M the market does not accommodate a majority, because it
cannot.

You can't have a majority of winners in anything,

be it horse-racing, or a turkey raffle, an election, rou37
lette, baseball, etc."
Wyckoff reiterates these thoughts,
stating:

"A moment's reflection will show that important

episodes in the market cannot possibly occur when the
majority thinks they will."88
The odd-lotters purchased on-balance as the market
entered its downward course, and they continued such activi
ty until mid-May,

1960, some four and one-half months after

the second market top.

The public actually maintained a

noimal sales to purchases relationship from mid-May until
the market bottom of October 25, I960.
Short Sales indicators again reached their greatest
heights at a time coincident with the market bottom, so they
provided excellent signals of the approaching market bottom.
The Weekly Short Sales Ratio and the Short Sales index
gradually increased on the market slide, reached a crest at
the market bottom of 1960, and then gradually decreased as
the market reversed and headed upward.

Harry D. Schultz, Bear Markets: How to Survive and
Make Money in Them (Englewood Cliffs, N. J . : Prentice -Hall,
Inc., 15^6), p. 112.
38

Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing,
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Pre ni ic e-Ha 11^ Inc .~ 1966 )~, p^ 137.
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Despite the strong possibility of tax selling towards
the end of the year, odd-lotters began selling on-balance
as of the end of November,

1960.

Sustained on-balance

selling continued during the initial stages of the bull
market.

An especially strong bull market signal was given

because both the Balance indicators and the Short Sales
indicators confirmed, which indicated universal sentiment
among the public.

The public sentiment had changed to the

bearish side, which forced the technician to consider that
there was a strong possibility of an approaching bull
market.

The odd-lot public bought heavily during the

initial stages of the decline, but they were essentially
correct in not participating heavily throughout the entire
dec line.
Neither of the top and bottom formations of 1961-62
and of 1966 adhered strictly to the definitions employed
for primary bull and bear markets.

As a result of their

brevity, the top and bottom formations for both of these
markets will be condensed to two analyses.
To reiterate, the brief bull market of 1961 had its
inception on July 18, 1961, and culminated on December 12,
1961.

Chart IV-2 illustrates the actions of the odd-lot

segments at both of these critical junctures in the market.
Table B-5 in the Appendix contains computations which
summarize all odd-lot activity.

The brief surge upward

indicated that the technical position was apparently strong.
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The general odd-lot public sold on balance on the advance
to the market top and illustrated Gilbert Haller's thesis
that a serious "weakness of the majority is their disbelief
in change." 39

Haller continues by saying:

"Most people do

not expect or prepare for changes in the status quo.

They

believe that things will continue indefinitely just as they
40
are right now."
Apparently, the upward movement was so
brief that the odd-lotters did not have time to adjust and
enter the market, even during the latter stages of the move
ment.

As a result, no top was signalled by the actions of

the general odd-lot public.
Immediately following the market top, there was a
congestion range present in the market

(Standard and Poor's

Average fluctuated within a range of about two points).
This condition prevailed until the beginning of April,

1962.

By mid-May, odd-lotters began to purchase on balance heavi
ly.

The technical position of the market was apparently

weakened substantially, which resulted in one of the
steepest declines ever witnessed in the stock market.
Standard and Poor's Composite Average plummetted twenty
points, or an equivalent drop in the Dow-Jones Industrial
Average of approximately two hundred points.

The brief bear

market of only 103 days contained a concomitant drop in the

3 ^Gilbert Haller, The Ha H e r Theory of Stock Market
Trends (West Palm Beach, Florida: GilberT-Haller, 1063),

p /'ss:
4°Ibid.
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DJIA of 187.78 points, which meant that this average almost
reflected representation of the market as a whole.
The odd-lot public continued to buy heavily on balance
until after mid-July,
June 26, 1962.

1962, well past the market bottom of

The public began heavy on-balance selling

toward the end of July, and the market began to rise
appreciably.
The activity of odd-lot short-sellers made the market
of 1961-62 very difficult to interpret.

At the market top

and during the early stages of the decline, the odd-lot
shorts were optimistic, as reflected by the depressed Short
Sales measures.

At the same time, the general odd-lot

public was selling heavily on balance and this indicated
that they were very pessimistic.

However, the Weekly Short

Sales Ratio and the Short Sales Index reached a peak at
precisely the market bottom.

The odd-lot short sellers were

incorrect because they increased their activity at the
lowest point of the market.
as the market turned upward.

Consequently, they were short
After the market bottom, both

indicators signalled that a rally was imminent, and they
led the market upward.
The odd-lot public reacted to the market of 1966 much
as they did in 1961-62.

chart lv-2 and Table B-6 in the

Appendix compare the two markets.

Odd-lotters sold heavily

on balance during the entire advance toward the market top
of January 18, 1966, and thus they did not join the market
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late in the stages of the upward advance.

The market of

1966, however, formed a double top, the second top oc
cur ing on April 22, 1966.

There was a brief period of

on-balance buying preceding the second market top, but it
was not a sustained movement by the odd-lotters.
ceding statement should be qualified, however.

The pre
The odd-

lotters bought on balance throughout most of 1966, but the
buying was slight and not construed to be in excess of the
normal sales-to-purchases relationship.

On May 6, 1967,

Business Week stated that the odd-lotters "started buying
stocks on balance as of January,

1966,"

41

but they failed

to point out that odd-lotters normally buy on balance to a
slight extent.

Empirical evidence suggests that the normal

Balance Ratio and Balance Index usually are in the proximity
of 90, which corresponded with the figures for that particu
lar time period.

Evidence provided by the tables in

Appendix B is in agreement with this norm of 90.

Therefore,

despite the fact that the statistics revealed slight onbalance buying, there was not enough deviation from the norm
to provide a signal for the subscribers of the odd-lot
theory.
However, Business week pointed out that "Anyone who
firmly believes--and staunchly practices--the theory that
small investors are the w o r l d ’s biggest suckers has probably

41»Is the Odd-Lotter Always Wrong?"
May 6, 1967, p. 147.

Business W e e k ,
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made a killing in the stock market in the past two years.”

42

The article continues by suggesting that "the public is
lured into the market after a lengthy price r'.se and sells
out after a lengthy decline."4^

Business W e e k , like Neill,

strongly believes that the public opinion moulders induced
the public to participate at the wrong time.
should recall the words of Wilbur Wright:

However, one

"The only birds

that talk are parrots, and they don't fly very high."

44

Although slight on-balance buying persisted throughout
much of the 1966 market, heavy, sustained on-balance buying
was evidenced by the Balance Ratio and the Balance Index at
the end of July,

1966.

Such heavy purchases continued past

the market bottom of October 7, 1966.

On-balance buying

continued until the end of October, 1966.

Heavy on-balance

selling then became noticeable and led the market upward.
Business Week quotes James Dines, head of a market advisory
service, as saying that "it is essential for the public to
. .
45
remain bearish if a bull market is to retain its virility."
Dines was also quoted as saying:

"The moment the public

starts agreeing with us we are going to start selling out--

42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44W ilbur Wright, as cited by Walter A. Heiby, Live
Your Life, o p . c i t ., p. 67.
4 **"Is the Odd-Lotter Always Wrong?"
May 6, 1967, oji. c i t ., p. 147.

Business W e e k ,
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by the theory of Positive Negativism.”46
The Short Sales indicators confirmed the action of the
Balance indicators, because the Balance indicators decreased
before the market top, as did the Short Sales indicators.
Apparently, there was universal sentiment toward continually
higher prices.

Schultz says that the "market direction

tends to reverse about the time that everybody is on board;
i.e., agreed on which way the market is going."

47

Professor

Lawrence of Princeton once asked, "Where is that group of
men with the all-embracing wisdom which will entitle them to
veto the judgment of the intelligent multitude?"4 ®
It should be mentioned that the Weekly Short Sales Ratio
and the Short Sales Index again reached a crest precisely at
the market bottom, serving as an excellent indicator of a
reversal of trend.

The odd-lot short-sellers were wrong b e 

cause they stepped up their activity feverishly at the market
bottom and were confronted with a sharp upturn in the market.
Summary.

The odd-lot indicators employed in the study

proved excellent in depicting the market junctures studied.
Although good indications were generally provided at market
tops and bottoms, the indicators were perhaps more decisive

4 6Ibid.
47schultz, 0£. c it., p. 173.
48Ibid., p. 113.
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at the bottoms.

The clearer picture is the result of the

public apparently becoming scared and "shaken out" at
market bottoms.
Empirical evidence revealed by the tables in Appendix B
confirms the theory that odd-lotters normally buy slightly
on balance.

This study shows that odd-lotters normally

purchased about 10 shares for every nine sold, resulting in
a Balance Ratio of .9000.

Therefore,

it would be incorrect

to say that odd-lotters were actually buying on balance when
the Balance indicators were .9000 or slightly higher.
By gaining an understanding of the above norm, one can
discredit a popular theory developed over the years by the
uninformed.

Many individuals have misconstrued this slight

on-balance buying phenomenon by believing that the oddlotter is well-informed and quite astute in his perception
of market movements.

However, this study has revealed that

the odd-lotter has not profited handsomely from his predilec
tion for buying.

In view of the rapidity of turnover of

odd-lot transactions and the lack of financial acumen at the
critical junctures, one can hardly contend that slight onbalance buying by odd-lotters has benefitted them in the
aggregate.
The Balance Ratio and the Balance Index revealed that
the general odd-lot public usually purchased immediately
before or immediately after a market top and then continued
their purchases on the decline.

The public was not wrong in
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the sense that they purchased at the market bottoms, but
they were invariably wrong in selling as each market advance
was launched.
It may be concluded from the study that the Short Sales
Index is less useful at tops than bottoms.

True, it is

generally low at market tops, but it may have been just as
low for some time while the market

was increasing.

Short

Sales indicators are valuable at market tops primarily b e 
cause they reflect the sentiment of a portion of the odd-lot
public; namely, the odd-lot "shorts."

When the sentiment of

the entire odd-lot public is bullish (Balance and Short
indicators low), the technician would consider this as a
bearish signal and begin to liquidate portfolios.

Con

versely, when the odd-lot public is bearish (Balance and
Short indicators high), the technician knows that the time
has come to enter the market.
The odd-lot short sellers were usually wrong in that
they decreased

their activity at market tops and on the

initial phases

of the decline.

In addition, odd-lot short-

sellers were apparently governed by emotion around market
bottoms because their activity was the greatest at a time
when they should have been considering a long position.
most instances

In

the odd-lot short-sellers confirmed the

action of the general odd-lot public,
sentiment on the part of the public.
usually been wrong in this study.

reflecting universal
Public sentiment has

In every case, a change

in public sentiment was very much incorrect and just the
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opposite of what it should have been in order to maximize
profits on stock trading.
The odd-lot investigation has substantiated the pre
ceding conclusion that the public is usually wrong at the
critical junctures of the market.

The odd-lot public is

essentially right during a portion of primary trends, but
it is wrong or "less correct"

in its actions just before

the market embarks on an important change in trend.

Ap

parently the public has a tendency to buy on weakness and
sell on strength.
Since the odd-lot theory has proved its merit in an
application to forecasting aggregate market trends,

it

would perhaps be beneficial to apply the theory to other
areas.

Attention will now be focused on the value of the

odd-lot theory as it relates to individual issues.

CHAPTER V
AN APPLICATION OF THE ODD-LOT THEORY
TO INDIVIDUAL SECURITIES
Follow the course opposite to custom
and you will almost always do well.
-- Jean Jacques Rousseau
The odd-lot investors, in the aggregate, are generally
wrong in their analysis of stock market trends.

Granville

has mentioned that odd-lotters do represent the public and
one should perceive their actions quite carefully.
marks:

He r e 

". . . public opinion is always considered to be

synonymous with majority opinion."1

Results of this study

are confirmed by James Dines, who states:

"Our most

important device for gauging the market as a whole is an
2
evaluation of public opinion."
Recently, however, there has been much conjecture
concerning the validity of odd-lot data relating to indi
vidual securities.

Leslie M. Pollack, director of research

Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market
Timing For Maximum Profit (Englewood cTTffs, to. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.^ 1966), p. 80.
2
James Dines, "A Peek is worth Two Finesses," Encyclo
pedia of Stock Market Techniques (Larchmont, N. Y . :
Investors Intelligence" Inc., 1965), p. 83.
120
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at Reynolds & C o . , has been quoted as saying that "The
odd-lot theory may even be more valid for individual
3
stocks than for the over-all market."
Since the correla
tion of odd-lot data and individual securities has been
tested very little empirically, Pollack's statement mill
be examined closely.
Methodology.

Odd-lot data on individual stocks did
4
not become available until the end of October, 1964.
For
purposes of this study, odd-lot data will be tested from
June 21, 1965, until June 30, 1967.

The dates were selected

to test the theory in both bull and bear markets.

The first

bull market began on June 28, 1965, and terminated in the
double top formations of February and April, 1966.

A bear

market was then initiated and lasted until October,

1966.

A bull market started in October,

1966, and lasted through

the tested period of June,

Pollock's theory can be

1967.

adequately tested during both types of markets.

The

3
As cited by Business w e e k , "Is the Odd-Lotter Always
Wrong?" May 6, 1967, p. 138.
4
Odd-lot data as it relates to individual stocks can
be found in the Statistical Bulletin, a monthly publication
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Individuals
may subscribe to the publication for a fee of only $1.50
per year.
In addition, the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis,
located in Chicago, Illinois, publishes an excellent
weekly advisory service entitled Stock Market Forecast.
This publication likewise provides odd-lot data on the
recently enlarged SEC list of 100 securities.
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volatility and magnitude of these movements should provide
ample conclusions concerning any correlation between the
odd-lot theory and individual securities.
In this study, stocks are tested on a quarterly basis.
Activity of stocks was first examined to determine which
5
issues showed a normal buying-selling relationship for the
quarter and which stocks showed a preponderance of either
buying or selling.

Issues which showed a preponderance of

buying were randomly selected for the first quarter, and
the same procedure was followed for those stocks which were
sold heavily on balance by the odd-lotters.

Stocks were

randomly selected in order to preclude bias and ensure
objectivity within the study.

After the issues which were

heavily bought or sold on balance had been randomly selected
for each quarter, prices of the issues were determined.
Prices at the beginning and ending of each quarter were
determined and the percent change in each issue was computed.
The average percent change in the market value of the
stocks tested in each buying and selling (odd-lot) group is
contrasted with the percent change in Standard and Poor's
Average.

Generally, there are approximately ten stocks

tested, but the number varies according to the technical
position of the market, and the sentiment and degree of

5
Empirical evidence in Chapter IV revealed that a
normal sales-to-purchase relationship by odd-lotters was
approximately .9000.
This relationship is defined as the
Balance Ratio.
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odd-lot participation.

At the start of an advance heavy

on-balance selling by the odd-lotters is usually present.
This may result in more than ten of the 75 stocks being
included in the selling group.

Conversely, odd-lotters

generally purchase as the market declines, which results
in a greater number of issues heavily bought on-balance.
During declines, there may be more than ten stocks included
in the buying group.
Stocks which were sold or purchased heavily on balance
during the first period were given first priority in the
selection of stocks for the subsequent quarter.
mainder of the securities was
each group.

The r e 

randomly selected to complete

Such methodology was continued throughout the

study and was necessary to ascertain how the odd-lot data
affected a stock over an intermediate trend.

If stocks did

not maintain their previous relationship, they were elimi
nated from their classification.

If stocks switched to the

opposite side of the buying-selling relationship,

they were

immediately reclassified in the other category to determine
the effect of public action on the market price of the
stock.
In the random selection of issues for each group,
stocks were required to maintain a definite trend of oddlot buying or selling for the duration of the particular
quarter to qualify for possible selection.

Such require

ments were predicated on the concept that the public buys
near the top and sells near the bottom.

Generally, then,
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stocks which are purchased heavily on balance should
theoretically be near or at the top of a move and their
subsequent advancement should be limited,

conversely,

stocks sold heavily on balance are probably close to the
bottom of a move and a subsequent advance should be immi
nent, resulting in a substantial advance for the issue.
Two different indicators are employed in the study.
The first is the Quarterly Balance Ratio, which was com
puted by summing weekly odd-lot sales for the entire
quarter and then dividing these total sales by the summation
of weekly odd-lot purchases for the quarter.

Although the

principal is essentially the same as the Weekly Balance
Ratio employed in the preceding chapter, the time period
is considerably longer.

The difference in the time period

is irrelevant because the Quarterly Balance Ratio is de
vised to show the extent and side of the market in which
the odd-lotters are engaged during the quarter.

Since

stock selection varied from quarter to quarter, no Balance
Index or moving average was utilized.
The other indicator is technical in nature and is
termed the relative strength measurement.

Edmund and

Anthony Tabell define relative strength as ", . . the
ratio of the stock’s price to the Dow-jones Industrial
Average, at weekly intervaIs.

For purposes of this

E d m u n d w. Tabell and Anthony w. Tabell, "The Case
For Technical Analysis," The Financial Analysts Journal,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (March-AprXl, 1964), p. 6V.
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study, the relative strength measurement is defined as the
ratio of the price of the individual security to the price
of Standard and Poor's composite market average.

The use

of the relative strength measurement becomes readily
apparent.

When the relative strength of a stock is plotted,

a rising line indicates that a stock is performing better
than the general market, while a falling line shows the r e 
verse .
The relative strength measurements are interpreted by
means of a table.

The table utilized indicates the percent

change in Standard and Poor's Average and the individual
issue tested during the course of each quarter.

By using

the odd-lot data in conjunction with the relative strength
measurement, one can determine whether these two indicators
can be correlated in the analysis of individual issues.
An analysis of the items selected in the first quarter
presents some interesting insight into the investigation.
Since the bull market of 1965 had its inception on June 28,
1965, the initial analysis encompasses the last week of the
second quarter.

To test the performance of stocks at the

beginning of the bull market, the third quarter of 1965 was
expanded to cover a fourteen-week period.
Early Stages of the Advance.

The third quarter of 1965

marked the beginning stages of a strong uptrend in the stock
market.

At the beginning of the advance, odd-lotters in the

aggregate were selling on balance, which apparently made the
technical position of the market stronger (oversold).

TABLE V-l
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967

Stock

Heavily Bought Issues________
Percent
Price
Balance
Change
Ratio

Stock

Heavily Sold Issues
Percent
Balance
Price
Ratio
Change

Third Quarter, 1965 (Standard and Poor1s Change = 5.70 Percent)
Singer Company
Allied Chem. Corp.
Gen. Tel. Elect. Corp.
Standard Oil (N.J.)
Communic. Satellite
Marathon Oil Co.
Libby-Oveos Ford
Avco
No. Amer. Aviation
Chrysler

.7646
.4617
.7470
.8372
.8003
.5263
.5617
.4734
.7907

- 3.12
+ 1.30
+10.00
+ 0.80
+ 0.80
+11.41
- 1.35
+ 6.02
+ 6.19
+ 7.61
+ 3.97

Average Change

Pfizer and Co., Inc.
United Aircraft
American Can
Westinghouse
Anaconda
Sperry Rand
Amer. Tel. & Tel.
Goodyr. Tire & Rub.
General Elec. Co.
Intern. Bus. Mach.
United Airlines
Average Change

1.7559
.9147
1.5047
1.6955
1.3281
1.4549
1.2021
2.2370
1.7118
1.2382
1.3946

+
+
+
+
+
+
-

14.65
25.69
16.30
15.98
16.40
22.45
0.74
1.51
+ 19.41
+ 10.10
+ 20.83
+ 14.51

Fourth Quarter, 1965 (Standard and Poor's Change = + 2.61 Percent)
Singer Company
Allied Chem. Corp.
Libby-Owens Ford
Marathon Oil Co.
Avco
No. Amer. Aviation
Gen. Motors Corp.
Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp.
RCA
Am. Tel. & Tel.
Average Change

.7346
.5754
.7962
.7221
.7324
.8187
.6056
.6083
.7376
.7168

- 4.73
+ 2.07
+ 1.60
-10.52
+13.79
+ 9.01
- 1.78
+ 4.25
+ 4.42
- 9.67
+ 0.644

Pfizer and C o . , Inc.
Chrysler Corp
American Can Co.
Westinghouse
Anaconda
Sperry Rand
Standard Oil (N.J.)
Aluminum Co. of Am.
Reynolds Metals Co.
Proctor & Gamble Co.
United Airlines
Average change

1.7764
1.8970
1.7052
2.1992
1.4505
1.0956
1.3116
2.1558
1.5795
1.9402
1.1689

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

18.33
1.91
3.97
9.69
10.26
46.67
1.74
14. 15
13.71
2.29
+ 19.71
+ 12.55

TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967

Stock

Heavily Bought issues______
Percent
Balance
Price
Ratio
Change

Heavily Sold issues
Stock

Bala nee
Ratio

Percent
Price
Change

First Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's Change = - 3.20 Percent)
Singer Co.
Allied Chemical Co.
Libby-Owens Ford
Marathon Oil Co.
Avco
No. Amer. Aviation
Gen. Motors Corp.
Gen. Tel. & El.Corp
R .C #A .
American Tel. & Tel.
Control Data Corp.
Great A. & P. Tea Co
Union Carbide
Average Change

.7820
.4638
.4783
.8690
.5180
.6578
.5109
.6709
.6524
.5592
.6822
.4608
.4157

-

+
-

+
-

—

12.30
10.15
1.58
2.90
12.63
3.55
8.53
8.74
8.05
8.54
24.38
8.19
7.72
6.84

Pfizer & C o . , Inc.
American Can Co.
Westinghouse Elec.
Anaconda Co.
Alum. Co. of America
Reynolds Metals Co.
Goodyr. Tire & Rub.
Col. Brdc. System
Swift & Co.
Royal Dutch Pet Co.
United Airlines
Average Change

1.9434
1.6916
2.2529
1.5806
2.6263
1.0798
2.1053
1.3420
2.7956
1.6092
.9153

+
+
+

6.61
3.39
1.41
3.86
13.01
15.37
6.53
16.00
5.37
7.35
31.28

♦

5.67

-

+
+
+
-

Second Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's Change = - 5.78 Percent)
- 18.00
- 7.35
2.1940
Westinghouse Elec.
Singer Co.
.7161
2.2344
5.84
12.43
Aluminum
Co.
of
Am.
Allied Chemical Corp. .5095
+ 12.47
12.88
Columbia Brdcst. Sys .1.9588
.6191
Libby-Owens Ford
- 7.98
- 8.77
Swift & Company
3.4516
.6150
Avco
- 1.58
- 16.49
Royal Dutch Pet.Co.
1.4450
.7769
No. Amer. Aviation
+
14.33
14.70
Goodyr. Tire & Rubber2.7696
.5042
Gen. Motors Corp.
- 11.04
+ 22.62
Commun. Satel. Corp. 1.1727
.6527
R *C .A.
+ 29,30
- 4.35
1.2147
Control Data Corp.
.6285
Amer. Tel. & Tel.
- 3.30
6.17
General
Elec.
Co.
2.1066
Great A. & P. Tea Co .5343
- 6.19
Reynolds Metals Co.
6.61
.6058
1.4026
Union Carbide
- 2.64
Sears, Roebuck & Co 1.6901
20.81
.4950
Chrysler Corp.
- 2.63
1.4704
Proctor & Gamble
12.73
.6095
Standard Oil, Calif.
+
23.13
Sperry Rand Corp.
1.0717
+ 5.43
1.1932
Burroughs
Average CKTffgg----------------T1.16
A V « a g « Change----------------- = 577H
-

-

-
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TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967

Stock

Heavily Bought Issues__________
Percent
Bala nee
Pr ice
Ratio
Change

Heavily Sold Issues
Stock

Balance
Ratio

Percent
Price
Change

Third Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's Change = - 10.57 Percent)
Allied Chemical Corp.
Libby-Owens Ford
Avco
No. Amer. Aviation
Gen. Motors Corp.
R* C. A.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Amer. Tel. & Tel.
Great A. & P. Tea Co.
Sperry Rand
Chrysler Corp.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.
United Airlines, Inc.
Comm. Satellite Corp.
Standard Oil (Calif)
Standard Oil (N.J.)
Average Change

.4535
.3986
.6735
.3976
.5151
.8084
.5192
.6273
.5721
.8078
.3040
.4249
.6178
.6866
.4915
.6103

1

10.86
9.27
18.22
15.79
9.69
15.92
11.88
9.09
10.17
1.35
10.22
4.95
24.16
27.09
7.90
9.14
12.23

Columbia Broad
casting System
Royal Dutch Pet. Co
Goodyr. Tire & Rub.
Chase Manhattan Bank
Control Data Corp.
Sears, Roebuck & Co
Proctor & Gamble Co
Burroughs
So. Calif. Edison Co

Average Change

2.4586
1.6600
2.9766
2.1301
1.4436
1.5402
1.9210
1.8240
2.6976

- 3.49
- 11.58
- 8.74
- 14.66
- 2.08
- 9.30
+ 10.79
+ 5.82
- 5.26

1

4.28

TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF ODD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967

Stock

Heavily Bought Issues
Percent
Balance
Price
Ratio
Change

Stock

Heavily Sold issues
Percent
Balance
Price
Ratio
Change

Fourth Quarter, 1966 (Standard and Poor's change * + 7.25 Percent)
Allied Chemical Corp.
Libby-Owens Ford
Avco
Gen. Motors Corp.
Chrysler Corp.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Comm. Satellite Corp.
Standard Oil (Calif)
U. S. Steel Corp.
Union Carbide Corp.

Average Change

.6561
.4648
.5880
.8038
.7127
.8516
.7411
.6770
.8393
.5529

-

+
-

+
+
-

-

2.55
8.43
4.17
8.67
12.14
1.80
7.79
2.56
0.34
4.55

2.*0

Pfizer & C o . , Inc.
Aluminum Co. of Am.
Royal Dutch Pet. Co.
Chase Manhattan Bank
Proctor & Gamble Co.
Burroughs Corp.
So. Calif. Edison Co
Sperry Rand Corp.
Swift & Co.
Texas Gulf Sulphur
Gen. Electric Co.
Marathon Oil Co.
Westinghouse Elec
Reynolds Metal Co.
Am. Tel. & Tel.
Chlumbia Brd. Syst.
United Airlines, Inc.
Average Change

2.8019
2.0480
2.3868
3.3960
1.7400
1.4910
3.9508
1.0258
1.2649
1.3688
1.7866
5.7357
2.8591
1.7834
1.5962
2.2531
.9830

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

24.44
11.17
2.93
28.35
1.39
20.41
15.30
16.10
18.33
37.11
5,99
17.84
3.84
22.26
8.91
17.14
27.75
16.08

TABLE V-l

(CONTINUED)

PERFORMANCE OF CDD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUGHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
_____________ Heavily Bought Issues_________
Percent
Balance
Price
Stock______________________ Ratio
Change
First Quarter,
Allied Chemical Corp.
Libby-Owens Ford Co.
Intern. Harvester Co.
American Tobacco Co.
No. Amer. Aviation
Standard Oil (Calif.)
Union Carbide Corp.
Parke, Davis & Co.
Standard Oil

Average Change

Stock

Heavily Sold Issues________
Percent
Balance
Price
Ratio
Change

1967 (Standard and Poor*s Change - + 12.22 Percent)
6617
4322
6704
8631
7276
5451
5087
7501
4139

+ 18.38
+ 14.67
+ 6.09
+ 10.63
0.78
0.21
+ 13.62
+ 14.49
+ 0.99
-

-

+

8.65

3.7758
Pfizer & Co., Inc.
Alum. Co. of America 1.7536
1.8492
Royal Dutch Pet. C o
Chase Manhattan Bank 3.2203
2.2557
Proctor & Gamble Co
Burroughs Corp.
1.3256
So. Calif. Edison Co 3.5937
Sperry Rand Corp.
1.1654
Avco
5.5680
Texas Gulf Sulphur
1.0057
Gen. Electric Co.
1.2776
1.4375
Swift & Co.
Sears, Roebuck & C o
1.5374
1.3284
R. C. A.
4.3797
Marathon Oil Co.
Westinghouse Elec.
1.7393
Bethlehem Steel Corp 1.9208
1.5188
Amer. Tel. & Tel.
1.4590
Col. Brdcst. System
Col. Gas S y s t . , Inc. 1.4742
Comm. Satellite Corp 1.7029
Control Data Corp.
1.9866
United Airlines, Inc. 1.5710
Average change

+ 5.32
+ 14.04
+ 7.81
0.0
+ 18.07
+ 41.75
+ 1.92
+ 14.78
+ 90.56
+ 5.53
- 4.63
+ 16.44
14. 25
+ 7.23
+ 10.26
+ 15.16
+ 19.75
+ 10.34
+ 12.32
+ 3.33
+ 43.32
+ 62.95
+ 27.05
+ 19.4'S

TABLE V-l (CONTINUED)
PERFORMANCE OF CDD-LOT PUBLIC IN HEAVILY BOUCHT AND
HEAVILY SOLD ISSUES, MID-1965 - MID-1967
Heavily Bought Issues
Ba la nee
Ratio

Stock

Percent
Price
Change

Stock

Heavily Sold issues
Percent
Balance
Price
Ratio
Change

Second Quarter, 1967 (Standard and Poor's Change = + 1. 57 Percent)
Ampex Corp.
Honeywell, Inc.
Union Carbide Corp.
Eastman Kodak Corp.
Litton Industries, inc.
Standard Oil (Calif.)
Standard Oil (N.J.)
Singer Co.
North Am. Aviation

Average change

.8041
.8385
.6772
.6814
.8718
.7857
.6802
.4979
.6103

+ 16.53
- 6.64
- 6.62
- 8.56
+ 2.05
- 7.11
- 3.84
+ 11.64
+ 2.63

+

6.422

Pfizer & Co., Inc
Proctor & Gamble Co
Burroughs Corp.
Sperry Rand Corp.
Avco Corp.
Texas Gulf Sulphur
Gen. Electric Co.
Sears, Roebuck & Co
R. C , A .
Westinghouse Elec.
Amer. Tel. & Tel.
Bethlehem Steel
Comm. Satellite
Control Data Corp.
Col. Gas Syst.,Inc
Gulf Oil Corp.
U. S. Steel
Woolnorth
Average Change

2.7435
2.7684
1.4891
1.2182
1.2841
1.3079
1.8248
2.3329
2.3206
1.9986
1.5067
1.6369
1.7117
1.4210
1.5478
1.7551
1.7166
2.9264

+ 5.32
+ 2.22
+ 15.21
11.07
+ 27.38
+ 17.67
+ 3.12
+ 9.45
+ 7.07
- 1.60
- 3.59
8.51
♦ 25.66
+ 79.01
- 0.92
+ 5.94
+ 0.57
+ 22.95
+ 12.82
-
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Tables derived from ran data provided by the following sources:
"Odd-Lot Customers' Purchases and Sales On the New York Stock Exchange in 75
Selected Stocks," Statistical Bulletin (U.S. Sec. Exchange Comm., Jan. 1965 - July 1965).
ISL Daily Stock Price Index, N.Y. Stock Exchange (Palo Alto Calif. :
Investment
Statistics Lalbora tory, Inc.'J 1^64-367.
Stock Market Forecast (Chicago, 111.: The Institute of Dynamic Synthesis),
Selecied* issues from September, 1965 to June, 1967.
The wall Street Journal, selected issues from June, 1965 to June, 1967.
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Despite the preponderance of odd-lot selling as a whole,
several stocks were purchased heavily on balance by the
odd-lot public.
Table V-l reveals that the third quarter of 1965
witnesses a 5.70 percent increase in Standard and Poor's
Average.
balance

Ten randomly selected stocks purchased heavily on
(as evidenced by their Balance Ratios) revealed an

average increase of only 3.97 percent.

The performance of

the general market exceeded the performance of the ten
stocks purchased heavily by the odd-lot public, but Marathon
Oil, Chrysler, and North American Aviation
Balance Ratio) were exceptions.

(especially low

The theory as a whole was,

therefore, applicable to the individual securities tested.
The technical position of most stocks tested had apparently
been weakened considerably by heavy public participation,
thus restricting the advance of the stocks.
Stocks which were sold heavily on balance by odd-lotters
during the third quarter of 1965 generally showed better
advances than the market.
section 2.

Results are shown in Table V-l,

Due to heavy on-balance selling by the odd-

lotters the technician construed the action as a reflection
on very bearish public sentiment.

All Balance Ratios were

in excess of 100, which means that public selling was heavy.
The only exception was United Aircraft, whose Balance Ratio
was slightly above 91.

Heavy on-balance selling prevailed

in the latter issue, however, until the last three weeks of
the quarter when buying became heavy.

At the end of the

quarter and after an appreciable price rise, the odd-lotters
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purchased heavily on balance and the Balance Ratio de
clined .
Stocks which were sold heavily on balance during the
third quarter of 1965 increased an average of 14.51 percent
during the period, as opposed to an increase of 5.70 per
cent in Standard and Poor's Average.

This tends to illus

trate that odd-lotter pessimism led to heavy on-balance
selling and probably accounted for a large increase in the
stocks tested.

Price increases in stocks tested for on-

balance selling were apparently not due solely to a rising
stock market but to stronger technical positions caused by
the stocks becoming oversold.

A large portion of the gains

of stocks purchased heavily on balance during the quarter
could probably be attributed to a significant rise in the
general market and not to a strong technical position.
The relative strength measurements proved valuable as
indicators in both heavily bought and heavily sold stocks
which were tested.

Nine of the eleven stocks sold on

balance illustrated significant increases in their relative
strength measurements.

Conversely, only five of the ten

stocks purchased on balance revealed an increasing relative
strength.
The Fourth Quarter of 1965.
in early 1966.

The bull market culminated

The ten stocks tested for heavy on-balance

buying resulted in an average increase of only 0.84 percent,
while Standard and Poor's Average advanced 2.61 percent.
Therefore,

the general market outperformed the tested stocks
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which were heavily purchased by the odd-lot public.

The

performance of the issues heavily bought and sold is pre
sented in Table V-l.

There were two notable exceptions to

the Odd-Lot Theory during the final quarter of 1965, these
being Avco and North American Aviation.

Six of the ten

stocks showed declining relative strengths, while two other
stocks showed small increases.

Two of the ten stocks pur

chased heavily by the odd-lotters showed relative strengths
that increased significantly.

In almost every instance,

stocks which were bought on balance during both quarters
either declined in price or increased only slightly.
Those stocks which were sold heavily on balance by the
odd-lot public continued to increase in price in the fourth
quarter of 1965.

In contrast to the 2.61 percent increase

in Standard and Poor's Average, the eleven stocks tested
increased an average of 12.53 percent.

Practically every

stock which maintained sustained on-balance selling for the
duration of the two quarters continued to show appreciable
rises.

Among the most notable were Sperry Rand, United

Airlines, Westinghouse, and Pfizer Company.

Eight of the

eleven stocks tested for on-balance selling revealed
strongly increasing relative strengths, while the remaining
three stocks possessed only slightly decreasing relative
strengths.
The Beginning of 1966.

During the first quarter of

1966, Standard and Poor's Average dropped 3.20 percent.
There was a concurrent drop of 6.84 percent in the tested
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stocks which were purchased heavily on balance by the oddlotters.

Results are shown in Table V-l, indicating that

these stocks decreased an amount more than double that of
the general market.
Ten of the thirteen stocks tested for on-balance buying
revealed a declining relative strength, while two of the
remaining three stocks showed a slight increase.

Singer,

RCA, Control Data, and General Motors decreased during the
early portion of the decline.

Balance Ratios for these

stocks were low during the first quarter, which indicated
that odd-lotters were optimistic about these stocks.

Odd-

lot sentiment was apparently strong and firmly entrenched
on the buying side.
Most of the stocks which were sold on balance fared
well during the

decline.

Despite the 3.20 percent

decline

in Standard and

Poor's Average, the tested stocks sold by

odd-lotters advanced 5.67 percent for the quarter.

Seven

of the eleven stocks tested showed increasing relative
strengths, most of which were very strong advances.

Good

year, Pfizer, and Royal Dutch Petroleum were notable
failures.

Balance Ratios in these issues were high, indi

cating that odd-lot sentiment was very pessimistic
the outlook for

about

these stocks.

Arrival of the Bear Market.

Stocks purchased on

balance by the odd-lotters in the second quarter of 1966
gave credence to the Odd-Lot Theory in its application to
individual issues.

Results of all tested issues during
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the second quarter of 1966 are revealed in Table V-l.
While Standard and Poor's Average decreased 5.78 percent,
those stocks tested for on-balance buying declined an aver
age of 11.16 percent.

Ten of the eleven issues tested

showed declining relative strengths, with a decline shown
in every market price.

Several of the issues had previously

defied the theory by advancing despite heavy odd-lot pur
chasing.

These were Avco, North American Aviation, and

Libby-Owens Ford.

Apparently, the technical position of

the stock does not necessarily become weak at the inception
of odd-lot buying.
Numerous blue-chip issues were included in the list of
heavily-bought stocks, among them General Motors, American
Telephone, RCA, Standard Oil of California, and Chrysler.
All of these issues dropped significantly.

All blue-chip

issues, with the exception of American Telephone, showed
declining relative strengths.

The performance of blue-chip

issues is considered because many advisory services and
brokers recommend the purchase of blue chips during a market
decline in order to minimize losses.

Apparently, if the

odd-lot public actively purchases a stock, the issue gene
rally falls.

Allied Chemical is an excellent example of a

weakened technical position because of a sustained buying
effort on the part of the public.

After little fluctuation,

the security declined more than 10 percent during the
second quarter.
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While Standard and Poor's Average was declining 5.78
percent, the stocks tested for on-balance selling advanced
an average of 4.19 percent.

Ten of the fourteen issues

tested illustrated an increasing relative strength, with
seven securities showing appreciable price increases.

The

two largest increases were recorded in Communications
Satellite and Control Data, both movements being accurately
detected by the odd-lot data.

Burroughs, Goodyear, Sperry

Rand, and Columbia Broadcasting also were strong movers as
a result of an apparent reinforced technical strength.
Strong odd-lot buying in Control Data and Communications
Satellite had been associated with depressed prices for the
issues, but a sharp reversal to the selling side was con
current with price rises in both issues in the midst of a
very acute bear market.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company possibly showed the
effects of sustained, on-balance selling by the odd-lotters.
The market price of Goodyear fluctuated only slightly during
the preceding quarter, but a persistent trend of selling
buoyed the price and the security showed a 14.33 percent
increase.

The action of Goodyear supports previous evidence

that persistent action by odd-lotters, whether it be buying
or selling, eventually alters the market price of the stock
but not necessarily during the same quarter that the trend
is initiated.
Balance Ratios for the particular issues tested for
on-balance selling were very high, indicating a strong pessi
mistic sentiment by the odd-lot public toward these issues.
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A notable exception was registered by Westinghouse
Electric, which dropped concurrently with the market de 
spite on-balance selling by the odd-lotters.
Depths of the Bear Market.

The largest decline in the

bear market of 1966 occurred in the third quarter as
Standard and Poor's Average dropped 10.57 percent.

Compari

sons of results from all tested stocks with Standard and
Poor's Average are shown in Table V-l.

The stocks tested

for on-balance buying (the list exceeded ten because of a
preponderance of on-balance buying in the aggregate)
dropped 12.23 percent.

Stocks purchased on balance per

formed worse than the general market, as represented by
Standard and Poor's Average.

Several interesting situations

were revealed, one of which was Communications Satellite.
After a substantial price rise, most of the increase was
nullified by a decrease in market price of 27.09 percent as
on-balance odd-lot buying became dominant.

Avco likewise

failed to break through previous resistance levels, but it
was associated with heavy odd-lot participation.
split, United Airlines dropped 24.16 percent.

After its

Almost

immediately after the split, odd-lotters were apparently
induced into participation by the lower market price.
Sustained odd-lot buying continued in issues such as
RCA, Allied Chemical, North American Aviation, General
Motors, standard Oil of New jersey, Chrysler, and General
Motors.

Stepped-up odd-lot activity in each of these issues

apparently created overbought situations and led to
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significant downward moves.
More issues were tested for on-balance buying than
selling.

The greater number of issues bought resulted from

a large amount of on-balance buying in the aggregate by the
odd-lotters who were optimistic during the sharpest decline
of the bear market.
These issues tested for on-balance selling revealed an
average decrease of 4.28 percent, as contrasted with a
10.57 percent decrease in standard and Poor's Average.

De

spite the fact that these issues decreased, stocks sold on
balance still outperformed the market.

Six of the nine

stocks tested showed an increasing relative strength and
seemed to resist the pressures of a falling market better
than securities purchased heavily on balance.
It is interesting to note that Burroughs, which e n 
joyed sustained on-balance selling for an extended period,
continued to move upward.

Proctor and Gamble, which had

dipped slightly in the previous quarter despite on-balance
selling, began to show the effects of the sustained oddlot selling effort.

Proctor and Gamble increased 10.79

percent in the midst of the incisive bear market which
eroded the profits of innumerable investors.
The Close of 1966.

The stocks tested for on-balance

buying in the last quarter of 1966 reaffirmed previous
results of odd-lot purchases and price movements.
market terminated in October, 1966.

The bear

The fourth quarter of
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1966 witnessed an over-all increase of 7.25 percent in
Standard and Poor's Average.

By comparison those stocks

tested for on-balance buying decreased 2.40 percent (see
Table V —1).

Thus, the general market outperformed the

tested stocks heavily purchased by odd-lotters.

Exceptio

nally low Balance Ratios indicate that public sentiment
toward these issues was leaning heavily toward optimism.
Of the ten stocks tested for odd-lot buying, nine
showed a decreasing relative strength.
was Communications Satellite.

The only exception

The three-point increase in

the market price of Communications Satellite indicated
that this volatile issue was still weak technically.
During the last quarter of 1966, aggregate odd-lot
selling was substantial and almost coincident with the ad
vance in the market.

Consequently, a large number of

issues were sold heavily on balance by odd-lotters, which
led to the testing of some seventeen issues.

These tested

issues revealed an average increase of 16.08 percent,
while Standard and Poor's Average increased 7.25 percent.
Once again,

issues sold on balance outperformed the market.

Thirteen of the seventeen issues tested showed increasing
relative strengths.
United Airlines substantiated odd-lot theorists in
the fourth quarter of 1966.

In the previous quarter, heavy

odd-lot buying was concurrent with a large dip in the price
of the issue.

During the fourth quarter, however, there

was a switch to the odd-lot selling side, and the price
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increased by 27.75 percent.

CBS, Reynolds Metals,

Burroughs, Texas Gulf Sulphur, Marathon Oil, Swift, Chase
Manhattan Bank, and Pfirer Company were all large movers
during the last quarter despite odd-lot selling.
The Beginning of 1967.

During the first quarter of

1967, heavy on-balance selling prevailed in the aggregate
market.

Standard and Poor's Average increased 12.22 percent

while stocks tested for on-balance buying increased an aver
age of only 8.65 percent.

Much of the increase in these

stocks probably was attributable to the strong upsurge in
the general market.

The performance of heavily bought and

sold issues are contrasted with Standard and Poor's Average
in Table V-l.
Exceptions to the application of the Odd-Lot Theory
were noted in Allied Chemical, Libby-Owens Fcrd, and Union
Carbide.

Five of the nine issues revealed declining

relative strengths, while three of the four increased
relative strengths were slight.

Once again, the blue-chip

Standard Oil stocks (N. J. and California) fared poorly.
These two stocks certainly make the application of the OddLot Theory to individual stocks very credible, especially
in view of the rising tide in the market.

Both Standard

Oil stocks, as well as the remaining portion of the tested
stocks, showed very low sales-to-purchases ratios.
Stocks sold on balance during the first quarter of 1967
increased 19.48 percent while Standard and Poor's Average
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increased 12.22 percent.

Fourteen of the twenty-three

stocks tested showed strong relative strengths.

The Odd -

Lot Theory seemed to have special application to most of
these stocks because it provided vital information con
cerning the technical strength of several stocks which
immediately began major moves.

Perhaps the most interesting

case among those stocks sold heavily was Avco, a stock which
had been habitually purchased by odd-lotters in the past.
Almost immediately after odd-lotters began selling the issue,
the market price increased 90.56 percent.

The high sales-

to-purchase ratio for Avco indicated that odd-lot sentiment
for this issue was diametrically opposite to that of the
preceding quarter.

Odd-lotters appeared to be "shaken out"

of Avco almost simultaneously.
In addition to Avco, the Odd-Lot Theory was helpful in
explaining large and extended moves by Control Data,
Burroughs, Communications Satellite, United Airlines, and
Proctor and Gamble.

High Balance Ratios were very much in

evidence in these issues during the first quarter of 1967.
These ratios reflected pessimistic sentiment in the issues
tested, and odd-lotters in the aggregate showed a concurrent
pessimism as evidenced by a high balance ratio for the total
market during the initial stages of 1967.

High sales-to-

purchase ratios, used in conjunction with strong relative
strengths, depicted those issues with extended moves.
The Second Quarter of 1967.

During the second quarter

of 1967, Standard and Poor's Average increased 1.57 percent
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However, those stocks tested for on-balance buying in
creased only 0.422 percent.

Table V-l indicates that

five of the nine stocks tested showed declining relative
strength while two of the four remaining securities had
slightly increasing relative strengths.
While Standard and Poor's Average was increasing 1.57
percent, the stocks tested for odd-lot selling revealed an
increased average of 12.82 percent.

Sustained on-balance

selling was maintained in Avco, Burroughs, Control Data,
and Communications Satellite, with each of these issues
showing continued price increases.

Thirteen of the seven

teen issues tested showed increasing relative strengths,
with none of the four remaining issues showing a significant
price decline.
Summary and Conclusions.

Dr. Thomas J. Kewley and

Dr. Richard A. Stevenson recently co-authored an article
in which they concluded that "Little evidence was observed
7
to substantiate the Odd-Lot Theory."
The authors also
contended that ".

. . odd-lot statistics had little value
8
in predicting price movements for individual companies."

The authors also took exception to Mr. Pollack's earlier

y

Thomas J. Kewley and Richard A. Stevenson, "The OddLot Theory as Revealed by Purchase and Sale Statistics for
Individual Stocks," Financial Analysts journal, Vol. 23,
No. 5 (September-October^ 1967), p. IC5.
8 Ibid.
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quoted statement that odd-lot statistics might even be more
valid for individual securities than for the aggregate
L. * 9
market.

The results of this study contradict the contentions
of Dr. Kewley and Dr. Stevenson.

The preceding analysis

reveals that stocks sold on balance by odd-lotters and
possessing a strong relative strength measurement are a p 
parently strong stocks technically.

Stocks meeting these

criteria usually are destined for large moves and outperform
the general market in a rising trend.

Stocks sold on

balance and possessing a strong relative strength will
usually defy a downward trend and advance or dip only
slightly.

Stocks such as Burroughs, Avco, Control Data,

Communications Satellite, Control Data, Sperry Rand, and
Texas Gulf Sulphur substantiate this thesis very well.
Conversely, stocks sold heavily on balance and possessing
a decreasing relative strength will decline, but their de 
cline in a falling market is usually restricted.

These

stocks will generally rise in an upward trend.
The study also revealed that stocks purchased heavily
on balance and possessing a decreasing relative strength
will generally show large decreases in a downtrend.

In an

uptrend, these stocks are usually restricted in their ad
vance, probably the result of having been overbought.
strong market technically will usually force the price

9Ibid., p. 106.

A
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slightly upward, although a quarterly p>eriod may not be
long enough to depict the reversal of trend.

In an upward

trend, stocks may briefly defy the Theory in cases where
on-balance selling prevails and the security price drops
in price or on-balance buying exists and the stock rises.
A few of the tested stocks defied the Theory in a downtrend
by possessing on-balance selling and the price of the
security drops, or conversely, a stock is characterized by
on-balance buying and the price of the security rises.
These stocks which defy the Theory generally do not remain
in an opposite trend for an extended p>eriod of time because
their technical position is altered as a result of the
action of the odd-lot pmblic.

CHAPTER VI

THE SYNTHESIS
There is a time in the price of certain
products and commodities,
Which, if taken by men at the advance
leads on to fortune;
And if taken at the decline, leads to
bankruptcy and ruin.
-- Samuel Benner
According to Peter Wyckoff, there is a dichotomy which
is very much in evidence in the stock market.

Wyckoff

asserts :
People who operate in the stock market may be
divided into two general classes:
those possessing
the right knowledge and psychological attitude, the
so-called insiders, more popularly referred to as
"They"; and those known collectively as "The Public,"
who lack much training and are further handicapped
by temperament.^
The professional element of the market has been far
superior in knowledge and were much better equipped to cope
with stock market junctures than have the uninformed
public.

This study has substantiated the thesis that the

public is often victimized by the professional element in
the market place, especially at critical junctures.

^■Peter Wyckoff, The Psychology of Stock Market Timing
(Englewood cliffs, New jersey:
PrenTTce-Hall” Inc., l^t&y,
p. 90.
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Results of Technics1 Analysis.

The technical analysis

employed in this study has proved to be beneficial.

The

technical approach is very pertinent in determining the
crux of all stock market analysis*-supply and demand.
Technical analysis attempts to determine whether a given
stock is overbought or oversold.

if a stock is overbought,

the public has been optimistic and has usually purchased
the stock heavily, thus creating a weak technical position.
Conversely, if a stock is oversold, the public is pessi
mistic about the chances for future advance by the stock
and has sold the stock heavily, thus creating a strong
technical status.
The Monthly Credit and Debit Balances, representing
the round-lot public and the astute speculators respectively,
provide an excellent indication of action by both the unin
formed and informed elements of the stock market.

The

Monthly Credit Balance appears to represent largely the
uninformed

round-lot public who habitually acquires securi

ties through cash purchases.

The Monthly Debit Balance

represents the margin account, the most potent tool of the
professional speculator.
Speculators seemingly possess valuable insight which
enables them to enjoy a much better sense of market timing.
Speculation appears to rely heavily on the psychology pre
vailing in the market.

In view of observations derived from

the Contrary Thinking Theory, one could infer that even the
composite curve of business activity is fundamentally a
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curve of mass psychology which is even in greater evidence
in the stock market.
The odd-lot data provides the technician with a con
ceptual framework as to what the odd-lot public is doing as
opposed to the round-lot public.

The Weekly Balance Ratio

and the Balance Index, a five-week moving average of the
Balance Ratio, are the most significant ratios employed in
odd-lot analysis.

In addition, the Weekly Short Sales Ratio

and the Short Sales index, a five-week moving average of the
Short Sales Ratio, are excellent market tools and are used
to confirm the actions of the Balance Ratio and the Balance
index.

The Short Sales indicators seemingly had more value

when applied at market bottoms, but served as helpful tools
at market tops by confirming the balance indicators.
Exceptional importance should be attached to the oddlot data because they are indicative of public and mass
psychology.

The trend of sentiment indicated by the odd-lot

balance of trading assumes even more importance than the
side on which the balance presently lies.

Any indicated

trend of majority sentiment is of the utmost importance
because a change in public sentiment usually means an
alteration in the technical position of the market.

In

addition, every change in public sentiment in this study
proved to be wrong.

Consequently,

investment moves by the

odd-lot public were mistimed and ill-advised.
The Odd-Lot Theory had very much merit when correlated
to the aggregate stock market.

In addition, the Theory
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also had virtue in its application to individual securi
ties.

This study determined that the Odd-Lot Theory was

of special importance when stocks sold heavily on balance
were used in conjunction with an increasing relative
strength for the stock.

Generally, such stocks proved to

have extended moves, especially with the presence of an up
ward trend in the market.

Stocks which are continually

sold or continually purchased on balance have a technical
position that is being gradually strengthened or slowly
weakened, thus making these stocks strong candidates for
advances or declines, respectively.
Stocks heavily purchased on balance will usually show
a decline, especially during a declining trend.

In an u p 

ward trend, these stocks may advance, but such moves can
generally be attributed to a rally in a strong general
market.

In its application to individual securities, the

Odd-Lot Theory generally proved to be valid.

However, the

Theory did not hold true in every individual case.
From the technical indicators employed in the study,
one can depict the actions of the professional element, the
round-lot public, and the odd-lot public.

This technical

analysis has provided the means to determine who is buying
and who is selling.

As a result one should be far removed

from this sea of confusion which surrounds most investors.
By determining the actions of the odd-lot public, the roundlot public, and the professional speculators through these
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technical indicators, much conjecture previously associated
with predictive actions is thus eliminated.
Resume of Public Conduct at Critical Junctures.

The

public, for the most part, has in the past showed a general
lack of financial acumen in the stock market.

In the

beginning stages of an advance, the public was usually found
selling securities rather than purchasing them.

Although

the public was, in many instances, correct in purchasing at
the bottom, they were essentially incorrect in selling
securities in the early stages of the advance.

The public

usually did not rejoin the uptrend until the late stages of
an advance, and they then purchased securities heavily on
the decline and at the bottom.

The round-lot public appeared

to be more consistent in entering the market before the oddlot public during the late stages of an advance.

The odd-

lot public, although entering on occasion prior to the
market top, generally rejoined the market at the crest or
immediately afterward.

Thus, the Monthly Credit Balance was

perhaps a better leading indicator of market tops than were
the odd-lot indicators.

The Monthly Debit Balance was also

an excellent leading indicator of market tops, as the pro
fessional element began to retreat when the public groups
entered.

All indicators were excellent and generally

leading indicators of market bottoms.

The concept of con

vergence was usually exhibited by most indicators at market
bottoms.

Both public groups usually sold securities prior
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to or coincident with a market advance.
The shrewd professional element, or the speculators,
were usually correct as they purchased at the beginning
stages of advances and sold out on the market declines.
Professionals seemingly did not desire to attract an active
public following during the period when they were accumu
lating stocks.

They obviously preferred to have the public

participate actively only when prices were substantially
higher.

The professionals provided the supply and the

public furnished the demand at the crucial market tops.
Conversely, the professional element furnished the demand
while the public provided the supply at market bottoms.
Professionals purchased low and sold high, while the public
bought high and sold low.
The study did not confirm the idea that the public is
always wrong.
to be correct.

The crowd was generally wrong when it paid
To be more sedate, one could state that the

crowd is usually wrong at the terminals of trends, but they
are essentially correct during a portion of the trends.
The public illustrated an apparent skepticism for new trends
once a juncture had occurred.

The public seemingly bases

its action on hindsight and present situations rather than
forecasting coming events.
The public apparently projected a gregarious image b e 
cause they acted simultaneously and presented unanimity of
thought.

One of the basic indications for conformity by the
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masses is the fact that the public apparently bases con
tentions on surface indications in the market.

A lagging

business picture is nearly always present in the market,
making the fundamental picture stronger at a time when the
technical position of the market usually grows weaker.
Fundamentals are essential in stock market tactics, but they
are not helpful in detecting reversals of trend in the stock
market.

Fundamentals should be employed by the "investor"

category over the "long pull."
In addition to the lagging business picture, the
moulders of public opinion apparently contribute to the
mistimed actions of the public.

Many brokers, tipsters, and

writers are likewise uninformed about the market, its
strengths, and its weaknesses.

They perhaps induce much of

the public participation in the market by making the public
believe that the market can go no lower and the "new era"
will last forever.
If one is to formulate an approach to market and
security analysis, it should be cerebral as opposed to
mechanical.

Newcomers and stock market neophytes should

always remember that during times of prosperity there has
been a tendency by the majority to over-speculate.

In most

cases, attempts to subsequently imitate success will usually
drag those who are oversealous for profits into an abyss
from which extrication is most difficult.
Excessive reliance on advisory service recommendations
also appears to contribute heavily to public participation.
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In many instances, some advisory people give good advice,
on balance, but are usually wrong at key turning points in
the market.

They are apparently analogous to the members

of the public majority in this respect.

Advisory services

unfortunately seem to provide the public with exactly what
they wish to hear.
For the most part, published news appears to be of
scant value because it has long since been discounted.

The

public seems to consider good news an inducement while
construing bad news to be an excuse to liquidate portfolios.
This seemed especially true concerning the odd-lot public.
News must be considered in conjunction with the technical
position of the market.

Poor news is ephemeral if the

market shows technical strength.

Unexpected news created

by "Acts of God" will occasionally affect the market, but
no one has the omnipotence necessary to accurately forecast
such developments.
Conelusions.

In summation, the public appears to have

its own folly, spurred on either by the desire for profit,
quest for excitement, or the mere force of imitation.

Pro

fessionals seem to have more judgment, common sense, and
market perception.

The public will rush in where pro

fessionals fear to tread.

The preceding may be explained be 

cause this technical analysis illustrates that the greatest
public participation is near and at market tops, because
rising prices and a judicious dose of propaganda appeal

to the
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emotions of the public and induce them to participate.
To avoid failure in the market, one must dismiss group
forces which distort judgment.

In the stock market,

success in the last analysis, is largely bravery.

One must

have courage in escaping from old ideas and old standards
and group forces.
To reiterate, the public is not always wrong.

In

essence, the public is generally right during a portion of
the trends but generally wrong where a market reversal
occurs.
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TABLE A -1
THE MARKET TOP OF 1956

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit
Balance
(Millions)

Monthly Credit
Balance
(Millions)

Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Stock Average

11-30-54
12-31-54
1-31-55
2-28-55
3-31-55

2202
2388
2516
2590
2652

972
1019
1069
1063
1022

34.24
35.98
36.63
36.76
36.58

4-29-55
5-31-55
6-30-55
7-29-55
8-31-55

2704
2684
2711
2735
2709

973
928
917
918
887

37.96
37. 91
41.03
43.52
43. 18

9-30-55
10-31-55
11-30-55
12-30-55
1-31-56

2805
2749
2758
2791
2786

977
920
876
894
905

43.67
42.34
45.51
45.48
43.82

2739
2-29-56
3-29-56
2786
4- 6-56 (top)
2788
4-30-56
2809
4-51-56

913
960
- -

45. 34
48.48
48.85
48.38
45.20

- 872
866

46.97
49.39
49.74
47.51
45.35

875

45.58

6-29-56
2786
2812
7-31-56
8- 2-56 (top)
8-31-56
2786
2787
9 t 28-56
10-31-56
SOURCE:

2748

896
870
836
858

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A .
Heiby, President of the institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -2
THE JUNCTURE OF i960

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit
Balance
(Millions)

Monthly Credit
Balance
(Millions)

Standard & Poor's
*500* Composite
Stock Average

8-29-58
9-30-58
10-31-58
11-28-58
12-31-58

3012
3109
3188
3245
3285

1103
1119
1140
1148
1159

47.75
50.06
51.33
52.48
55.21

1-30-59
2-27-59
3-31-59
4-30-59
5-29-59

3297
3253
3305
3401
3385

1226
1196
1257
1205
1188

55.42
55.41
55.44
57.59
58.68

6-30-59
7-31-59
8-31-59
9-30-59
10-30-59

3388
3375
3270
3250
3210

1094
1079
1035
1039
966

58.47
60.51
59.60
56.88
57.52

11-30-59
12-31-59
1- 5-60 (top)
1-29-60
2-29-60

3273
3280
- - 3199
3129

974
996
998
981

58.28
59.89
60.39
55.61
56. 12

988
940
970
1016
1018

55.34
44.37
55.83
56.92
55.51

3-31-60
4-29-60
5-31-60
6-30-60
7-29-60
SOURCE:

3028
3037
3082
3082
3003

- -

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -3
THE MARKET TOP OF 1961

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit
Balance
(Millions)

Monthly Credit
Balance
(Millions)

Standard & Poor's
•500• Compos ite
Stock Average

6-30-60
7-29-60
8-31-60
9-30-60
10-31-60

3082
3003
3109
3137
3132

1016
1018
1021
1059
1063

56.92
55.51
56.96
53.52
53.39

11-30-60
12-30-60
1-31-61
2-28-61
3-30-61

3141
3222
3253
3358
3601

1062
1135
1269
1392
1507

55.54
58. 11
61.78
63.44
65.06

4-28-61
5-31-61
6-30-61
7-31-61
8-31-61

3936
4060
4025
3991
3972

1508
1453
1283
1207
1208

65.31
66.56
64.64
66.76
68.07

1227
1214
1213
1219

66.73
68.62
71. 32
72.64
71.55

1225

68.84

3991
9-29-61
4028
10-31-61
4141
11-30-61
12-12-61 (top) - - - - 4259
12-29-61
1-31-62
SOURCE:

4111

- - -

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -4
THE MARKET TOP OF 1966

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit
Balance
(Millions)

Monthly Credit Standard & Poor's
Balance
*500' Compos ite
(Millions)
Stock Average

12-31-64
1-29-65
2-26-65
3-31-65
4-30-65

5080
4986
5007
5050
5069

1169
1207
1254
1264
1207

84.75
87.56
87.43
86.16
89.11

5-28-65
6-30-65
7-30-65
8-31-65
9-30-65

5128
5113
4863
4886
4994

1208
1297
1233
1192
1369

88.42
84. 12
85.25
87.17
89.90

1475
1479
1666

92.42
91.61
92.20

1730

92.88

5073
10-29-65
11-30-65
5209
5221
12-31-65
1-18-66 (top) . . . .
5552
1-31-66
2-28-66
3-31-66
4-29-66
5-31-66
6-30-66

5753
5645
3835
5768
5766

1765
1822
1744
1839
1661

91.22
89.23
91.06
86.13
84.74

7-29-66

5667

1597

83.60

SOURCE:

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter
A. Heiby. President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc ., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -5
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1957

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit Monthly Credit Standard & Poor's
Balance
'500' Composite
Ba lance
(Millions)
(Millions)
Stock Average

3-29-56
4-30-56
5-31-56
6-29-56
7-31-56

2786
2788
2809
2786
2812

960
896
870
836
858

48.48
48.38
45.20
46.97
49.39

8-31-56
9-28-56
10-31-56
11-30-56
12-31-56

2786
2783
2748
2785
2823

872
866
835
822
881

47.51
45.35
45,58
45.08
46.67

1-31-57
2-28-57
3-29-57
4-30-57
5-31-57

2760
2728
2713
2792
2794

866
828
820
807
817

44.72
43.26
44. 11
45. 74
47.91

6-28-57
2887
7-31-57
2885
2832
8-30-57
9-30-57
2789
10-22-57 (bottom) - - -

820
829
816
838

47.37
47. 91
45.22
42.42
- - - 38.98

10-31-57
11-29-57
12-31-57
1-31-58
2-28-58

2569
2517
2482
2487
2580

879
876
896
937
939

41.06
41.72
39. 99
41.70
40.84

3-31-58
4-30-58
5-29-58
6-30-58
7-31-58

2665
2735
2857
2920
3021

954
985
979
1047
1080

42.10
43.44
44.09
45.24
47. 19

8-29-58
9-30-58
10-31-58

3012
3109
3188

1103
1119
1140

47.75
50.06
51. 33

SOURCE: Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter
A. Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -6
THE MARKET BOTTCM OF I960

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit
Ba la nee
(Millions)

Monthly Credit Standard & Poor's
Balance
'500* Composite
(Millions)
Stock Average

3-31-59
4-30-59
5-29-59
6-30-59
7-31-59

3305
3401
3385
3388
3375

1257
1205
1188
1094
1079

55.44
57.59
58.68
58.47
60.51

8-31-59
9-30-59
10-30-59
11-30-59
12-31-59

3270
3250
3210
3273
3280

1035
1039
966
974
996

59.60
56.88
57.52
58.28
59.89

1-29-60
2-29-60
3-31-60
4-29-60
5-31-60

3199
3129
3028
3037
3021

998
981
988
940
970

55.61
56.12
55.34
54. 37
55.83

1016
1018
1021
1059

56. 92
55.51
56.96
53.53
52.30

3082
6-30-60
7-29-60
3003
8-31-60
3109
9-30-60
3137
10-25-60 (bottom) - - - -

- -

10-31-60
11-30-60
12-30-60
1-31-61
2-28-61

3132
3141
3222
3253
3358

1063
1062
1135
1269
1392

53.39
55.54
58. 11
61.78
63.44

3-30-61

3601

1507

65.06

SOURCE:

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -7
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1962

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit
Balance
(Millions)

4-28-61
5-31-61
6-30-61
7-31-61
8-31-61

3936
4060
4025
3991
3972

1508
1453
1283
1207
1208

65.31
66.56
64.64
66.76
68.07

9-29-31
10-31-61
11-30-61
12-29-61
1-31-62

3991
4028
4141
4259
4111

1227
1214
1213
1219
1225

66.73
68.62
71.32
71.55
68.84

2-28-62
4066
3-30-62
4083
4-30-62
4079
5-31-62
3999
6-26-62 (bottom) - - - -

1190
1154
1110
1205
- -

69.96
69.55
65,24
59.63
52.32

6-29-62
3605
7-31-62
3563
3773
8-31-62
9-28-62
3887
10-23-62 (bottom) - - - -

1374
1252
1130
1091
- -

34.75
58.23
59. 12
56.27
53.49

10-31-62

1126

SOURCE:

3864

Monthly Credit Standard & Poor's
Balance
'500' Composite
(Millions)
Stock Average

56.52

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc,, Chicago, Illinois.
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TABLE A -8
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1966

Monthly
Data
Date

Monthly Debit Monthly Credit
Balance
Balance
(Millions)
(Millions)

Standard & Poor's
*500' Composite
Stock Average

6-30-65
7-30-65
8-31-65
9-30-65
10-29-65

5113
4863
4886
4994
5073

1297
1233
1192
1369
1475

84.12
64.25
87. 17
89.96
92.42

11-30-65
12-31-65
1-31-66
2-28-66
3-31-66

5209
5521
5552
5753
5645

1479
1666
1730
1765
1822

91.61
92.43
92.88
91.22
89.23

4-29-66
5-31-66
6-30-66
7-29-66
8-31-66

5835
5768
5766
5667
5610

1744
1839
1661
1597
1595

91.06
86.13
84.74
83.60
77.10

1529
1520
1532
1637

76.56
73.20
80.20
80.45
80.33

1914

86.61

5355
9-30-66
10- 7-66 (bottom) - - 5169
10-31-66
5218
11-30-66
5329
12-30-66
1-31-67
SOURCE:

5288

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A.
Heiby, President of the Institute of Dynamic
Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

A PPENDIX

TABLE B-l
THE DOUBLE TOP OF 1956

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500* Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

10-14-55
10-21-55
10-28-55
11-4-55
11-11-55

41.22
42.59
42.37
47.96
45.24

.8202
.7365
.7629
.8118
.7825

11-18-55
11-25-55
12-2-55
12-9-55
12-16-55

45.54
45.68
45 .44
45.89
45.13

12-23-55
12-30-55
1-6-56
1-13-56
1-20-56
1-27-56
2-3-56
2-10-56
2-17-56
2-24-56

Ba lance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sa
Index

.7828

.9406
.6251
.6123
.8386
.6005

.7234

.8616
.8776
.8831
.9281
.9404

.7911
.8193
.8433
.8666
.8981

.8679
.7818
.6908
.4997
.6707

.7089
.7402
.7559
.6881
.7022

45.50
45 .48
45. 14
44.67
43.22

.9380
.8585
.8009
.7656
.7179

.9134
.9096
.8932
.8607
.8162

.6494
.3637
.2625
.4974
.4055

.6418
.5749
.4892
.4887
.4357

43.35
44.78
43.64
44.52
45.32

.7438
.7544
.8094
.7677
.8345

.7773
.7565
.7487
.7586
.7820

.5751
.4917
.5983
.7924
.4799

.4208
.4464
.4956
.5546
.5695

TABLE B-l (CONTINUED)
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

Balance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

3-2-56
3-9-56
3-16-56
1-23-56
3-29-56

45.81
46.70
48.14
48.83
48.48

.7748
.8764
.8717
.8271
.8868

.7882
.8126
.8384
.8369
.8474

.7931
.5032
.4710
.6357
1.0072

.6131
.6154
.6079
.5766
.6820

4-6-56
4-13-56
4-20-56
4-27-56
5-4-56

48.85 (top)
47.95
47.76
47.99
48.51

.8067
.7910
.7655
.7595
.7967

.8537 (top)
.8367
.8154
.8019
.7839

.6241
.4833
.5170
.5468
.4946

.6482
.6443
.6535
.6357
.5332

5-11-56
5-18-56
5-25-56
6-1-56
6-8-56

47.12
46.39
44.62
45.58
45.14

.7828
.7795
.8633
.6972
.7942

.7791
.7768
.7964
.7839
.7834

.3680
.3986
.6466
.7928
.5673

.4819
.4650
.4909
.5401
.5547

6-15-56
6-22-56
6-29-56
7-6-56
7-13-56

46.37
46.59
46.97
48.04
48.72

.7777
.8881
.8914
.8123
.8009

.7824
.8041
.8097
.8327
.8341

.5223
.3875
.6384
.8187
.6052

.5855
.5833
.5817
.5868
.5944

7-20-56
7-27-56
8-2-56
8-3-56
8-10-56

49.35
49.08
49.74 (top) 49.64
39.09

.84 96
.7933

.8485
.8295

.4532
.7618

.5806
.6555

.8110
.7791

.8134
.8068

.6818
.6396

.6641
.6283

Weekly
Data Date

Short Sales
Index

TABLE B-l (CONTINUED)
Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Ba la nee
Ratio

Balance
I ndex

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

8-17-56
8-24-56
8-31-56
9-7-56
9-14-56

48.82
47.95
47.51
47.81
47.21

.7880
.7092
.7192
.7520
.7433

.8042
.7761
.7613
.7495
.7423

.6365
1.5534
1.0827
.5854
.5430

.6346
.8546
.9188
.8995
.8802

9-21-56
9-28-56
10-5-56
10-12-56
10-19-56

46.58
45.35
46.45
47.00
46.24

.6858
.6901
.5903
.6773
.7170

.7219
.7181
.6923
.6774
.6721

.6897
.8515
1.0085
.8882
.8537

.8908
.7505
.7356
.7962
.8583

10-26-56
11-2-56
11-9-56
11-16-56
11-23-56

46.27
46. 98
46.34
65.73
45. 14

.6890
.6639
.5946
.7437
.7389

.6727
.6675
.6684
.6816
.6860

.7438
.6323
.8217
.9472
1.3386

.8691
.8253
.7897
.7997
.8976

11-30-56
12-7-56
12-14-56
12-21-56
12-28-56

45.08
47.04
46.54
46.37
46.56

.7473
.7302
.8460
.8654
.8476

.6977
.7109
.7612
.7856
.8066

.6407
.5163
.4251
.4820
.6060

.8761
.8529
.7736
.6805
.5240

1-4-57
1-11-57
1-18-57
1-25-57
2-1-57

46.66
46.18
44.64
44.82
44.62

.7239
.6832
.6992
.7057
.7011

.8026
.7932
.7639
.7319
.7026

.7830
1.0085
1.0950
1.0843
.9670

.5625
.6609
.7951
.9155
.9877

Weekly
Data Date

SOURCE:

Short Sales
Index

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

TABLE B-2
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1957

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500* Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

5-17-57
5-24-57
5-31-57
6-7-57
6-14-57

47. 15
47.21
47.43
47.65
48.15

.9145
.9219
.8468
.8558
.8562

6-21-57
6-28-57
7-5-57
7-12-57
7-19-57

47. 15
47.37
48.69
49.08
48.38

7-26-57
8-2-57
8-9-57
8-16-57
8-23-57

Ba lance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
Index

.8790

1.1581
.7391
.8494
.6768
.6173

.8081

.8303
.7394
.7545
.8163
.8108

.8622
.8257
.8072
.7993
.7903

.8139
.5324
.5061
.6013
.4455

.7393
.6980
.6293
.6142
.5798

48.45
47.68
46. 92
45.83
44.51

.7844
.7397
.6924
.6861
.6525

.7811
.7811
.7687
.7427
.7110

.4647
.9071
1.0543
1.4485
1.8456

.5100
.5849
.6946
.8640
1.1440

8-30-57
9-6-57
9-13-57
9-20-57
9-27-57

45.22
44.68
44.80
43.69
42.55

.6527
.6950
.7248
.7290
.7136

.6847
.6757
.6822
.6908
.7030

2.3590
1.1876
1.3604
1.1712
1.8283

1.5229
1.5790
1.6402
1.5848
1.5813

10-4-57
10-11-57
10-18-57
10-22-57
10-25-57

42.79
40. 94
40.33
38.98
40.59

.6562
.7361
.6356

1.3269
2.3950
2.6629

1.3755
1.6164
1.8769

2.8312

2.2088

.7037
.7119
.6941
(bottom)- - .6718
.6175

•

TABLE B-2 (CONTINUED)

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

Balance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sa
Index

11-1-57
11-8-57
11-15-57
11-22-57
11-29-57

40.44
40.19
40.37
40.87
41.72

.6690
.7112
.7616
.8223
.8298

.6629
.6739
.6790
.7163
.7588

3.2895
3.1040
2.4309
2.3385
1.9249

2.5011
2.8565
2.8637
2.7988
2.6175

12-6-57
12-13-57
12-20-57
12-27-57
1-3-58

41.31
40.73
39.48
39.78
40.87

.8813
.9221
.9371
1.0561
.9050

.8012
.8434
.8785
.9253
.9403

1.0968
1.0548
1.2729
.7870
.7030

2.1790
1.7692
1.5376
1.2273
.9829

1-10-58
1-17-58
1-24-58
1-31-58
2-7-58

40.37
41. 10
41.71
41.70
41.73

.6142
.6792
.7727
.7562
.7555

.8869
.8383
.8054
.7455
.7156

2.6830
3.7000
2.3653
2.2495
2.0866

1.3001
1.8292
2.0476
2.3383
2.6150

2-14-58
2-21-58
2-28-58
3-7-58
3-14-58

41.33
40.88
40.84
42.07
42.33

.8688
.8480
.8597
.8212
.8693

.7665
.8002
.8176
.8306
.8534

2.6234
2.8624
2.8031
1.6621
1.9459

2.6031
2.4356
2.5232
2.4075
2.3792

TABLE B-2 (CONTINUED)

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

Balance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
Index

3-21-58
3-28-38
4-3-58
4-11-58
4-18-58

42.42
42.20
41.48
41.74
42.71

.8845
.8694
.7660
.8063
.8528

.8565
.8608
.8421
.8391
.8304

2.0515
1.5951
2.2099
2.1437
1.9003

2.2648
2.0113
1.8926
1.9890
1.9801

4-25-58
5-2-58
5-9-58
5-16-58
5-23-58

43.36
43.69
44.00
43.36
43.87

.8418
.8717
.8667
.9026
1.0090

.8219
.8223
.8425
.8617
.8984

1.7301
1.6681
1.6112
2.5474
1.3391

1.9158
1. 9304
1.8107
1.8914
1.7792

5-29-58
6-6-58
6-13-58

44.09
44.64
45.02

1.0046
.9964
1.0498

.9309
.9559
.9925

.9918
.8195
.8646

1.6315
1.4618
1.3125

SOURCE:

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

TABLE B -3
THE TOP OF I960

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
*500* Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Balance
I ndex

Short Sales
Index

7-17-59
7-24-59
7-29-59
7-31-59
8-7-59

59.41
59.65
60.62 - - - - 60.51
59.87

8-14-59
8-21-59
8-28-59
9-4-59
9-11-59

59.29
5 9.08
59.49
58. 54
57.41

.8060
.8328
.8707
.7816
.7848

.8571
.8437
.8437
.8194
.8152

1.0333
.8551
.7927
1.1739
1.8223

.5107
.6048
.6986
.8711
1.1355

9-18-59
9-25-59
10-2-59
19-9-59
10-16-59

56.09
56.73
57.20
57.00
57.33

.6901
.6491
.6883
.7694
.7755

.7920
.7552
.7188
.7163
.7145

1.8763
2.6656
2.0066
1.1229
1.0044

1.3041
1.6662
1.9089
1.8987
1.7352

10-27-59
10-30-59
11-6-59
11-13-59
11-20-59

56.56
57.52
57.60
56.85
56. 97

.8222
.7828
.8360
.8288
.8371

.7409
.7676
.7972
.8091
.8214

.9285
.9570
.8693
.6497
.6529

1.6567
1.2039
.9764
.8818
.8115

.9000
.8706
■

.3847
.3238
- -(top)

.8423
.8666

.3115
.5003

TABLE B-3 (CONTINUED)

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Rat io

Ba lance
index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
Index

11-27-59
12-4-59
12-11-59
12-18-59
12-24-59

57.70
58.85
58.88
59. 14
59.00

.8997
.8848
.9179
.9458
.9199

12-31-59
1-5-60
1-8-60
1-15-60
1-22-60

59.89
60.39 - - - - 59.50
58.38
57.38

.8945
.7029
.7184
.7233

1-29-60
2-5-60
2-12-60
2-19-60
2-26-60

55.61
55. 98
55.46
56.24
56. 16

.7695
.6532
.7338
.7299
.7798

.7617
.7135
.7196
.7219
.7332

.8081
1.1636
1.4312
1.3632
.8720

.5297
.7059
.9259
1.0844
1.1276

3-4-60
3-11-60

54.57
54.24

.8228
.7980

.7439
.772 9

1.0602
1.4229

1.1780
1.2299

SOURCE:

.8369
.8573
.8737
.8971
.9106

.8970
.4756
.3786
.4061
.3465

.2822
.9126
(ma r ke t top) - - - - .8762
.3316
.8363
.5706
.7918
.6558

.8052
.7089
.6602
.5620
.5008
.3778
-

-

-

-

-

.3490
.3874
.4373

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President
of the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

-

-

TABLE B-4
THE MARKET BOTTOM OF 1960

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'5001 Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

1-8-60
1-15-60
1-22-60
1-29-60
2-5-60

59.50
58.38
57.38
55.61
55.98

.7009
.7184
.7233
.7695
.6532

2-12-60
2-19-60
2-26-60
3-4-60
3-11-60

55.46
56.24
56.16
54.57
54.24

3-18-60
3-25-60
4-1-60
4-8-60
4-14-60
4-22-60
4-29-60
5-6-60
5-13-60
5-20-60

Balance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short S
Index

.7135

.3316
.5706
.6558
.8081
1.1636

.7059

.7338
.7299
.7798
.8228
.7980

.7196
.7219
.7332
.7439
.7729

1.4312
1.3672
.8720
1.0602
1.4229

.9259
1.0844
1.1276
1.1780
1.2299

55.01
55. 98
55.43
56.39
56.43

.8018
.8558
.8990
.8868
.9049

.7865
.8116
.8355
.8483
.8697

1.2994
.9190
.8131
.6793
.6911

1.2035
1.1147
1.1020
1.0267
.8804

55.42
54.37
54.75
55.35
55.83

.8684
.8483
.8311
.9040
.9364

.8830
.8815
.8679
.8713
.8776

.8923
1.1868
1.2115
1.1067
.6357

.7990
.8525
.9322
1.0177
1.0066

TABLE B-4 (COr^TINUED)

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor’s
'500' Composite
Stock Average

Weekly
Ba lance
Ratio

Balance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Rat io

Short Sales
Index

5-27-60
6-3-60
6-10-60
6-17-60
6-24-60

55.74
56.23
57.97
57.44
57.68

.9444
.9432
.9457
,9444
1.0176

.8928
.9118
.9347
.9428
.9591

.5923
.4792
.3617
.4071
.3572

.9466
.8051
.6351
.4952
.4395

7-1-60
7-8-60
7-15-60
7-22-60
7-29-60

57.06
57.38
56.05
54.72
55.51

.9354
.9280
.9215
.8850
.7913

.9573
.9542
.9494
.9375
.8922

.3464
.4149
.6661
.6470
1.4930

.3901
.3775
.4383
.4863
.7135

8-5-60
8-12-60
9-19-60
8-26-60
9-2-60

55.44
56.66
57.01
57.60
57.00

.8860
.9117
.9581
1.0075
.9906

.8824
.8791
.8864
.9109
.9508

1.4165
.8862
.6103
.5446
.7993

.9275
1.0218
1.0106
.9901
.8514

9-9-60
9-16-60
9-23-60
9-30-60
10-7-60

56.11
55.11
53.90
53.52
54.03

.9807
.9479
.8715
.9004
.7858

.967 9
.9770
.9596
.9382
.8973

.9410
1.0096
1.5789
1.7470
1.8723

.7563
.7810
.9747
1.2152
1.4298

10-14-60
10-21-60
10-25-60
10-28-60
11-4-60

54.86
53.32
52.30 - - - - 53.41
54. 90

.8650
.9291

2.1340
1.6875

1.6684
1.8039

2.4593
2.0129

1.9800
2.0332

.9208
.8978

.8741
.8704
(bottom) .8802
.8797

TABLE B-4 (CONTINUED)

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Price Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

Balance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
Index

11-11-60
12-18-60
11-25-60
12-2-60
12-9-60

55.87
55.82
56.13
55.39
56.65

.8235
.9838
1.0222
1.0650
1.1291

.8872
.9110
.0206
.9585
1.0047

1.8873
1.2574
1.0786
.9500
.9052

2.0362
1.8609
1.7391
1.4372
1.2157

12-16-60
12-23-60
12-30-60
1-6-61
1-13-61

57.20
57.44
58.11
58.48
59.60

1.1688
1.2147
1.1827
.8803
.8976

1.0738
1.1200
1.1521
1.1151
1.0686

.6271
.3764
.3235
.7134
.6553

.9637
.7875
.6364
.5891
.5391

1-20-61
1-27-61
2-3-61
2-10-61
2-17-61

59.96
61.24
62.22
61.50
62.10

.9696
.9965
.9230
1.0569
1.0401

1.0288
.9852
.9332
.9685
.9972

.6467
.5989
.4669
.4762
.3972

.5431
.5876
.6162
.5688
.5172

2-24-61
3-3-61
3-10-61
3-17-61
3-24-61

62.84
63.95
63.48
64.60
64.42

1.0307
.9888
1.0376
1.0132
1.0209

1.0094
1.0079
1.0308
1.0221
1.0182

.3593
.3431
.4103
.2872
.2417

.4597
.4085
.3972
.3594
.3283

3-30-61

65.06

1.0489

1.0219

.2010

.2967

SOURCE:

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

TABLE B-5
THE MARKET OF 1961-62

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Price Average

Weekly
Balance
Ratio

Ba la nee
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
Index

12-8-61
12-12-61
12-15-61
12-22-61
12-29-61

1.0724
72,04
72.64 - - - - ■
72.01
1.0147
1.0757
70.91
1.0627
71.55

1-5-62
1-12-62
1-19-62
1-26-62
2-2-62

69.66
69.61
68.75
68. 13
69.81

.8723
.8423
.9023
.9255
.9332

1.0196
.9735
.9511
.8889
.8963

.7909
1.1404
.9190
1.1986
1.1217

.4898
.6217
.7919
.8799
1.0341

2-9-62
2-16-62
2-23-62
3-2-62
3-9-62

70.48
70.59
70.16
70.16
70.42

.9471
1.0358
1.0317
1.0059
1.0182

.9113
.9500
.9747
.9907
1.0077

.7108
.5059
.7117
.6436
.5827

1.0181
.8912
.8317
.7387
.6309

3-16-62
3-23-62
3-30-62
4-6-62
4-13-62

70.94
70.45
69.55
68.84
67.90

1.0245
1.0729
1.0205
.9600
.9397

1.0232
1.0306
1.0284
1.0192
1.0035

.4196
.4560
.6704
.9592
1.1135

.5727
.5627
.5545
.6176
.7237

.4810
- - (top) .4378
.3887
.3506

TABLE B-5

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
'500' Composite
Price Average

(CONTINUED)

Weekly
Balance
Rat io

Balance
I ndex

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
I ndex

4-19-62
4-27-62
5-4-62
5-11-62
5-18-62

68.59
66.30
66.24
62 .65
67.82

.8993
.9541
.8656
.9933
.7588

.9785
.9547
.9237
.9304
.8942

1.1261
1.3957
2.1847
2.5185
3.5272

.8650
1.0530
1.3558
1.6677
2.1504

5-25-62
6-1-62
6-8-62
6-15-62
6-22-62

59.47
59.38
58.45
55.89
52.68

1.0164
.7292
.7696
.8884
.8820

.9176
.8727
.8535
.8325
.8571

4.5633
2.4080
6.1346
6.5628
6.4470

2.8378
3.0403
3.8303
4.6391
5.2231

6-26-62
6-29-62
7-6-62
7-13-62
7-20-62

52.32 - - - - 54.75
56. 17
57.83
56.81

7-27-62
8-3-62
8-10-62
8-17-62

57.20
58. 12
57.55
59.01

SOURCE:

.85.10
.6784
.7016
.8880
.9371
1.0174
1.0141
1.0689

- (bottom)
.8240
.8139
.8003
.8002
.8112
.8445
.9116
.9851

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5.9395
5.4675
5.0277
5.2376

5.4983
6.1102
5.8889
5.6238

3.5385
2.7137
2.6267
1.9173

5.0521
4.4070
3.8388
3.2167

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President of
the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

-

TABLE B-6
THE MARKET OF 1966

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard & Poor's
•500* Composite
Price Average

Weekly
Ba lance
Rat io

Balance
Index

.8985
.8840

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
I ndex

1-7-66
1-14-66
1-18-66
1-21-66
1-28-66

93.14
93.50
93.95 ........
93.47
93.31

.4802
.8220

.9316
.9023

2-4-66
2-11-66
2018-66
2-25-66
3-4-66

93.26
93.81
92.41
91.14
89.24

.8823
.9140
.9039
.9357
.7924

.8997
.9028
.9007
.9076
.8857

.8660
.6145
.6727
.6314
.8480

.6637
.6909
.6607
.6700
.7265

3-11-66
3-18-66
3-25-66
4-1-66
4-7-66

88.85
88.53
89.54
89.94
91.76

.7692
.8477
.8340
.9722
.9176

.8630
.8498
.8358
.8431
.8681

1.4028
1.7550
1.7727
1.2571
.8378

.8339
1.0620
1.2820
1.4071
1.4051

4-15-66
4-22-66
4-29-66
5-6-66
5-13-66

91.99
92.27
91.06
87.84
85.47

.9592
1.0191
.9543
.9632
.7972

.9061
.9404
.9645
.9627
.9386

.5956
.7571
.7432
1.4710
2.4455

1.2436
1.0441
.8382
.8809
1.2026

.(top) .
.5852
.5652

TABLE B-6 (CONTINUED)

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Price
of Standard and P o o r ’s
'500’ Compos ite
Price Average

Weekly
Balance
Rat io

Ba la nee
Index

Weekly
Short sales
Ratio

Short Sa
I ndex

5-20-66
5-27-66
6-3-66
6-10-66
6-17-66

85.43
87.33
86.06
86.44
86.51

.8448
.8003
.9121
.9675
.9715

.9157
.8720
.8635
.8644
.8992

3.3919
2.8157
2.8779
2.5962
1.7612

1.7617
2.1734
2.6004
2.8254
2.6885

6-24-66
7-1-66
7-8-66
7-15-66
7-22-66

86.58
85.61
87.61
87.07
85.41

.9558
.8314
.8667
1.0173
1.0053

.9214
.9277
.9186
.9285
.9353

1.4086
2.7324
2.0237
1.4096
1.5027

2.2919
2.2752
2.1044
1.8671
1.8154

7-29-66
8-5-66
8-12-66
8-19-66
8-26-66

83.60
84.00
83.17
79.62
76.41

.8121
.8088
.9492
. 9426
.7605

.9066
.9020
.9185
.9036
.8546

3.1799
2.8609
2.3776
2.4401
3.4199

2.1692
2.1949
2.2835
2.4900
2.8734

9-2-66
9-9-66
9-16-66
9-23-66
9-30-66

77.42
76.29
79.99
77.67
76. 56

.7068
.7493
.7193
.7897
.7500

.8336
.8217
.7757
.7451
.7430

5.1723
6.4280
4.9855
5.1584
4.7917

3.2719
3.9853
4.4891
5.0328
5.3071

TABLE B-6 (CONTINUED)

Weekly
Data Date

Weekly Closing Prices
of Standard & Poor's
’5001 Composite
Price Average

Weekly
Ba lance
Ratio

Balance
Index

Weekly
Short Sales
Ratio

Short Sales
Index

10-7-66(bottom)
10-14-66
10-21-66
10-28-66
11-4-66

73.20
76.60
78.19
80.24
80.81

.7713
.7802
.7851
.8379
.9221

.7559
.7621
.7753
.7849
.8193

7.6828
8.6667
6.7339
5.7088
4.6863

5.8092
6.2570
6.6067
6.7167
6.6957

11-11-66
11-18-66
11-25-66
12-2-66
12-9-66

81.94
81.26
80.85
80. 13
82.14

.9518
.9361
1.0801
1.2066
1.2001

.8554
.8866
.9456
1.0193
1.0749

3.1008
3.0028
3.0058
2.1920
1.3040

5.7793
4.6465
3.9009
3.1975
2.5210

12-16-66
12-23-66
12-30-66
1-6-67
1-13-67

81.58
81.47
80.33
82.18
84.53

1.2512
1.2665
1.2876
.8715
1.0227

1.1348
1.2009
1.2424
1.1754
1.1399

1.4732
.8422
.8788
2.0712
1.6706

2.1955
1.7634
1.3380
1.3139
1.3872

1-20-67
1-22-67
2-3-67
2-10-67
2-17-67

86.07
86.16
87.36
87.63
87.89

1.0363
1.0862
1.0912
1,0829
1.0950

1.0969
1.0609
1.0216
1.0639
1.0738

1.2333
1.2520
.9828
.9567
.9546

1.3392
1.4212
1.4420
1.2191
1.0759

SOURCE:

Table derived from raw data supplied by Walter A. Heiby, President
of the Institute of Dynamic Synthesis, Inc., Chicaog, Illinois.
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